One Lawyer, One Dating Service, a Contract, a Few Dates & a Lawsuit

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

Law Offices of Quinn & Quinn
2630 Exposition Blvd #115

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.corn

Resumes: www.michaelseanquinn.com

One Lonely Lawyer:
Dates Bought, Services Defective, Lawsuit Brought

        Julie Hyman, a New York lawyer, couldn’t get a date, so she
bought a series of them, together with training and advice services from what
should be called a “date broker,” but which is more commonly called a matchmaker. She paid $8,000.00 for the services, in advance.

Hyman portrays herself on her website as a 43 year old
lawyer, who got out of Cardozo Law School 18 years ago, who was both a teen fashion
model and a child star(let?) of some sort, and who has been involved in the
entertainment industry all of her life. 
Her law firm websites lists both divorce law and entertainment as her
foci, and the website says that she has three NYC “Top Attorney Clients”—two in
Manhattan and one  in her bailiwick, the
Bronx.

Of the two listings, perhaps divorce is her main interest.
Does the fact that she is selling divorce related merchandise on the website
but nothing fashion and/or entertainment-related suggest this?  What about the fact that one of the items is
called “Julie Hyman’s Divorce Kit,” for $49.95, while the other is entitled “Julie
Hyman’s Divorce Kit Deluxe,” for  474.95, but there is nothing linked to fashion or
entertainment.

Hyman’s is an unusual website. There is the usual semi-official
identity picture, but there are also 20+ pictures of her posed in
different ways at different ages. It is also very unusual for there to be a
photo of a lawyer’s dog, where only the dog is pictured, and even more
unusual for there to be an image of a partially animated TV commercial of
her “Super Girl” underwear hawking Fruit of the Loom’s “Underoos.” (She remarks
in the “All About Me” section of her website that she took a lot of kidding
about that incident in high school.)

According to Hyman, she was having trouble meeting men, so
she retained someone who had appeared in a TV reality show, “Matched in
Manhattan.” Their contract apparently called for “’8 dates/one date per month
with highly educated men with an entrepreneurial spirit that were single and not
in relationships,’” according to the lawsuit Hyman filed against the date
broker, as reported in the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, of two weeks ago.

What she got, she says, was fewer dates, at least one
cancellation, at least one no show, and no coaching or feedback, as promised in
the agreement. She also claims—and the broker admits—that men he provided had
undisclosed special relationships with the broker:  partners, maybe, or
something of the sort.

On one level, this strikes me as an easy case to try for the
plaintiff. Without shallow humor being intended, she got screwed.  The broker was not just an insensitive lout;
probably a dork when it came to business, but also something of a cad. Someone
could go on and draw from what he said to the newspaper that he was a bit of a
crook.

He did not provide her with enough dates. It looks like he
may have sent her the wrong people, perhaps because he did not get to know
enough about her. He did not provide her with helpful after-date reports. He also did not provide her with the advice built into the agreement. It looks to me
like the defendant stumbled and blundered or worse.

But it is also a difficult situation for Hyman. She has a
sophisticated education; she is professionally experienced in both law and
entertainment, and she is a lawyer specializing in the exigencies of
male-female relationships.  She is 6’
tall; she is canine centered; and she knows she is something of an
odd-ball.  She must have believed that
she needed coaching and feedback from the broker, and that fact at least
suggests men-women relationships were not one of her gifts—very good looking
though she was–and that such relationships of a subtle and nuanced sort may
have been difficult for her, no matter how she looks or presents herself.

So, is there an interesting and possible instructive question
here about lawyer conduct?  In a subtle
way, there are two.  They both hang on
the bringing of the suit.

Suit Brought at All #1. Hyman should never have brought this suit at all. It
illustrates, what some might call, a profound lack of judgment. As a general
point, whoever got herself into this situation made one mistake after another.

The basic problems revolve on structuring the
relationship.  It was far too hap hazard.
Who is the date broker really? What is his experience? What kind of information
does he work from? Why is the obligation to provide dates spaced out at one
month intervals, if that’s what the spacing was?  Why would the arrangement not call for the
woman that was a party to the contract to read up on, inquire about, perhaps
interview and approve the candidates? After all, various forms of
something like this are done with other dating services.  Why were “feedbacks” needed? What sort of
information would the broker try to get from the man? Why did a woman like Hyman
need this sort of information, given her history? The whole arrangement was
poorly planned and set up.

Suit Brought at All #2. The very bringing of this lawsuit was a bad decision.

The
damages to be won were probably more than would be collected.  There is not all that much money at stake
here to peruse except for the punitive damages which might be awarded in a
fraud case, and they probably won’t be collected.   Even those might not be all that great; they
are seldom won; and big punitive damages on top of quite small actual damages
often won’t survive on appeals.

            The best that can be done here may
be a modest settlement, and a lawyer can make substantially more than such a
sum from hourly work. The lawsuit under
discussion will take a fair amount to time to prepare, some time to gnash
teeth over, some time for “upsetedness,” and some time to make up for sleep
already lost.  Figure the hours up,
multiply them times a reasonable hourly fee, and it is clear which one is better.

            Finally, the practice of a lawyer
who brings this sort of case will be undermined to some degree. Not only will
the lawyer suffer from what was discussed in §#1, the lawyer will also suffer
from a critique of judgment.  The §#1
question, is “How could this girl, sophisticated though she is, let herself get
into this ridiculous situation?” The §#2 is “How could a lawyer bring a case
where she is the plaintiff, which she knew would trigger publicity as to her
judgment about bringing the case at all?”  

Many people will say “In bringing the case, she is exposed to
publicity about her judgment in entering into the absurd contract. That was a bad
idea. Lawyers should hide their legal mistakes about themselves if they can,
and it is legally permitted.” Many people may also say, “No rational lawyer
would, in the normal course of things, expose their own poor decision-making to
the kind of reaction that will arise if this lawsuit is filed and publicized, unless the
lawyer has another goal—another purpose. What might that be?”

The only one that is obvious is the one found in the age-old
principle of publicity: Some of it is better than none of it.  As often as this principle is repeated, the
principle is false.  The situation under
discussion is a virtual paradigm of what’s wrong with the idea that bad
publicity is invariably preferable to none. The proposition that silence and
modest loss can be preferable to negative publicity is established by the fact
that when someone runs unnecessarily into harm’s way, not only might it not
hurt the person, it might send out negative information of its own. Consider
the following question: “Do I actually want that lawyer representing me in my
divorce case given the lawsuit she filed essentially about her own ridiculous
errors—she set the whole thing up, really without thinking?”

*************
On February 22, 2015, the following article was brought to my attention. It may be a different account of the same situation discussed in the sources upon which I depended. I confess that I do not have a positive reaction to the subject of the HuffPost piece, but that does not distinguish my attitude in the slightest from the one I previously had. Still, the whole “affair” was a complete and unpleasant mess. 
://www.huffingtonpost.com/matt-titus/confessions-of-a-nyc-matc_b_6142720.html

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Tacky Tactics in Insurance Defense Litigation

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., C.P.C.U., Etc.

2630 Exposition Blvd  #115

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-9759

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes at  www.michaelseanquinn.com)

Coen v. Aptean, et al (Ga. Dist Ct., 12A42185-6)

         

There were sanctions imposed. There were (legal fees (maybe extras) awarded. Or maybe there were  both.  The quickie description of the problem would be “obviously unjustified war of attrition litigation” tactics

A Georgia District Court make this decision in  a wrongful discharge case.  The background involved a complex business with a parent company, a subsidiary,  where the subsidiary of the parent, the bankruptcy of the parent, the sub being its huge creditor, what to do with—how to treat–the sub’s assets, and various complex transactions.

            The sub had hired a new general counsel. There was a contract specifying a time period of employment, a formula for payment if there was termination, a schedule of payment, and the specification of a substantial bonus. 

            The new General Counsel was terminated. He was not paid. He sued. According to my source, the defendant was a likely loser.  The defense went forward, however.

In the process of defending, defense counsel appears to have sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel saying the following, or something close to it: “the costs of [Plaintiff] Coen’s suit[—both defense and indemnity–]was being covered by the company’s insurer, a development that ‘remov[ed] the only material litigation risk for the company in pursuing its defense of this case through trial and, if necessary, appeal, which the company fully intends to do.’”

            The defense was aggressive in standard ways of aggression, e.g., it pled 20 affirmative defense when only a fraction of them—probably a small fraction, in my experience—though it reduced them substantially upon the filing of an

objection.  Other than being over done, this is standard.

            In any case, the district judge said he found the letter “revealing,” and wrote that the “’[d]efendants gambled on a bad faith strategy and lost.’” “’This strategy constitutes the very, [i.e., exact] bad faith [that  Georgia law] exists to prevent, and the very bad faith that warrants an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses.” (Of course, this language suggests that there were sanctions and not just fees.)

            Maybe so. . .maybe the conduct of the defense really was outrageous on the whole.  And the letter upon which the judge apparently focused strikes me as in poor taste—what used to be called “ungentlemanly” and now must be called “ungentlepersonly,” or something like it. The question is whether the letter was itself actually revealing, as the judge said, of a defense conduct contrary to laws forbidding such performances.

            The letter by itself, if I have seen all the important part of it on the Law360 news blog is not revealing at all.  One of the lawyers involved says that he has never seen anything like it in his 35 years of practice.  I’m not sure I have either—when coming from a defendant–but I can easily imagine circumstances where such a letter might be thought appropriate and not indicate an invalid and unsound pursuit of a defense.

            What that letter does not do is to say, “We have no defense in this. We know we will lose it, if you pursue it to the end. But keep in mind that, although our client is at the vortex of the financial difficulties surrounding it, there is plenty of money to defend this case, since we have applicable insurance. It has coverage, so we have no real risk in never giving up—something we have no intent of doing.” Part of the message would that the surrounding Chapter 11, “or whatever,” problems are not an impediment to a prolonged struggle.

            One might want to do this if plaintiff’s counsel was saying the same sort of thing: “We will never give up, and we have the money to pursue the matter.” Remember: If you lose, you may well have to pay my attorney fees, and I don’t lose cases. Ask around and find out what my fees usually are.”  That kind of statement is often said in contingency fee cases, for example, by—and only by–prideful, hubristic, “loud and  rambunctious,” ill-educated plaintiff lawyers.

            The word “only” is perhaps the most important in letter from junior (?) defense counsel.  It does not say that the use of our insurance is the only reason we have to pursue the case.  It says that “our only risk, i.e., having to pay a lot of money for a defense as we go along, isn’t really a risk for us. It’s insured. That fact means that we won’t  ourselves have to pay the damages.”

            All of these statements may be absolutely true or thought to be true.  Still, it’s tacky.  How should it have been done?  
First, the insurer should have been informed.  If it had been informed, and had permitted this, the adjuster as well as defense counsel should be replaced. 
Second, all messages like this one, if sent at all—a bad idea– should happen in conversation not in writing. 
Third, if the plaintiff did not know about the insurance, and had not asked about it in discovery s/he should be told. 
Fourth, if opposing counsel is told, the next event in the law suit will be a Request for the Production of Documents focusing on the policy, the insured’s correspondence with the insurer, reservation of rights letters,  and maybe even a coded or clandestine offer from the plaintiff to restructure the case to make sure that the defendant had plenty of coverage to pay the loss. Conceivably, the defendant trying to put the plaintiff on the kind of notice just mentioned in an effort to make sure that got all the insurance information he “needed.”

            I am not licensed in Georgia, so what I am about to write is general and theoretical only.  There is no indication in Law360 as to the procedure that was employed in the Coen case as to the procedure leading up to what happened.  If there were sanctions involved, and not just fees, it seems to me there would have to be a separate hearing. There would have to be independent testimony regarding the extent to which the defendant deviated from accepted practice and in what ways.  Probably there would have to be expert witness testimony regarding standard litigation practice.  In the absence of this, in many jurisdictions, there could be an application for a writ of mandamus, and not just an appeal when the case in the district court was completely over and done with.

            It is interesting to reflect upon other law suits. We know that Coen has sued at least one of the other participants in the farrago that lead to this suit for defamation. It seems to me that the defendant may wish to sue it s carrier, if was providing a defense and what happened here increases its insurance premiums. The defendant may want to sue its lawyers it increases the damages that have to be paid.

In any case, what happened was still tacky. And my analysis focuses on the letter. All sorts of other things may also be true, and they may affect the correct evaluation of the letter. The district judge may be right; then again, maybe he’s not.

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Tacky Tactics in Litigation

Michael Sean
Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas
78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-9759

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes at  www.michaelseanquinn.com)

Coen v. Aptean, et al (Ga. Dist Ct., 12A42185-6)

         

There were sanctions imposed. There
were (legal fees (maybe extras) awarded. Or maybe there were  both.  The quickie description of the problem would
be “obviously unjustified war of attrition litigation” tactics

A Georgia District Court make this
decision in  a wrongful discharge
case.  The background involved a complex
business with a parent company, a subsidiary, 
where the subsidiary of the parent, the bankruptcy of the parent, the
sub being its huge creditor, what to do with—how to treat–the sub’s assets,
and various complex transactions.

            The
sub had hired a new general counsel. There was a contract specifying a time period
of employment, a formula for payment if there was termination, a schedule of payment,
and the specification of a substantial bonus. 

            The
new General Counsel was terminated. He was not paid. He sued. According to my
source, the defendant was a likely loser. 
The defense went forward, however.

In the process of defending, defense
counsel appears to have sent a letter to plaintiff’s counsel saying the
following, or something close to it: “the costs of [Plaintiff] Coen’s
suit[—both defense and indemnity–]was being covered by the company’s insurer,
a development that ‘remov[ed] the only
material litigation risk for the company in pursuing its defense of this case
through trial and, if necessary, appeal, which the company fully intends to
do.’”

            The defense was aggressive in
standard ways of aggression, e.g., it pled 20 affirmative defense when only a
fraction of them—probably a small fraction, in my experience—though it reduced
them substantially upon the filing of an

objection.  Other than being over done, this is standard.

            In
any case, the district judge said he found the letter “revealing,” and wrote
that the “’[d]efendants gambled on a bad faith strategy and lost.’” “’This
strategy constitutes the very, [i.e., exact] bad faith [that  Georgia law] exists to prevent, and the very
bad faith that warrants an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses.” (Of course,
this language suggests that there were sanctions and not just fees.)

            Maybe
so. . .maybe the conduct of the defense really was outrageous on the
whole.  And the letter upon which the
judge apparently focused strikes me as in poor taste—what used to be called
“ungentlemanly” and now must be called “ungentlepersonly,” or something like
it. The question is whether the letter was itself actually revealing, as the
judge said, of a defense conduct contrary to laws forbidding such performances.

            The
letter by itself, if I have seen all the important part of it on the Law360
news blog is not revealing at all.  One
of the lawyers involved says that he has never seen anything like it in his 35
years of practice.  I’m not sure I have
either—when coming from a defendant–but I can easily imagine circumstances
where such a letter might be thought appropriate and not indicate an invalid
and unsound pursuit of a defense.

            What
that letter does not do is to say, “We have no defense in this. We know we will
lose it, if you pursue it to the end. But keep in mind that, although our
client is at the vortex of the financial difficulties surrounding it, there is
plenty of money to defend this case, since we have applicable insurance. It has
coverage, so we have no real risk in never giving up—something we have no
intent of doing.” Part of the message would that the surrounding Chapter 11,
“or whatever,” problems are not an impediment to a prolonged struggle.

            One
might want to do this if plaintiff’s counsel was saying the same sort of thing:
“We will never give up, and we have the money to pursue the matter.” Remember:
If you lose, you may well have to pay my attorney fees, and I don’t lose cases.
Ask around and find out what my fees usually are.”  That kind of statement is often said in
contingency fee cases, for example, by—and only by–prideful, hubristic, “loud
and  rambunctious,” ill-educated
plaintiff lawyers.

            The
word “only” is perhaps the most important in letter from junior (?) defense counsel.  It does not say that the use of our insurance
is the only reason we have to pursue the case. 
It says that “our only risk, i.e., having to pay a lot of money for a
defense as we go along, isn’t really a risk for us. It’s insured. That fact
means that we won’t  ourselves have to
pay the damages.”

            All
of these statements may be absolutely true or thought to be true.  Still, it’s tacky.  How should it have been done?  First, the insurer should have been
informed.  If it had been informed, and
had permitted this, the adjuster as well as defense counsel should be replaced.
Second, all messages like this one, if sent at all—a bad idea– should happen
in conversation not in writing. Third, if the plaintiff did not know about the
insurance, and had not asked about it in discovery s/he should be told. Fourth,
if opposing counsel is told, the next event in the law suit will be a Request
for the Production of Documents focusing on the policy, the insured’s
correspondence with the insurer, reservation of rights letters,  and maybe even a coded or clandestine offer
from the plaintiff to restructure the case to make sure that the defendant had
plenty of coverage to pay the loss. Conceivably, the defendant trying to put
the plaintiff on the kind of notice just mentioned in an effort to make sure
that got all the insurance information he “needed.”

            I
am not licensed in Georgia, so what I am about to write is general and
theoretical only.  There is no indication
in Law360 as to the procedure that was employed in the Coen case as to the procedure leading up to what happened.  If there were sanctions involved, and not just
fees, it seems to me there would have to be a separate hearing. There would
have to be independent testimony regarding the extent to which the defendant
deviated from accepted practice and in what ways.  Probably there would have to be expert
witness testimony regarding standard litigation practice.  In the absence of this, in many
jurisdictions, there could be an application for a writ of mandamus, and not
just an appeal when the case in the district court was completely over and done
with.

            It
is interesting to reflect upon other law suits. We know that Coen has sued at
least one of the other participants in the farrago that lead to this suit for
defamation. It seems to me that the defendant may wish to sue it s carrier, if
was providing a defense and what happened here increases its insurance
premiums. The defendant may want to sue its lawyers it increases the damages
that have to be paid.

In any case, was still tacky. And my
analysis focuses on the letter. All sorts of other things may also be true, and
they may affect the correct evaluation of the letter. The district judge may be
right; then again, maybe he’s not.

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THE GOOD LAWYER – Part XI- Rapidly Changing Profession

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

Law Offices of Quinn & Quinn

2630 Exposition Blvd #115

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.corn

Resumes: www.michaelseanquinn.com

Douglas O. Linder & Nancy
Levit. THE GOOD LAWYER: Seeking Quality in the Practice of Law.  Oxford University Press, 2014, with an
enormous bibliography to be found in the footnotes.  My exposition, commentary and critique will
be presented in eleven parts.

This is Part XI.  Part I should be read first. It pertained to foundations, topics, most
important sources. Other parts with concern other specific matters and they
will be organized by questions about, commentaries on, and therefore
arguments with different chapters of the book

Part X, concerned Chapter #4, “The Good
Lawyer Values Others in the Legal Profession.” 
Part  XI, also relates to the good
lawyer and the profession It is entitled “Seeking Quality in a Rapidly Changing
Profession.” They are related. In case, this is a discussion of Chapter 11. This
is it, and it comes last.  

The last
chapter of THE GOOD LAWYER is a difficult one. Here are some of the admonitions:

·       
Young lawyers should find themselves qua lawyer and
pursue it.

·       
Do not try to do everything.

·       
Billable hours are not just a bad thing; they are a
“scourge.”

·       
Law firms should treat different types of lawyers
differently, insofar as possible.

·       
Law firms should try to design environments in which
creative lawyers can create, and imaginative lawyers can imagine.

·       
Good lawyers can recognize themselves as that, even
if no one else does.

But are there
not replies to these noble and quite general principles?

·       
A lawyer cannot find “himself” as a lawyer
without dealing with a number of pieces of lawyering.  Doing that is not very easy.

·       
Can a lawyer find him/her real self-qua lawyer, if
s/he has not found at least a good chunk of her true self?   

·       
Can all lawyers specialize? Shouldn’t some lawyers be
foxes instead of groundhogs? See Isaiah Berlin’s work for the definition.  Do some lawyers really like skipping
around—having a general practice—granted that it is seldom “deep”?

·       
Is it actually the case that all lawyers are
treated alike in big firms?  Even if
that’s true, is it true in every way? Aren’t there such things as leaves of
absence, e.g., for maternity purposes? Are all associates required to do
document review?

·       
Don’t most motions and briefs have to look alike?
Don’t many filings with governmental agencies have to fit within some rule they
devise?

·       
Is easy to fine institutions what are not
hierarchical? Don’t profit making institutions virtually require that?

·       
If a business is a service rendering business, they
must be a way to compute the price of the services.  If that cannot be done ab initio, then other
ways must be found? If the service business is required to file detailed
reports with their purchasers as to activities, then records must be kept. 

·       
Why not use time records?  If something else will do the job, why not
use it. This is especially true if the law requires the service business to
have maximal connectedness with its customers? 
But isn’t that exactly what the law requires of lawyers? And rightly so?

·       
Will a good lawyer really recognize that he is a
good lawyer if others say that he is not? 
Probably not.  But what if they
say nothing, but the culture is such that good performance is often rewarded by
praise and thanksgiving?

But they do not come. What does silence
mean then? What about material rewards and the sense of having professional
excellence?

Might something
be left out?  The world today is permeated by cyber realities. There can easily be malpractice, not to
mention ethical violations, for any lawyer who does not know how to use
computers in all sorts of ways, can there not?  Many courts do not accept anything but
electronic filings. I just received 617 pages of document production in a
relatively small case—small, that is, to everyone but my client the
plaintiff.  The production came on a
disc. As an expert, the material upon which I am expected to rely on for the
preparation of my expert report is often delivered to me electronically.
Lawyers are repeatedly told to encrypt their files to preserve confidentiality.
Much correspondence is conducted by email. Briefs are written using computer
tech. Much is delivered by using PDF or Word. I do all sorts of research on Westlaw.
And on. And on. And on. 

Isn’t mastery of the “New World” of
“Cyber Realities” a key to being a “good lawyer”? Do all lawyers under the age
of, say, 35 have that mastery already. Do good lawyers need to keep up with the
uses of cyber technology? And, if so, how is it to be done? What about knowing
cyber law?  How much does the good lawyer
automatically need to know? Is it to be found in the law school? In the CLEs?
Should video games be invented to help in the development of strategic thinking
excellences for litigators? Transactionalists? Negotiators? The answer in all
three cases is “Yes.” Hence, aren’t lessons in gaming as important in law
school training as important as seminar-classes in the profound ethics which
goes with the kind, good lawyering the authors contemplate and advocate?

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Weighty Insurance Claim Paid in Coins and Pounds

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., C.P.C.U., Etc.

2630 Exposition Blvd  #115

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-9759

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes found at

www.michaelseanquinn.com)

One hears about insurance companies paying claims in buckets of coins, from time to time.  Biz Ins. reported another of these events in its August 18, 2014 issue, p 26.  Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc. paid part of a claim that it had settled in “thousands of quarters, nickels, dimes and pennies–in [something on the order of 17] buckets. Else where it was reported that the amount was $21k+/-.The insured was over 70 years old and was recovering from hernia surgery and the time.  There is a photograph next to the article of a pile of money the size of a miniature mountain, but it is not identified as the money involved. Adriana may have weighed its settlement decision carefully. 

It is reported in Southern California, the blog of an NBC TV station in California that the person whose claim was paid suit Adriana’s Insurance Services “after he was physically assaulted by one of the company’s  employees.”

Now, why would an outfit that claims is a leading California insurance broker for many years do such a thing?  Talk about a violation of established business ethics! The company’s website is introduced by a large photograph of a woman who appears to be relatively good looking, dynamic, and there is a touch of the sexy. (The latter characteristic can be found more clearly in other photographs of her.) 

To her credit, she does not appear to be a woman would would seek to pay a claim with wooden nickels. And besides the plaintiff’s lawyer would have advised him not to take them.  It is a powerful rule of lawyer performance to be sure and bring that up to you client: “Don’t take any….”

Here is my guess, and that’s all it is.  According to the Net the “Adriana Biz” is not all that respectable an establishment. Its principle product (or service) is the sale of what it called “Super Cheap Insurance” or just “Cheap Insurance.” The several evaluations presented on the Internet are uniformly negative, and one of them is critical of it for mistreating customers by making them wait a long time for services in an unattractive lobby, in other words, a “cattle call” process. 

This is a company that works mainly on publicity–any publicity, the more the better. Well, that’s what it got here.  It specializes in selling cheap, probably low quality insurance to the less well off. This got its name before the public once again. It either did directly or did impliedly tell a fraction of the masses that it could get insurance there within their difficult budget.  

Many people need to get whatever they can.  They are not always concerned with obtaining a satisfactory amount of coverage or being treated appropriately.  The know they must have it; they want the super-cheap; and they will put up with whatever s–t they have to to get it.

For a company like this one, not even a BBB member though it has several offices around the state, every publicity incident is better than silence. This is especially true if the company was advised that there was probably not a new suit the settling plaintiff could bring.  And, besides, Adriana may have believed that the $21k was worth paying for the publicity the company got. Besides, one can imagine that the payee impliedly agreed not bring a suit like what would be required here. 

In any case, people find the buckets of coins story striking, somewhat to be remembered (even if not memorable), amusing, and indicative of what they may need. Some of the male purchasers may also be intrigued by catching a look at Adriana herself, if they believed that the website figure is she.  Perhaps the unconscious of at least some young men conform to the questionable ad principle in the fashion adv industry, “Fall for the model, fall for the dress.” In this case, it would be “Want the chick, want her coverage.”

Is it possible, I find myself asking, what sort of insurance company would permit itself to be involved in such an outrage.  I can’t think of any.  There probably aren’t any, thank God! There is something I am even more sure of, and that’s this: Adriana is not cooking up a second version of this incident.  The first one that occurred to me was one involving bitcoins, but that won’t work.  On the other hand, I would not be surprised to find out that the PR company for Adriana was not meditating upon another high publicity escapade.  Of course, my not being surprised does not suggest for a moment that the idea has any truth. 

Certainly no more than the idea of my suggesting to Biz. Ins. that when it said that “people prefer cash to coin,” it might have wanted to check and see whether or not coins are not a kind of case.  Also, that paper does not appear to understand that Adriana can truthfully and literally say in publicity contexts,without any fear as to whether there is a misrepresentation involved:  “We pay claimants buckets of money.”

The extent to which this blog has been proof read correctly, may reflect the degree of respect I have for Adriana’s business ethics.

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Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact