BIG DATA, BIG LAW FIRMS & BIG BULLSHIT

According to the Gartner IT Glossary: “Big Data”* is high-volume, high-velocity, and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making. This is more or less how the idea of big data was first conceived. Now the three “V’s” have grown and grown; for example, some organizations have added Veracity another has added Vision.  There is nothing rigorous or complete built into the “V-system.” These “Vs” refer to, describe or portray the data sets that are involved in Big Data.   V words could be added by the many.  Many attractive V-words have not been added, e.g., Very, Voluptuous, Vane, Vindictive, Vigorous, and so forth  The same is true with respect to new V words that have large data groups that are not within the definition or specs for actually BIG DATA.  Real “Big Data” as opposed to data sets that are simply bit is probably not going to be found in the accumulated file of even a really BIG law firm.  It is more likely to be millions upon millions upon millions of “pieces” of data.  Its even billions of pieces sometimes. Here is how PC Magazine defined Big Data:Big Data refers to the massive amounts of data collected over time that are difficult to analyze and handle using common database management tools. Big Data includes [enormous and lengthy series of] business transactions, e-mail messages [by the millions, at least], photos [in similar volumes], surveillance videos, and activity logs. Scientific data from sensors can reach really mammoth proportions over time,  Social media are the same sort of thing. [A problem here is to guess at what might count as massive. Most lawyers–among others–could not really think realistically or concretely in such large terms.]

Wikipedia defines Big Data this way:Big data is a collection of data sets so large and complex that it becomes difficult to process using on-hand database management tools or traditional data processing applications.

“Difficult” is the wrong word here. Running the Library of Congress was difficult when it was done by hand; given that big data tools are now used, the matter is easier, even though massive + massive amounts of data and therefore information is collected and analyzed.—MSQ

The two types of functions are not, as it were, on the same planet.]  The challenges include capture, collection, storage, search, sharing, transfer, analysis, and visualization.

Not all of these are real problems in every case and/or together. It is not hard for Wal-Mart to collect its sales documents, although designing the collection methods may not have been easy.—MSQ

The trend to larger data sets is due to the additional information derivable from analysis of a single large set of related data, as compared to separate smaller sets with the same total amount of data, allowing correlations to be found to “spot business trends, determine the quality of research, prevent diseases, link legal citations, combat crime, and determine real-time roadway traffic conditions.”

Notice that none of what is said here amounts to asserting that one document, including all the forgoing, is automatically a separate category.  Ask yourself this:  Is a given document–its addressees, date, content, author, &c.–likely to be contained in one digit or one data point–especially if a discovering lawyer, for example, wants to know who knew what, from whom.  What about a document with a lot of pages? What a chain of emails? Here, more or less near the start of this discussion, is a good time to say that the truly extraordinary accomplishment involving big data involved correlations.  Asking simple questions like “Where is Michael today?”  Or, “Where was Michael yesterday?” may not be provide-able.—MSQ

Webapedia says this among many other things:Big data is a buzzword or catch-phrase, used to describe a massive volume of both structured and unstructured data that is so large that it’s difficult to process using traditional database and software techniques.  IBM defines big data as:Every day, we create 2.5 quintillion bytes of data — so much that 90% of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years alone. This data comes from everywhere: sensors used to gather climate information, posts to social media sites, digital pictures and videos, purchase transaction records, and cell phone GPS signals to name a few. This data is big data. [Here is another way to put this point. The amount of data in sets that count as big data is unimaginably huge.] Se Nate Silver, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE:  WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL–BUT SOME DON’T N.27-40 (2012).  Silver is a spectacle of predictions based simply on stats and another form of objectivity. ABA said this in its May 2013 issuance:Big data, loosely defined as the computer analysis of torrents of information to find hidden gems of insight, is slowly transforming the way law is practiced in the U.S. [Talk about bullshit, this is a paradigm.

(1) What is a “torrent” in ordinary English?  Relative to  “bigness” can some torrents be quite “small”? What is it a torrent of? What’s the significance of the torrent?  How fast was the torrent’s flow?  Not every torrent implies big data flowing. Indeed, most do not. Big data is very special.

It is also worth pointing out, here and now] that the word “torrent” has at least one special meaning in computer “jargon,” a name, to wit: “BitTorrent,” BitTorrent” protocol, and a few others.  Among other oddball facts the phraseology is linked up to the name “Pirate Bay,” but that is of doubtful significance here.  Most importantly, perhaps, is that a torrent is relatively small (around a few kilobytes), and that plainly has nothing to do with big data.  The ABA draws no distinction and doesn’t seem to realize that there are two very distinct usages, meanings, and ideas.  Here is a reasonable inference:  With respect to the ABA’s outlook, it cannot distinguish “shit from Shinola.”—MSQ

(2) What about the idea of “gems”?  [The ABA metaphor is nonsense. A gem is a relatively small object, like a diamond on a $1M Cartier necklace. Looking for a gem would be like digging around on a beach looking for something quite small.  That would work on a hypothesis that it–the single object–might be there. This is not the study or use of big data works. One is not looking for single objects; one is looking for huge patterns from which (at first) tentative conclusions can be drawn. The process is not a perfect one; it is not necessarily accurate; indeed, it has been called “messy” by some world-leading experts. Better to say that someone mining big data is looking for gold; at least it only comes in nuggets when it is in a river, or more likely very close to or under it.

In terms of what many lawyers do a lot of the time,  one of the central theses of the ABA’s article is especially absurd. Most lawyers do not themselves get involved with nearly enough documents to describe them as mining in, manipulating data “piles,” or pursuing correlations in the realm of big data.    No, or virtually no, suits involved big data, even if they involve a lot of data: enough for example to involve “predictive coding.”  Then again, no doubt there is probably some business transaction with might; consider a merger of Wal-Mart and Amazon.

In addition, at least as important, is the fact that virtually all lawsuits involve looking for causes. The function of analyzing big data is not to determine causation–the why–it is to determine the what, where, when.  Imagine trying any sort of case without trying to determine individual facts (“Did that doctor foul-up and why did he do it?) and relevant standards (“Did that accountant act in accordance with the applicable standard of care?) These are not the kind of analyses and conclusions that big data is likely to really be helpful to lawyers.

The ABA article talks about using big data to determine what other law firms are charging clients, what kinds of cases are being won or lost, summary judgments being granted or denied, and/or which courts grant what kinds of sanctions. It even says that big data will tell us why a judge refused to grant certain types of motions. At this last point, the ABA’s articles go well below the surface of nonsense.

Information regarding what other law firms are charging clients is probably not big data. There is not enough information. In addition, one law firm does have data regarding that kind of information, if it even exists. Moreover, knowing what other law firms are charging is not helpful. The contemplated and recommended analysis would have to do with what is being charged for what. Modest-sized real estate deals are not the same, so far as fees are concerned, when compared to gigantic antitrust cases or huge securities cases.  The reader must ask him/herself how the correlations might work, and also ask what was being correlated with what?

What matters in the analysis of big data–as everywhere else in the world of big data–is the what; the why is not–and cannot be–the focus. 

(1) Conjectures about the whys may be easier to work with,  if one has enough sufficient actual data. 

(2) Patterns of what large business clients (and small ones, for that matter) are easy for lawyers to figure out: “Ask them,” for one. thing.  This does not take big data, and that will certainly not solve “why” questions.  

(3) Only the area of gargantuan discovery–a very, very rare area–is the homeland of big data.  I just read 20,000 documents.  This was not big data, or anything even close to it.

(4) There is even less data for determining what judges are doing. Besides, judges have to be divided into subcategories: What jurisdiction? What issues? and so forth. Big Data will not reveal what judge is making the decisions s/he is making.  Here is a big data question: How many times does the word “idiot” appear in Texas appellate cases. Of course, that information can be retrieved from two Big Data archives.

The data numbers that “move” in big data circles are measured by exponential multiples: 1, 2, 3, 4 of 1024. They have separate names. Starting with bits, there are bytes, kilobytes, megabytes, gigabytes, and so forth, the numbers go up with amazing “speed.  Maybe the reader might wish to square 1024, then cube it,  then keep going up the steep incline to big data–amounts “galaxies” larger than “predictive coding.”   I doubt that there are anywhere near the number of law firms doing business work and having more than 60 lawyers in the United States, or even a total staff, that would in any way close to big data, or even remotely near those kinds of numbers. I doubt that the total number of lawyers in the U.S. is enough to, as a general rule,  generate enough data a year to enter into the category of big data.  Or, at any rate, enter that class and generate useful commercial information.

The ABA is not the worst offender at producing bullshit, so far as law firms are concerned, though its view is god awful. Consider a remark by Sol Irvine the author. Before recently, he says, but presumably, before the rise of big data, lawyers were essentially glorified librarians.” Few statements about what lawyers do could be more mistaken.

If one considers the following list, it is easy to see concretely why law firms are not situated in the big data “marketplace.”  I am also inclined to wonder whether the reviews universities do on their online course when used by students are within reach of actual big data treasure troves. Marc Parry, Big Data on Campus, NYT July 18, 2012.

Google’s location of the swine flu epidemic,learning airline ticket flux and timing itGoogle mapWal-Mart daily salesAmazon’s salessame for Targetrecords of national and international  bank transactions (e.g., debit cards use)construction of world wide interconnected transaction on a nearly basis,Visa daily trackingZestFinancial studiesAvia, Prudential, and AIG premium calculationsimmunizationspremium baby problems built on a huge amount of data (relatively small)Sloan Digital Sky Survey (in contrast)UPS truck repair timingmanhole cover explosion problems (few manholes, 94,000 or so, but much other measured)Google’s book collectingKindleGPSspell checkers and their expansions (Google and Microsoft)the U.S. governments checking on calls, etc.,  among citizensthe US government’s checking incoming calls, emails, and who knows what elseAnd so forth

Of course, this is an incomplete list.  It is also obvious that law firms are almost never involved in collecting this kind of data.  Most of the ideas in the forgoing list have been extracted from  Victor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, BIG DATA: a REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK.  (2013).  —MSQ

The first listed author is a professor at the Oxford Internet Governance and Regulation at Oxford University and the second is a journalistic commentator for several world-respected newspapers and journals.  He is now the editor at the Economist, perhaps the world’s leading economics and finance (among other things) weekly.  Some of the ideas explored in this blog come from this very helpful source.

The unhelpful literature on big data–really advertisements from law firms and vendors for law firms–continues.  In addition, most of these ads either conceal or don’t know the difference between “lots of data”–as in pricing-history and current-pricing with 1000 clients–and “big data.” 

Of course, there is another category: pricing history with 5000 former clients–a useless enterprise if ever there was one for determining future pricing based on then-current market conditions and business sociology.  Other ads come from vendors of big data services, although they do not explain what they proposed to deliver. —MSQ

One of the vendors went so far as to suggest that the institution of e-discovery in rules of evidence is one of the principal causes of the way big data could (and should) be used by law firms “today and tomorrow.” This proposition something like the ABA could have been published.

The only vendor that I   can recall is that of a vendor of big data-based services that admitted that 100M documents were big for it to handle.  Another one, at least impliedly, indicates that law firms are not likely to be able to do this by themselves and should form coalitions to hire outside vendors.

 This is in contrast to an ad published by a law firm (while trying not to look like it) which says that the law firm among many which do not engage in digitizing and “data-fying” its own files will have real trouble as a law firm. “Real trouble” in the arena of businesses, even those of professionals, in the end, means “serious money [or profit] troubles.  Look at what happened to the formerly celebrated  Dewey firm.

As a whole slew of magazine pieces, there are law firms, always named, obviously seeking business–so far as I can tell–but not actually talking about “big data” in their texts, except in the headline of the ad.  They certainly do not explain big data at all.  Perhaps it’s better this way since it is reasonable to infer that they have no real idea what they are talking about.

An important relatively new practice is the electronic storage of information. Clouds are a big deal.  Law firms use them extensively, and they have contributed to new discovery rules in civil cases. They are being used more and more. There are a number of different ways to do this, but in large cases, a court recently approved “predictive coding” as a sound methodology in at least some cases. The Magistrates opinions in Moore v. Publicis Groupe & Publicis Groupe & MSL, 287 F.R.D. 182 (2012) are helpful about the lingo and how for conflicting sides to get a relevant job done.  It is not about the contrast between the object of predictive coding and the use of big data. In fact, Judge Peck avoids the phrase “big data” and speaks only of “large data,” i.e., a data set that is large.   It is either fashionable or some sort of misunderstanding of the language and concepts of big data. 

Interestingly, there were 3m pieces of data in the case before the job, but, it looks like, it was mostly emailed.  In addition, in the grand scheme of big data problems, when that phrase is used correctly, 3m is not actually that large.

Perhaps both of these ideas apply since the locution “big data” is now a “buzz phrase,” and therefore almost certainly, at best, misused, misunderstood, set forth incoherently given the proximate science, and false.

Advocates of conclusions based on “buzz phraseology” should be thought of as epistemological “buzz-ards” and therefore not worth listening to. In any current culture, when that phrase is closely connected (or what might be called “ontologically” connected) to any concept or words, the connection always gets things wrong, though it may get a little bit of its “picture” almost right.

It may be reasonably conjectured that Big Data if correctly and adequately conceived,  will play very little (if even that much) of a role in litigation.  (1)  The amounts of data are way, way too large for the purposes and sizes of most lawsuit discovery, not to mention the amounts of money required and available to do it.  (2) In addition, in “predictive coding” discovery methodology, the method of discovery techniques must start with a set of alterable hypotheses specified (or approved) in advance by the participating lawyers (perhaps with technical assistance—as in “These terms, x, y, z, (etc.) will provide valuable guidance to important documents.”  Then those terms are run through the database containing possible relevant documents, to look for key terms, which will help reduce the number of documents that need to be retrieved in order for the parties either (a) to accept the search list, or (b) to contest it, probably with arguments, expert witnesses, and/or to provide concrete alternatives. 

Successive searches may be conducted to provide a reasonable reduction in the available hoard of documents. Then the very large “stack” may be searched again and again, probably with a more expanded list.   Maybe the list will not be expanded; perhaps some terms will be eliminated and others will be substituted.  The components on the discover-the-really-relevant-document lists are not random compilations. 

There is an old saying: ENOUGH IS ENOUGH. This blog post violates that rule.  Its axiom is apparently: SOMETIMES AUTHORS THINK READERS NEED MORE THAN ENOUGH. Some times, readers might be right. —MSQ

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Expert Witness: What Not to Do

Earlier in 2013, there was a legal malpractice case involving the FDIC and a group of lawyers representing a Florida bank. The issues involved standard of care and legal ethics. The FDIC’s expert witness was Lawrence Fox, a heavy hitter when it comes to these issues.  He’s in the league of the best and the brightest, for example, Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. and the like.  A professor of law and legal ethics from the University of Miami also testified.  He swore that Fox (or Fox’s view) was “totally inaccurate.”  While Drinker may have exaggerated a bit–who knows–it was a very bad idea to call his view “totally inaccurate.”  A complex assertion containing one or more mistakes (even important mistakes) is one thing; being totally inaccurate is another. (It may have been a mistake for Drinker to say that the situation he was analyzing was the worse example of what he had ever seen of the type in controversy.) A set of propositions is totally anything if and only if every single component of the set has the property of being whatever that anything actually is. Obviously, this principle applies to truth and falsity. Go a step further.  Even if all asserted conclusions are wrong, for a view to be totally wrong, none of the premises given to support the conclusion could have one sense of truth to them. And none of the arguments could be approaching validity. 

Thus, expert testimony can be totally inaccurate only if every conclusion is false; every premise is false; and none of the arguments is logically valid, perhaps even a trifle (if there is such a thing).—MSQ

Experts are not the only “idiots” of semantics and rhetoric.  Lawyers themselves often make this particular mistake in arguments.  I will not say that the mistake is totally inaccurate when it comes to effective speech.  Surely they do not embrace the principle that the complex and coherent views can be “totally wrong.”  In connection with all of this, one wonders if a deductive argument can be “inaccurate,” unless inaccuracy is equivalent to invalid.  Even unsound arguments can be valid if their premises are false.  Remember, some unsound arguments can produce conclusions that are true.  Maybe this erroneous view of rhetoric depends on the idea that no complex views containing mistakes are coherent. Of course, maybe it’s that the incoherent views are never really complex. These views are inaccurate, in some sense,  I guess, but even I can think of propositions that keep them from being totally inaccurate   To look at another, similar example of terms not to use, the nearly constant, ubiquitous use of the term “outrageous” is one example.  It has lost nearly all of its influence in legal circles, and that is unfortunate. Notice I did not say that the ballooning of the use of the term is rhetorically outrageous. Additionally, this one comes from general usage.  Much discourse on public affairs and therefore political ideas where there are any doubts of controversy, is, these days, said to be or need a “conversation.”  This idea clearly presupposes that there is such a thing as a national conversation.  And/or that there can be such a thing. Conversations are personal;  they arise in person-to-person encounters.  It may make more sense to conjecture having some of a local conversation rather than a nationwide conversation.  A small city counsel actually does have conversations. Having discussions is much the same way a conversation. Instead of the term “conversation,” the right language for politics is “debate” or “dispute.”  The underlying idea is to destroy the idea of opposition, log jam, lasting disagreement, intractability, the raised voice, shouting, accusations, and “nasty” political cartoons.  I love conversations and often participate in them, even about some political matters.  Not all debates can be civil.  Now, there’s a good idea, and legal professionalism virtually requires it.  Reason and rationality do not entail that a debate is a conversation.  Not even the best-run trial involves having conversations; the same is true even in the Supreme Court; there can be conversations in negotiations. The best thought about having a nationwide (or worldwide) conversation about a given proposition–as opposed to linguistic chaos–is that the idea is equivalent to restrained, civil, and reasonable debate.  In my view, any stretch far beyond this constitutes a revolt against a centuries-old, consensus-based, undoubtedly sensible, and productive doctrine of governance for proper language.  Advocating its overthrow is semantic treason. Although it is difficult to stomach, making the word “text” into a verb (as in “She texted her lover, but she was not texted back by him, although he vowed to text here in the future.  She responded, to his no-texting failure by saying, “Your failure to text me is anathema.  If you are not texting me in the future frequently,  I will go back to reading the texts I often receive from your soon-to-be former wife. You might as well be told.  She will continue to text me for years to come since she is my twin sister, and we text each other all the time, often about what you have been texting me about.”)

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Law Firms Dismiss Legal Secretaries

It has been reported that many larger law firms are firing considerable numbers of staff members, supposedly, for financial reasons. Whether this is to increase profits or avoid the fate of the Dewey firm is not clear. For the purposes of these remarks, it does not matter. (I shall refer to legal secretaries in the feminine. That is unfair, of course, since there are male legal secretaries, but they are a minority, so gender will be ignored.) Why are they in particular being let go? Here are the alternative mentioned: (1) not enough to do; (2) lawyers don’t need them anymore, since dictation is no longer used much, except for geezer lawyers; (3) they are the workers of yesteryear and the world has changed, so they are really not useful; (4) paralegals can do things legal secretaries cannot; (5) legal secretaries do not know about electronic cyber stuff, and they can’t or won’t learn, besides teaching this sort of thing is expensive. This action is ill-advised. Legal secretaries know more than most others in the firm as to how it works, who is who, what is what, who has “connections” with whom, and so forth. To a considerable extent, they are the glue of the firm. In addition, secretaries for lawyers who manage firms help them with the kind of knowledge, which can be described as significant “revealing gossip.”  Capable firms and business managers all say that having this sort of information is a boon.  (Of course, the hearer must actually,  appreciate what is being said.) There is little that an experienced legal secretary cannot be taught. (The word “trained” carries the wrong connotation.)  If one cannot be educated, is unwilling to learn, or is unwilling to try to do new stuff, and if there are really no “leftovers” then she has to go.  Indeed, if there is a target for who to let go first, it would be one of these persons arranged from worse to best, with the former going before the latter. In case of a tie, keep the one that has been at the firm the longer, so long as that person so long as there is retrainability.  (For a somewhat analogous situation, see Kim Farmer “When Your Office Is Someone Else’s Home,”  Jobs Section, Sunday NYT 8 (June 23, 2013) (An interesting problem is how to handle the secretary who has been at the firm for 10 years, but at a similar for the 10 previous years.  How do you count the previous 10 years? I conjecture, on the basis of my experience, that secretaries can do all sorts of things. For example, if there is a document search going on, secretaries can do all the work, even if Big Data problems are involved. Today’s paralegals will still have lots and lots still to do. For example, they can do what some of the inexperienced young lawyers do and hate doing. Junior lawyers in large firms are said to find their jobs unpleasant and quit in a relatively short period of time, 3 years or less.  It is unlikely that paralegals will act in accordance with the same timetable. The ousting process with paralegals could use the same criteria: the worst go first and the best go last. In case of a tie, keep the one that has been there the longest, assuming that new directions are achievable. This system is not only sound management, quite potentially profitable,  and exemplary loyalty, it is realistically pursuing good public relations.  Use the local papers.  Use NLJ.  Use AmJ.  And so forth. “We don’t do it like other ___________ in this profession.”  (Of course, it is also a business, but that need not be emphasized. Of course, do this again with the youngest of the lawyers. In addition, at least some observers now claim that many–even most–young lawyers in large firms are unhappy, clear out within the first few years and that it would be good for them (and for the firm) to go earlier and find something they really want to do.  Is the same true of the secretary who has been in place for years, has lots of friends know some of the lawyers–and sometimes their families–well?  I hypothesize that the reader already knows the answer. 

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LAWYERS, NON-CLIENTS, AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION.

The common law of Texas and most other law “making” jurisdictions relatively recently have adopted the view that lawyers can be sued for negligent misrepresentation to non-clients.  McCamish, Martin, Brown [and] Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1999).  This rule is subject to some limitations.

Obviously, there is nothing wrong with this view as a practical matter and even a theoretical one, I suppose.  It seems to me, however, that whenever a lawyer makes a misrepresentation to what or who appears to be a non-client, as to a matter connected to the law, even if it’s a factual matter, the lawyer has entered into a lawyer-client relationship.

The reason to draw the distinction between false representation to clients and misrepresentations to non-clients is simply the criteria for when a relationship become an attorney-client relationship. A chat in a grocery story, or one with a friend in the middle of the night, or when both are rather drunk or high, may not be an attorney client relationship, since neither person believes that it is. Of course this case is limited in various insensible ways.

I am inclined to think that the opposite is true, or nearly true.  If a lawyer asserts to a person that a contract contains a particular obligation, or language that creates an obligation, then the attorney-client relation has  probably–indeed, almost certainly–been created.  I think this is obvious if the lawyer has a duty to make a representation, e.g., because of an “order” from a client–or, as I would put it–a client who becomes another client. See Blankinship v. Brown, 2003 WL 1281763 (Tex. App.–Dallas, March 14, 2013). The misrepresentation, if any, is made at a relevant time.

In closing, consider the following: There are three people in a room. The lawyer makes a representation to A but not to B, and the representation is false. Does B have a right to recover? Now try this one. L provides its client A with advice, which contains a false proposition that L has asserted, among other places in a letter which does not say “For the Client Only” and A provides it to B in order to close a deal. Or, A says to L, “Give this to B; it will help close the deal.”

In any case, in my view, both causes of action should be pleaded and not eliminated until after discovery.

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An Elementary Discussion: Definitions and Endorsements in Contracts of Insurance

The What & The Where

This post will discuss the role of definitions in insurance policies in abstracto first. I confess, however: there are a few practical points here and there.

The definitions to be found in all contracts of insurance are at least as important as the “insuring agreements,” which try to say “what-all” is insured and the “exclusions,” which subtract from the insuring agreement.  Each separate category of what is included in the specifications of what is insured are more-or-less stated separately and identified by letters (A., a., (a), and so forth),  numbers of one sort ((1), 1., (ii), IV, iv) or another, or both letters and numbers. Roman numerals are both letters and numbers, of course.  (I tend to conceive of categorical limits in insuring agreements as really exclusions, but mine is a distinctly minority position.)

The definitions help understand the general terms.  For example, for many, many years the term “occurrence” has been mostly defined as “an accident.”  This focuses the term “occurrence,” admittedly not very well or completely, but it is far better than nothing, as courts have recognized.

This feature of definitions is of crucial importance in the new cyber-world. Sometimes, the terms there are invented for the policy itself, and it obviously needs specification and clarification. One can easily imagine in today’s world that a lawyer’s not being familiar (or not getting familiar) with the vocabulary of cyber-world vocabulary and discourse might be malpractice. The vigorous study of definitions might help with this.

Definitions help understand the meaning of the propositions in which they occur. The phrase “personal injury” deviates from common usage in frequently used liability policies, so it needs to be defined. Knowledge of vocabulary and definitions is  especially important when there are several ways to refer to the same sort of thing or several ways to describe a given statement.  Consider maritime law, in addition to the law of the cyberworld.

Judge Easterbrook one time said that there is not more new law for the cyberworld than there has been for dealing with horses.  He is wrong beginning with definitions and their nature as of now.  Consider the relationship between possible law and possible codes  

Definitions are also helpful in discarding ambiguities. It is helpful in dealing with drafting blunders and/or poor thinking. Definitions may also be crucial in the avoidance of trickery and/or the achieving balances of interests. Both of these propositions are true and important because, if for no other reason, ambiguities must be interpreted in favor of any party to any contract, and therefore contracts of insurance, that did not draft the contract or substantially participate in drafting it. Of course, in the present day, insureds only infrequently draft even parts of insurance contracts. The exceptions are those complex policies that are individually designed.

Perhaps sophisticated insureds that select between two or more available policies and/or more than one available endorsement and that really understand them, including their differences, should be treated like someone who has participated in drafting the contract of insurance. Even in these cases, definitions are extremely important.—MSQ

The main bodies of insurance policies are seldom like that–drafted by the insured or by insurers in conjunction with insureds, but endorsements are occasionally constructed cooperatively. Very seldom has it been seriously considered that in part of a policy language a term is to be treated as ambiguous, but not in another part of the same policy. Clearly such a thing is conceptually possible. It is a bit more common for insurance intermediaries to be involved in drafting policies.This matter will come up again.

Sometimes one party’s legal agent has drafted the whole insurance contract, or a lot of it, and submits it to both sides. If there is ambiguity, then the party for whom the intermediary is not a legal agent would be entitled the benefits resulting from ambiguous language. Interestingly, many participants in the insurance industry do not know for whom brokers are legal agents, and they sometimes get brokers and insurance agents reversed or otherwise wrong, when they think about legal agency and both brokers and agents in the same thoughts.

Definitions like all other parts of insurance policies can themselves be subject to ambiguity. This is true, even though they are specifically designed, in part, to guarantee the non-existence of ambiguity. Of course, if the term being defined–the definiendum–is ambiguous in the definition, it was already ambiguous when it got into the endorsement. What is of interest is where an ambiguity of a substantive term, found in the definition, is by itself, or is part of, the definiens.

In the present day, standard policies are not actually drafted by insurers, but are prepared by entities hired by the individual insurers or hired by a group of insurers. Sometimes the entities that draft standard contracts do this first and then offer them to insurers or groups of insurers. More frequently, nowadays, drafting entity has committees of professionals appointed by a variety of  insurers, supposedly improved policies, or constructing wholly new policies. One of the main topics involved in the drafting of policies is the definitions; drafting committees spend an immense amount of time drafting definitions and getting them approved by the participating carriers.

As already indicated, definitions are also important to endorsements. Endorsements can be divided into all sorts of groups. One important type of group includes these. (1) There are endorsements that add  new parts onto a policy; (2) there are other endorsements that alter parts of policies; and (3) there are endorsements which eliminate provisions of policies. Generally speaking, endorsements that alter policies formally struck some part and add something in its place. There can be endorsements changing other endorsements, eliminating parts from other endorsements, or simply adding parts on. Of course, definitions can be extremely important to each of (1)-(3).

There can be many different types of endorsements for a given type of policy. Property policies on the inventories of car dealerships are a good example of frequently changing endorsements especially pertaining to the contents of the declarations pages of a policy. These can be hundreds of pages long. They are drafted and agreed upon, usually through a broker, during the period of the policy.

Even declaration pages are subject to the use of definitions straight away and through endorsements.

In considering standardized endorsements, it is worth noting that sometimes available endorsements are on the same topic but involve quite different provisions.  Endorsements are usually numbered to fit with given policies, but there is no standard numbering system across different policies or different kinds of policies.  The ordering of the endorsements can have impact of the definitions.

When a whole policy is presented as a “package policy,” i.e., a policy covering quite different categories of events, e.g., liability policies and property policies or as a “blanket policy,” i.e., one that covers a whole variety of types of acts, events, things, entities, or patterns that are all in the same general category.  Definitions may be needed to specify the category or definitions to indicate what is included in that category.  This can be especially important in policies for the cyberworld. 

In an “every day” insurance policy, there are not usually many endorsements, and they are all short.  As a general rule, they do not formulate new definitions. In more complex policies–usually policies involving lots of money, often business policies–there can be a great many endorsements, and some of them can be quite complex, adding up to numerous pages. Recently, I say a cyber liability endorsement that was 30 pp. long attached as an endorsement to a standard Commercial General Liability policy. (Of course, not all complex policies are business policies.) Consider for example art and jewelry policies for very wealthy people when some of their “stuff” is at one or another of their homes, some is on a family yacht, some is on loan to a museum, and some is in a bank vault.

Now we arrive at the most important part of this discussion of endorsements and definitions. As already indicated, definitions in endorsements can be designed to affect the main body of a policy. Everything a definition in an endorsement can do to or for terms in the main body of a policy, it can do to or for terms in other endorsements; in other words, it can change other endorsements, sometimes quite radically. It should be noted that there can be layers of endorsements. In theory at least, definitions in upper layers could not only change definitions in lower layers, they can restore definitions x layers down.

Returning to definitions considered just by themselves, where do they go, and where should they go.  Here are least some of the alternatives:

after the insuring agreement,after both the insuring agreement and the exclusions,right after the pages containing declarations–that is first, when matters of substance are concerned,here and there, e.g.,  some first, some after the insuring agreements, some after the exclusion section, some after this sub-sub-section or that one, i.e., scattered around,after the section containing the conditions ( near the end of the policy), andperhaps elsewhereThere are no rules about how it must be done or how it cannot be done. There is a consensus that definitions could not be placed after the section for endorsements. There are definitions that may be changed, and besides endorsements can create new definitions.

The way it is generally done is that the definition section comes right after the insuring agreement and then the exclusion section. This is so general that it feels odd to see a policy do it differently.

All defined terms in policies are designated somehow, these days usually by bold lettering, but other ways in yesteryear, e.g., italics and before that with quotation marks.  (In much earlier times, there were no definitions at all.  Property policies in the Eighteenth and part of the Nineteenth Century were like that, at least much of the time.)

Myself, I think the best place to put the definitions is first. Browsing through them prepares the reader for the rest of the policy.  They are easier to find when one studies a policy. If they are listed elsewhere, the reader of a policy will often need to mark them with a tab for make finding easier. Endorsements alter, eliminate or transform definitions in the main body of the policy.  Probably there will need to be marginalia about changes coming from endorsements. It is easier to deal with this later when all the definitions are situated before the insuring agreement and right after the dec. pages.. Of course this is more true–truer and truer (if that idea makes sense)–as the text of the policy lengthens.

Of course, the problem could also be solved by having a page by page table of contents.  Some insurers do this, but not many, and then only with the most standard of all policies.  Obviously, it is virtually impossible to scatter endorsements. around.

What should never be done is to scatter definitions around the policy.  This is true even if the definition is used only once. 

It is worth mentioning that sometimes endorsements are put at the first of the policy.  This is true, so far as I can tell, for no very good reason.  However, it stands in the way of having genuine clarity as to the location of definitions.

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Reasonable minds almost certainly adapt to, or change, in some strikingly different situations. When advocates argue different positions at different times, they have not necessarily changed their minds about anything.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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