LEGAL FEES–THE UNREASONABLE AND THE UNCONSCIONABLE

PERMISSIBLE
LEGAL FEES–A DISCOURSE 

Michael Sean Quinn*

www.michaelseanquinn.com

          Lawyering
is a noble profession. After all, it has to do with establishing justice and
maintaining social stability. The “establishing justice” dimension of legal
practice includes both establishing it in general and establishing it in
individual cases.

At the same time it is a source of livelihood
and therefore a business. In the world we live in, lawyering is a high prestige
business in which one can reasonably expect to make a living of substantial
size and sometimes of an enormous size. 
Thus fees are important, but they must also be just, honest, and fair,
among other things.  They must fall
within the ambient of the socially acceptable.

This is a discourse of one features of evaluating legal fees. There are many other dimensions. What counts as acceptable billing practice is another one. 

Determining whether given legal fees are acceptable
is a multidimensional matter, but the official ethical rules governing lawyer
conduct are important. They are so important, in fact, that they are often
translated, as it were, into the criteria the judiciary uses in arriving at
judgments as to the acceptability and therefore the enforceability of disputed
fees that come before it. 

In this essay, I want to consider two
foundational rules in two different systems for governing legal ethics. They
are designed to play the same function in their respective ethical systems, but
they are quite different as to key wording and so may be quite different as to
interpretation and application.

One of these rules is Rule 1.5(a) in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association (2014). It’s
this:

A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect
an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.

The other one
is Rule 1.04(a) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. It’s
this:

A lawyer shall not enter
into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or unconscionable
fee. A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable
belief that the fee is reasonable. [Emphasis added,]

In the first sentences of these two rules there are only three
substantive differences regarding fees, or that’s the way I see it anyway.  (1) The Texas Rule uses the phrase “enter
into an arrangement,” while, the ABA Rule uses the phrase “make an agreement.”
Conceptually, as opposed to rhetorically, these are the same thing.  (2) The Texas Rule explicitly forbids an
illegal fee, while the ABA Rule does not. But no reasonable fee could possibly
be illegal as between a lawyer and a client. And (3) the ABA Rules uses the
words “unreasonable fee,” while the Texas Rule uses the words “unconscionable
fee.” (Notice that I am not discussing expenses.)

For now, I am also talking only about the first sentence of the Texas
Rule.  I will get to the second sentence
presently. Thus, the term “unconscionable” is the topic.  Significantly, perhaps, there are distinct
usages (and therefore, meanings) for this term.

What is the common, ordinary meaning of that term? Intuitively,
something is unconscionable if it is contrary, when correctly conceived, to the
objective conscience. In
other words, it is contrary to propositions the objective and informed
conscience; it is unacceptable to the objective and informed conscience; it
cannot be brought within the informed and objective conscience.

WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY gives a
definition like this. Its #1 entry is “not guided by or controlled by
conscience,” and it list “unscrupulous” as a synonym and associates the term
with villainy. Its #2a entry is synonyms, and they are “excessive” and
“exorbitant.”  It #2b is “lying outside
the limits of what is reasonable or acceptable: shockingly unfair, harsh, or
unjust: outrageous.

The definition of “unconscionable” in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY is
roughly similar. The first definition is, when said of a person, “having no
conscience—unscrupulous. The second is, when said of a transaction, “showing no
regard for conscience; affronting the sense of justice, decency, or
reasonableness.

In either dictionary, the theme is ethics and morals, and
“unconscionable” does not just include merely light cases of the unreasonable,
such as inattention, a little sloppiness, not paying attention, or a little
stumbling here and there. It doesn’t come in bits and pieces or crumbs.

Thus, the criteria for a fee are being unconscionable in the
second sentence of Rule 1.04(a)—the reasonable belief of the competent lawyer
that a fee is not reasonable—must be understood in contexts.  And the context is this: that of a fiduciary
and that would include maximal loyalty, the duty of the zealous pursuit of the
client’s interests, and the subordination of the interests of the lawyer to the
interests of the client.  The reasonable
belief of the competent lawyer must apply to that situation: the lawyer is the
client’s fiduciary and hence the duties owed by the lawyer and hence the rights
the client has.

The use of the term “reasonable” in the second sentence of
1.04(a) does not exhaust the meaning of the terms “conscionable” and
“unconscionable,” though it is certainly also true that a lawyer as a party to
a client-attorney contract has a duty to charge unreasonable fees and that he
is not entitled to collect them by the contract, since his breach is material.  

Of course, it may also be true that if an attorney-client
agreement, arrangement, or contract is itself unconscionable, then the fees
specified in that contract are also unconscionable. They surely must be
unreasonable under contract law, at least because the contract has bad faith
built into it.  Plainly, if the
relationships outlined here are correct, all unconscionable fees are
unreasonable, though not all unreasonable fees, while uncollectable under
contract law, are not in and of themselves unconscionable. (Crumbs are not
slices, and slices are not loaves, though if crumbs have mold on them, the
slice should almost certainly not be eaten, nor—probably—should the loaf,
especially because not all poisons are visible.)

There is a good deal more to be said, of course, but that’s
all for now. In closing, however, it is good to keep in mind that 1.04 is a disciplinary rule; the law of fiduciary duties consists of other rules and principles; and the law of ordinary contracts consists of yet another set of rules and principles.  In the midst of this “jungle,” it must always be remembered that lawyers are fiduciaries, and those rules apply to them. (I use the word “jungle” partly because it is a cliche-is metaphor for complexity, but it is also a good thing to remember that the ethical rules governing rules (whether disciplinary or not, whether rules of law or otherwise) and the law and ethics of fiduciaries are itertwined.  

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D.,
J.D. Etc.

The Law Firm of Michael Sean Quinn and

Quinn and Quinn

                                 1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208

                                             Austin,
Texas 78703

                                                 (512)
296-2594

                                            (512)
344-9466 – Fax

                                E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com

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Tatoos, Criminal Trials, and Legal Ethics

MURDER ACCUSATIONS,
TEMPORARY TATOO CONCEALMENT, AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Michael Sean Quinn*

www.michaelseanquinn.com

            Each of the following men, X, Y, and
Z, is to be conceived as a defendant accused of murder in a Florida state
court.  In addition, each of them had
tattoos visible to ordinary observers. One of them, Y, has very controversial
tattoos, including “Fuck you” and a swastika plus a line of  Frankenstein-like stitches down his face. 

Each of these defendants requested that he be provided with makeup
of cosmetic services to conceal them.

In the case of X, his lawyer applied them from a supply
provided him by the relatives of the client, i.e., the accused.

In the case of Y, the court ordered the services of a
cosmetologist at $ 100.00 a day.

In the case of Z, the judge refused to provide a make-up
artist.  The press report does not say
whether Z could use the “X-option.”

I have doubts about permitting this sort of thing at
all.  The accused is trying to conceal an
important feature of who he really is, and it seems arguable to me that the
jury should actually see him.  I can’t
imagine that there is a 5th Amendment right to conceal the “Fuck
You” locution you have stamped on your forehead. 

For me the more interesting question is the case of X.  In that case X’s lawyer was applying the
makeup him/herself.  (I am not trying to
guess whether the lawyer was male or female, though I certainly couldn’t do it,
nor can any of the men I know, granted that I am a bit of an introvert and may
simply have never had sufficiently intimate conversations with males to be in
the know.) In any case I wouldn’t do it; I’m sure I don’t know how, and I doubt
I would want to learn. 

In any case,  I feel certain that that this fact does not diminish my credentials as a capable
lawyer. Then again, maybe I’m wrong. I certainly had a duty to zealously pursue my client’s interests and to zealously advocate his case. Does the fiduciary level of loyalty require that I do a makeup job on him?

The problem of the lawyer for X is that s/he was helping X
present something false to a tribunal., namely “who” he was.  Lawyers are forbidden from doing this when it
is testimony (the hear-able) or documents (the readable). So isn’t there
something wrong about a lawyer helping a client conceal from the triers of fact
the actual physical appearance of the defendant.

Suppose a man with a swastika tattooed on his face, and he
was accused of the murder a Jew—say, a militant West Bank radical
sympathizer.  Surely that particular
tattoo on X’s face would be relevant to some degree to determining something
relevant to the charge.  The court is not
demanding that he say anything. It is simply requiring him to appear as he
really is.

Surely, if the alleged murder had occurred 10 year before,
and X had immediately had his tattoos removed somehow, other people or photos
could be used to create a picture of his frames of mind.

Now, there are lots of the exceptions to the requirement that
an accused present himself as he, as it were, really is. A man who persistently
walks nude in city parks should not be required to appear naked at trial. Quite
the opposite. That’s entirely different, though the possibilities for humor are
immense. 

But what do we do about this one. The tatoo says “Judge Joan [the judge sitting in the case] gives great blog jobs”  One is tempted to say, “That on has to go.” But exactly why? 

 Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D.

The Law Firm[s] of Michael Sean Quinn et

Quinn and Quinn

                                 1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208

                                             Austin, Texas 78703

                                                 (512) 296-2594

                                            (512) 344-9466 – Fax

                                E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com

             

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Lusitania Salvage — Part XIII

SECOND LUSITANIA BEMIS SALVAGE CASE—Part XIII

On August 5,2015 I published a blog-essay with the above title in the blog chain “Quinn’s Commentaries on Insurance Law.”

It pertains to a case the reported decision of which contains a very interesting discussion of a couple of insurance matters and a lot about the law of personal property, e.g., when the legal rule “Finders, Keepers” applies. 

It is not about lawyering so I haven’t put it here, but it is not hard to find. Under the circumstances and the nature of cyber metaphysics, however, once you have found it and read it in detail, you can’t keep it.  

I suppose fairness requires that I disclose to those who are weighing seeking the real blog essay, that there is no discussion there of the phrase often attached to “Finders, Keepers,” in non legal contexts, namely “Losers, Weepers,” and what it might have to do with legal traditions, if anything. 

This essay was slightly revised on August 6, 2015. This essay is followed by “Lusitania: Bemis and the Minister,” 10/20/15.

 Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D.

The Law Firm[s] of Michael Sean Quinn et

Quinn and Quinn

                                 1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208

                                             Austin, Texas 78703

                                                 (512) 296-2594

                                            (512) 344-9466 – Fax

                                E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com

             

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Lusitania Salvage — Continuing Litigation Part XIII

SECOND LUSITANIA BEMIS SALVAGE CASE—Part XIII

Michael Sean Quinn*

www.michaelseanquinn.com

            The first of the Bemis-Salvage cases
was an English case in the Court of the Queen’s Bench Division.  In that case, Bemis prevailed in the sense
that he established ownership rights for himself as opposed to—but only as
opposed to–the Crown.  Now comes the
next phase.  Did he establish such rights
for all of the contents of the ship, or just for some of them. And was he able to block the efforts of others.  Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F.Supp. 1043 (E.D. Va. 1995) aff’d (4th
Cir. 1996).

Several
parties had originally been involved. Bemis settled with one of them, so there
were only two left, and an entity named Fifty Fathom Ventures, Inc. was the other.  FFV’s position was roughly, “Look,  we dove[–or is it ‘dived’–] down to the ship too,
granted it was in 1994 and Brmis dove down in 1982, but still. . . .” Facts about
the another party, Muriel Light, more or less speaking for her late husband, play a role in the evolution of the
case and in the court’s considering chain of title, though I am going to ignore it.  One of the questions Bemis placed before the
court was whether he could have an injunction stopping others from following
his lead and making off with artifacts what were really his. So we have
ownership and injunction.

 There were some procedural matters discussed
in the opinion, but I am skipping all those too.  I am even skipping some of the admiralty
terminology discussions. This essay is about insurance and its aftermath. 

Title by Conveyance

The Liverpool
and London War Risks Insurance Association Limited insured the ship against loss
from what happened. It paid Cunard for its loss under the policy and thereby acquired ownership interest and right
in the vessel.  In 1967, it sold what it
had to John Light (“Light”), namely,

the rights and interest in the wreck of the LUSITANIA
on the understanding that it would not be salved as a whole, repaired and put
into commission again, and also that the purchaser takes over all liabilities
and expenses which might attach to the wreck. [Emphasis added.]

Less than three weeks later Light
entered into an agreement with the publisher Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.
(“HRW”), and it paid him in anticipation of a book of photographs. Light sold
his rights to someone else; that someone else sold them to yet another; and
eventually Bemis ended up with title to whatever it was that the insurer had
conveyed. (I’m not sure whether anything happened with Light and his taking photos.)

The case
discusses all this, but I will skip over it, since the insurance policy plays
no role in determining title, although a letter from the insurer relating to
subrogation and title transfer sent to Light does.  Still, insurance matters were not in
controversy.[1]

               One
of the important questions in this lawsuit was therefore what was conveyed running from the insurer to Bemis. Obviously,
what it did legally convey was only what it could, legally speaking
“convey.” The other significant questions pertained to the law of finds
and the law of salvage.  These questions
all pertain to the ultimate and essential question, “What did Bemis own?”  The answer to this question begins with the
question, “Were the contents that were not part of the ship, i.e., the personal
property that belonged to passengers or which was cargo, abandoned?”  That issue comes first.  

Law of Finds

               What earlier cases have called “the
ancient and honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers,” earlier applied to
maritime property which had never been owned by anyone.  In recent times, however,  that principle has changed.
Now that principle applies when an owner has abandoned his/her property.
Abandonment is to be inferred if no one comes forward and claims it.  The court found that precisely that had
happened and found the contents to be abandoned.

               But
a problem now arises. In order to be able to be a finder and have a right of
keeping, the claimant must take possession of the property and that requires
that the claimant exercise “dominion or control over” the claimed
property.  But except for what he had
already salvaged, Bemis did not have possession over the property he
claimed.  What he had salvaged was what was on the
list of property involved in the Queen’s Bench case and one other item, a spoon
from the the Lusitania’s cargo. (I wonder how could know that it was cargo and not a utensil owned and used by Cunard, e.g., to serve passengers. Or how it could be known that it was not the personal property of one of the passengers.  Granted, people often travel without any of their spoons.)

               The
next question then becomes, “Did Bemis have any type of “possession” of the personal property
not part of the hull that is still at the bottom of the sea?” To possess it
under these circumstances held the court, Bemis would have to have control over
that property and his right to go get it does not imply possession, nor does
the fact that he (and those working for and with him) have gone down two times,
and a third attempt had failed. (One of those trips was a National Geographic magazine
trip to get photos and videos for a TV documentary.)

Law of Salvage

               The
court noted that the requirement of possession is much looser under the law of salvage than under the law
of finds. Indeed, the meaning of the term “possession” appears to be quite different.
Nevertheless a liberal salvage award and injunctive relief so that a claimant
may have the sole right to continue salvage operations involves three elements.

               First,
the property must be in “marine peril.” This court quoted as follows:  “Courts will usually find that underwater
shipwrecks are in marine peril, because sunken vessels and their cargoes are in
danger of being lost forever.” Second, “the salvage service must be voluntary.
Third and finally, “the salvage must be successful, in whole or in part,” and the salvage process
must be a continual process, though it need not be continuous.

               Although
it was an odd way to put it, the court held that Bemis had not “demonstrated
the requisite amount of possession over the contents to qualify for the
exclusive right to salvage in the future.” He had not exercised “due diligence
or continuing salvaging operations[.]” (And the court spends a couple of pages
describing gaps in Bemis’s salvage efforts.)

               So
that was that, and I cannot find clear evidence of further efforts by Bemis since the
court’s ruling, but there is some unclear evidence that there were some, at least financed by him.  At the time, Bemis’s principal opponent, FFV, was ordered by the
court to turn over to him the items it had recovered. The reason was
interesting.  All of those items seem to
have been part of or attached to the hull (actually making they part of it);
Bemis did own that by conveyance.[2] I have found no evidence that FFV continued its efforts. 

               So
far as I can tell, there have been a few further attempts to visit if not salvage
from the Lusitania in the last two decades. 
(1) The opinion of the Fourth United States Court of Appeals which has
jurisdiction over federal district courts in Virginia and which affirmed Judge
Clarke’s decision noted in passing that one Polly Tapson, a Brit, and her
chums, had talked about taken a “stab” at a salvage effort around 1994. She was a “big time” diver, so maybe she kept going. The
Internet does not have clear evidence that her plans ever happened, even once.[3]
(2) Eoin McGarry claims to a dived down to what he and Bemis call “the Old
Lady” 30 times. (3) And apparently Bemis may have financed some further
“visits.”[4]

               There
is a completely different story floating around about Bemis’s conflicts with
the government of the Republic of Ireland and most especially its National
Monuments Service which apparently now has jurisdiction over the ship, since
the United Nations Law of the Seas statute extended territorial waters from 3
miles to 12.[5]
(The reader will remember that the Lusitania is positioned at 11.5 miles from
the Irish coast.) There is a decision of the Irish Supreme Court recounting
parts of this conflict,[6]
but that will have to await the next Part of the blog telling that story.

              

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D.,
J.D., C.P.C.U. . . .

The Law Firms of Michael Sean Quinn and

Quinn and Quinn

                                                  1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208

                                                              Austin,
Texas 78703

                                                                  (512)
296-2594

                                                             (512)
344-9466 – Fax

                                                 E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com

           

[1]
In note 5 the District Judge, one Clarke, states this: “The Court notes that
Bemis did not present any evidence covering the insurance contract between
Cunard and Liverpool and London. 
Therefore, the Court looks to the letter sent by Liverpool and London to
Light on March 2, 1967 in an effort to determine the scope of insurance
coverage.”  I conjecture that if Bemis
had the policy, he would have produced it, probably as an exhibit to the
Complaint. Hence, I conclude that he did not have it.  Why not? That strikes me as rather
strange.  I have undertaken to lay my
hands on it in various ways.  I have not,
however, gone to the Clerk of the Queen’s Bench, yet and asked for it.  Shame on me. 
Still if that Court does not have it, Why not?

[2]Stolley,
see note 4 below,  reports that the
objects FV was required to hand over to Bemis were turned over by him to an
Irish museum.

[3]
According to some of the questions found on the Internet, she is a bit of a
mystery.  She did some videos, some
photos, and led some fun expeditions. But it looks like she may have died in
the early 2000s. John Chatterton may have also done some independent diving.

[4]
He wants to prove that what sank the ship so fast was a munitions explosion in
or near a boiler room.  That is contrary
to the received view that no such thing happened. See Richard B. Stolley,
Lusitania: The Epic Battle Over Its Biggest Mystery, found in a 2015 issue of
FORTUNE magazine and on the Internet.

[5]
The Service Bemis may not be on the best terms. Stolley describes Bemis’s
reactions to it as “colorful, unsparing criticism of the country’s cultural
mandarins.”  Again according to Stolley,
what the Service says it is doing is protecting a historical, archeological object,
a historic monument, and as a cemetery. Even Bemis’s own lawyer has said that
he is a bit of a “pain in the ass” when it comes to the Service.

[6] Bemis v. Minister for the Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and The Islands [2007]IESC
10, [2007]3 IR 255.  The decision—3
justices with 2 writing opinions can be found on the Internet under “Supreme
Court of Ireland Decisions” (So what does the word “Gaeltacht” mean? It is an Irish-language word used to denote any primarily Irish-speaking region. There is a Wikipedia articles using that word as the title, Mainly they are geographical areas in Ireland recognized by the government where a meaningful-to-significant fraction of the population speak the native language on a daily basis. That population is apparently shrinking. 

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Lusitania: Salvage–Some Anyway–Part XII

Lusitania: First Bemis Salvage Case—Part XII

F. Gregg Bemis, Jr. is now an elderly, wealthy, Harvard
MBA-type. He says he walked out on his executive employment  in the 1970s at the age of 51 and became a
variety of different things, including several types of investors.  A little after he retired, he began
diving—and having other dive with and for him. The Lusitania was one of his
“targets,” and he found it.  It looks
like he made three attempts at salvage. Some of all this will be described in
“Lusitania: Second Bemis Salvage Case—Part XIII.

Thereon lie three
different but not separate stories. One was in the Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division in England[1];
one was in the federal courts in the United States, both District Court and appellate
court; and one involving a dispute with the government of the Republic of  Ireland. Nothing further will be said about
Mr. Bemis himself. Superficial material about his is easily findable on the
“Net,” as are several photographs.

In any case, Bemis found the Lusitania and bought it from
persons who had bought it from the insurance company that had covered it.  (If a property insurer pays for a covered
loss to a structure, it becomes the owner of the structure. Of course, often, it
is property is totally destroyed, since it no longer exists, there is nothing
to own or sell. Or is there? There is, if one counts a complete wreck as total
destruction. Moreover, there may be continuing property rights somehow
connected to other property rights.)

In any case, in 1982 divers working for Bemis brought up more
than a few chattels (aka movable property). Some of it was actually part of the
ship, which Bemis has already purchased from others who had purchased it from  London and Liverpool War Risk Associates Ltd,
the company that insured the Lusitania for the loss inflicted by the U-boat
perhaps among others..[2]
Some of what he had brought up  was part
of the ship.
A lawsuit arose over who owned the contents that were not
part of the ship.  That is the lawsuit
about to be discussed. That problem will arise again in the American lawsuit.

Bemis worked out settlements with some of the folks who
thought they might have rights, so in the end the lawsuit was between Bemis and
people or entities he “controlled,” on one side, and the British government on
the other, i.e., “the Crown.”
The decision of the court is interest reading filed with
precedent running back to 1601 and legal terminology which most American’s
today have never heard, e.g., “droit”[3]
and “ligan”—or have heard and used only as slang, e.g., “flotsam,” “jetsam,”
usually meaning some sort of junk.  Even
the terms “wreck” and “derelict [ion]” have special meanings in the British
vocabulary of maritime law. Pierce and
Another v. Bemis and Others (Court of the Queen’s Bench, November 29, 1985).[4]
(In American courts this case would be usually be cited 1 Q.B. 401 (1986).

I am going to skip all that, chocked bull of educational
tid-bits though it is.   And I am going
to skip summarizing the many lengthy quotes pertaining to such topics as the
history of how the idea of “droit” was
thought of in history of English admiralty law, fascinating though they
are too.

The  issue before the
court was, in the end, really quite simple. Who had legal title to the contents
brought to the surface, Bemis or the Crown. The latter claimed it at least
because it had been brought within British territory after it was found. The court’s
decision depended on the correct interpretation of a key British statute, The
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 (and a few subsequent amendments). (There were
other, earlier maritime statutes that were discussed. I am going to skip them
too.)

Interestingly the court notes that English jurisprudence
treats statutory interpretation differently than does America.  This case cites the great Lord Denning in
another case where he said this:

In this country we do not refer to the legislative history of an
enactment as they to in the United States of America. We do not look at the
explanatory memoranda which preface the Bills before Parliament. We do not have
recourse to the pages of Hansard.[[5]]
All that the courts can do is to take judicial notice of the previous state of
the law and of other matters generally know to well-informed people.
Escoigne
Properties Ltd. V. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] A.C. 549, 566.

Under English practice,what is
important here is that an English court’s job is to determine whether a given
statute under consideration changed the previous law.  If I have understood it correctly, this means
the judges must focus on earlier statutes and
judge-made law in thinking about the meaning of a new statute, and not
to any extent on what the legislative body, as it were, has said to itself
about what it was doing or said to others about its intent when it passed the
new law.  Truth is: I think I like their
system better.

In
any case, the statute said that if objects like those at issue in the Bemis
case were found within Britain’s territorial waters and they were unclaimed by
previous owners, they went to the Crown.
The chattels at issue in this case were not in English territorial
waters, therefore–well, what? Who was to get them?

In
the end the judge said that there was no law as to the Crown having a property
right in/over what is, in effect, abandoned property lost in and found in
international waters.  The fact that
there was not specific law about this merely entail that there is a “lacuna” in
the law, as the court  called it.  But since no one can make a plausible claim to
have a legal right to any of the objects and since Bemis possesses them, there
are to be regarded as his.

Under
the circumstances, this strikes me as a just result, particularly since he
spent a fair amount of money procuring them.
But this is not the end of the story. What about the contents not
brought up and still remaining at the bottom of the sea, though only about the
length of a football field down.

As a sort of footnote is is worth reporting a magazine articles by one Richard B. Stolley, entitled LUSITANIA; THE EPIC BATTLE OVER ITS BIGGEST MYSTERY (2015) reports that the 1982 dive–Bermis’s first salvage attempt–was conducted partly to determine whether an estimated $12M could be recovered if the ship were sold commercially as scrap.  Apparently Bemis had hired an independent firm to do most of the work, although he apparently did some of the diving. It ended up with a lot of the “treasure,” and Bemis did not  make much.

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D.,
J.D., C.P.C.U. . . .
The Law Firms of Michael Sean Quinn et
Quinn and Quinn
1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208
Austin,
Texas 78703
(512)
296-2594
(512)
344-9466 – Fax
E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com

 

[1]
“The Queen’s Bench Division in England and Wales today
consists of the Lord Chief Justice and
fourteen puisne judges, exercising original
jurisdiction and also appellate jurisdiction from the county courts and other
inferior courts, in practice being exercised by a division of the Queen’s Bench
only. Other sub-divisions include the Commercial, the Admiralty Court and the Administrative
Court. The abbreviation QB (or KB)
in legal citation is used in the Law Reports to denote cases heard in the
Queen’s (or King’s) Bench Division.” I took this from as Wikipedia article,
“Queen’s Bench.” Obviously, there’s lots more to say.

[2]
Interestingly, it is not always clear exactly what the name of the insurer was.
Some say it was a Lloyds Syndicate, and maybe it was.  However, in the American case, Bemis v. RMS Lusitania,884 F.Supp. 1042
(E. D. Va. 1915), aff’d 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996), the insurer is
called the Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association Limited. Of
course, one doubts that the discrepancy really matters, except. . . .

[3]
OK. I’ll back down for “droit,” but only an inch or two. The term comes from
the French meaning a right. In the
present context, the word would be used to determine who had a property  in a lots object to which no one was making a
claim based upon a property interest. In olden days, in England, it might be
the Lord of the Manor, or it might be the Crown. Interestingly, the word
“adroit” has the same origin. It means really skillful. My guess is that it
worked this way: a person was so consistently good at something that it looked
like he had a right to be able to do it.
“He can do it so well—better than absolutely everybody, or (at least)
the few who have tried–and has been doing it for so long, as everyone knows,
that it’s like his property so he has the right to say that it is really his.” Granted,
this guess is not exactly compelling, but it would not mean that someone was
simply getting things very right.  The
term “maladroit” is simply the opposite of “adroit.”

[4]
There may also be differences in other sorts of usages, as well. Virtually the
first, if not the out-and-out first, sentence in this case reads in part as
follows: “The Lusitania, a passenger
liner outward bound for New York. . . .” In think in American English it would
be said in virtually the opposite way, namely, “The Lusitania, a passenger liner outward bound from New York for
Liverpool. . . .”

[5]“Hansard is the traditional name of the
transcripts of Parliamentary Debates in Britain and many Commonwealth
countries. It is named after Thomas Curson Hansard (1776–1833),
a London printer and publisher, who was the first official printer to the
parliament at Westminster.” Copied from a Net entry.

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Reasonable minds almost certainly adapt to, or change, in some strikingly different situations. When advocates argue different positions at different times, they have not necessarily changed their minds about anything.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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