LAWYERS SHOULD DISCOURAGE SOME CLIENTS SOMETIMES

“DON’T DO IT, DEAR CLIENT!”

Michael Sean Quinn*

I often tell “ordinary” clients and
potential clients that litigation is a rich man’s game. It is not meant for
regular people, absent serious bodily injury or property damage, and perhaps not then if a class action can be found.   Victory is usually not very profitable, I point out, and the monetary penalties
resulting from losing can be large, cumbersome, and sometimes even ruinous, especially if the client is paying fees or expenses. 

I know
this is disappointing for people to hear, since it seems inconsistent with the ideals of justice in
a cosmopolitan society, and modern ideals of justice-for-all but, “That’s the way things are,” I say gently and sometimes at explanatory length. Thereafter, I send them on their way, usually quite promptly.  

Sometimes I feel disappointed in myself for not undertaking to make things right for them (to go out and get justice for them), and I feel weak for not plunging forward. On the other hand, I know that they should not be exposed to “headaches,” anxiety, and stresses of a new, if not different, kind. 

I say to myself that I am actually looking after their interests by declining to go forward and suggesting that they not go forward either. Sometimes the best lawyering for some clients is to “just say ‘No'” to them and at the same time encourage them to use the same word on themselves. Paradoxically, my unconscious self bubbles up and reproaches me.  At that point, I have to say again, this time to myself, “That’s just the way things are.”

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D. and J.D., Etc.
Quinn and Quinn

1300 West Lynn Suite 208

Austin, TX 78703

Office Phone: 512-296-2594

Cell:512-656-0503

Fax: 512-344-9466

Email: mquinn@msqlaw.com

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HAPPY LAWYERS AND LAWYER PERFORMANCE: A PARADOX?

DUTIES OF LAWYERS TO CLIENTS

Michael Sean Quinn*

Suppose happy people do better work than those that are unhappy. Suppose that this difference is substantial.  If this general proposition is true, i.e., applies to all workers, then lawyers perform better if they are happy than if they are not. 

But Ls owe their clients a high duty of performance. For example, they have a duty to pursue the interests of their clients zealously. Section [2] of the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, in part, as follows: “As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” 

According to this section, Ls have other duties to Cs in this and other different contexts, e.g., those of adviser, negotiator, and/or evaluator. (One might wish to add document conceiving and drafting, perhaps among others.) Given the general truth linking to the quality of performance, as a consequence, to actual happiness (as a cause), it stands to reason that happy lawyers perform these functions better than unhappy, or not so happy, Ls.  

Now, Ls are not legally required to do excellent jobs for their Cs.  They are only required to do a competent jobs.  This is all the Model Rules required in Rule 1.1.  But surely Ls owe their clients at least moral duties in addition to legal ones; surely Ls have moral obligations to their Cs as well as legal duties.  

(Note that I have assumed that merely competent L do not necessarily do excellent jobs. Many spokes person for Ls would dispute this obviously true proposition, however. Nevertheless, if all competent lawyers do excellent work and if the happiness of L makes L competent and therefore excellent, then perhaps all lawyers have a duty to each client to actually be happy. This will not happen, of course. Imagine a grievance or malpractice case based upon the fact that C’s L was not happy, and so. . . .) 

In addition, Ls are fiduciaries of their Cs; the constellation of fiduciary duties is broader than simple loyalty. It requires that Ls place Cs interests ahead of their own, at least within the scope of the representation, and the edges of “scope” are not always crystalline.  

If this is true, then Ls have a moral obligations to their clients to, at least, appear to be happy. But if the mere appearance of happiness, as opposed to the presence of actual happiness, is generally recognizable by most people who are Cs, then Ls do not owe Cs only the appearance of happiness. Besides, that is a version of lying to (or making misrepresentations to) Cs.  In either case, Ls owe Cs actually being happy).

Hence, if Ls owe Cs actually happiness, then they also have a duty to be happy. If they are not they have a duty to become so. (Sometimes alcohol or drug based unhappiness can be conquered, and sometimes it can be handled through Twelve Step programs.) 

If they can make themselves happy, without external assistance, they have an obligation to do that. If they cannot do it for themselves or by such programs as “The Twelve Step” programs,” often unlikely or unfitting courses, then Ls have a duty to find a satisfactory type of happiness-producing therapy and pursue it. If it has costs (and it usually will), then L has a duty to buy it.  (After all, it can be regarded as a kind of investment, if not an actual business expense.) 

One last set of points. If L must for moral reason be happy when serving a client, how happy must s/he be? Obviously, maximal happiness, whatever that might be, is not required. Indeed, most of us don’t really know what it might be.  One is inclined to think that the sufficiently happy L must be more happy than the average competent L, and perhaps more happy than the L of average happiness. 

In addition, must the required level of happiness, in general, be continuous or merely continual. Moreover, is unhappiness forbidden during the entire time length of a given representation, or only when L is actually working on this or that case. This might be called “temporally horizontal happiness requirement.”

Of course there are other horizontal requirements. One might be a “client-to-client  horizontal happiness requirement.”  If L is happy dealing with C#1, but is unhappy in dealing with C#2, and there is some chance that L’s happiness level is diminished by having to deal with C#2, does L have a duty to C#1 to get rid of C#2? 

This is a wholly new conflict of interest possibility, of course, though it may concern only moral obligations. Conflicts amongst obligations to clients are not the only problem. Standard legally obligatory conflicts can be other than L with too many clients. there can be conflict problems between L and C. Thus, if happiness is required of L when representing C, how can L represent a C s/he dislikes, dislikes intensely, or hates?  

(If you think that  the foregoing is sophistry, illogical, or for some reason absurd, you are invited to find and count the fallacies.)

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D. and J.D., Etc.
Quinn and Quinn

1300 West Lynn Suite 208

Austin, TX 78703

Office Phone: 512-296-2594

Cell:512-656-0503

Fax: 512-344-9466

Email: mquinn@msqlaw.com

  

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VERDICALLY ORGANIZED MJ (aka “WEED”) MERCHANTS AND SOME PROBLEMS OF INSURANCE

THE MARIJUANA BUSINESS AND THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE

Michael Sean Quinn*

There was a wildfire. It spread and progressed until it finally did damage to the building and inventory of a Colorado weed biz–oops: “medical marijuana” production and retail business. It had a number of marijuana plants. Some of them were still in what might be called the agricultural stage; some of them had moved off the interior farm, as it were, and into the processing plant, or the warehouse, or–perhaps–onto the retail floor. 

The building didn’t actually catch fire, but the dust, smoke, and ashes from the fire got into the ventilation system and ruined a huge amount of the merchandise–$200,000 of the “still growing stuff” and $40,000 for the “already grown stuff. 

(There was a second claim for damage to the roof of the plant caused, allegedly, by thieves entering or leaving the building. I will ignore the through-the-roof claim and discuss only he “canna” claim. There were more than several issues, but I will focus on only three of them. The insurer was Atain Specialty Insurance Company--it was the defendant—while the insured was The Green Earth Wellness Center, LLC–and it was the defendant. (United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 13-cv-03452, February 17, 2016–a rather long, 27 pp. opinion.) 

Basically, the insurer was trying to find ways out of paying an mj claim. Apparently, it didn’t like what it took to be the smell of it. Thus, it argued that this sort of insurance was against public policy. This argument went nowhere. After all, everything happened in Colorado.  

Basically, insofar as genuine insurance law issues are concerned, the issues were about the meanings of several words. Unquestionably, the policy covered “stock,” so there was an issue as to whether the mj plants ever constituted “stock.” If and when they were stock,  there was coverage, unless an exclusion applied. And there was a possible exclusion, namely, that the policy did not “growing crops.” And there was a third semantic issue as well, to wit, was the mj “contraband”?

The court’s conclusions as to the first issue began with the policy’s definition of the term “stock.” Its defining language was “merchandise held in storage or for sale, raw material and in-process or finished goods, including supplies used in their packing or sipping.” The parties agreed that finished product was stock, so the controversy boiled down to whether certain types of mj plants were stock, since they were “raw materials.” The court  found this issue confusing and unsettled given the meanings of words in the mj industry and so might as well have ruled that such mj plants as “mother plants” and “clones” were stock. 

But that does not reach the second question regarding the exclusion: no coverage for growing crops.  Green Earth argued on a variety of grounds that mj plants growing indoors did not fall into the category expressed by the word “crops.” Some of its arguments were clever, but the court wouldn’t buy them. It wouldn’t even agree that the term “crop” was ambiguous and therefore having a meaning that would favor the insured, though it admitted that the term usually applies to that which is grown outside.  Hence, the court counted “mother plants” and “clones” as growing crops. 

The third question was whether the merchandise was contraband. In effect, although it does not use the word “define,” or its “sibling-terms,” the policy actually defines “contraband” as “property in the course of illegal transportation or trade.” (Here is a dictionary definition quoted by the court: “goods or merchandise whose importation, exportation, or possession is forbidden.) The insurer’s arguments appears to depend on the difference between state and federal law regarding mj and its consequences for public policy. The court was not inclined to line up with the insurer. As the court remarks, it certainly appears that the parties agreed to insure at least already harvested mj product. 

Now remember, I have discussed only three themes in the case, and there are others. One of the most interesting of them is the insured’s accusation of insurer bad faith against Atain, the carrier.  I may write briefly about it elsewhere.  See Quinn’s Commentaries on Insurance Law, Marijuana and Insurance Bad Faith.

 In the meantime, I wonder about the phrase “growing crop.” It seems to me that if a crop is not crowing at the time of the insured event, then it is not a growing crop. It is unclear to me that the mother plant was itself growing at the time of the “ashing” of the “farm.” If not, even if it was “feeding” or helping product other plants which were growing at the time, it, itself was not growing. 

Supplementary Question (8/13/2016): Might the refusal of the DEA to chance and loosen its classification have any impact on the attitude of insurers toward mj farms? Especially since the FDA 

wants to encourage experimentation.  If I were a conspiracy buff (or even bluff) I would suggest that the University of Mississippi has some polico/lobbying influence in this decision in order to maintain its virtual monopoly and medical mj ag production. See NYT Friday, August 12, 12016, Catherine Saint Louis, “D.E.A. Refusal to Reclassify Marijuana Draws Criticism, NYT. A-3. See also NYT Editorial “Stop Treating Marijuana Like Heroin,” Saturday, August 13, 2016.  

*Michael Sean Quinn

Quinn and  Quinn

1300 West Lynn Suite 208

Austin, TX 78703

Office Phone: 512-296-2594

Cell:512-656-0503

Fax: 512-344-9466

Email: mquinn@msqlaw.com 

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INSURANCE ADJUSTERS AND LOCAL COURT RULES

Local Court Rules: Know and Uniformly Obey Them

Michael Sean Quinn*

In my experience lawyers, including litigating lawyers, do not take seriously the local rules of court. This is a bad idea. In one recent case, for example, two lawyer from large prestige law firms–what are called BigLaw lawyers from BIGLAW firms, were money-sanctioned for telling their client that he didn’t need to come physically to a mediation. Sporadic attendance by Skype would be sufficient.

 Alas, there is a Local Rule 16.2 in at least one of the federal district courts in the Southern District of Florida that controls mediations, and subsection e of it requires parties to actually show up without written consent of the presiding judge. (Not only do parties have to show up, but so do “required claim professionals (e.g., insurance adjusters)[.]”)

The defendant did not show, since his Ls told him didn’t have to. Consequently, those Ls were ordered to pay $13,058.82 in sanctions. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f). Most of this sum, which the two Ls owed jointly and severally, was for the travel expenses of the plaintiff and his Ls. (The court excluded amounts that the plaintiff and his lawyers would have to pay to come back to where-ever for the next–the actual–mediation. It also excluded attorney fees for the plaintiff’s Ls to “reprepare” for the future mediation. The plaintiff’s motion to strike was also denied.)

This is the sort of thing lawyers are reminded of over and over again. And yet they still, at least sometimes, do not pay attention. Maybe the facts in this case will draw some focus.

 The plaintiff was an unsightly fellow. He has some sort of rare genetic disorder which caused deformities of his face and tooth loss. The defendant was Shaquille O’Neal, a basket ball player (for any reader who is wondering). It seems that Shaq had published a photo in two social amusement internet places of himself imitating the look of the plaintiff with an actual photo of the plaintiff next to his.

There being no cause of action or poor manners that have arisen to torture and humiliation of the innocent, the plaintiff sued for defamation and invasion of privacy. One can guess the defenses without difficulty, though I must say I am now tempted to conceive of a new tort, that defamation by tasteless comparative visualizations.

 Interestingly, the opinion of the court itself does not set forth the facts as pleaded in its ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYINT IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. Binion v. O’Neal, 15-60869-CIV-COHN/SELTZER (S.Fla. February 16, 2016). But see various news sources. It does point out, however, that the plaintiff’s Ls had indicated that they wanted the defendant there and had received no reply. 

So why is this unusual case being set forth in a blog series about insurance law? Both insurance defense counsel and liability adjusters need to be attentive to the requirements of local rules. I have seen adjusters attend mediations many time by phone or internet. One needs to make sure that this is “A-OK” before blithely doing it. 

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D. and J.D., Etc.

Quinn and Quinn

1300 West Lynn Suite 208

Austin, TX 78703

Office Phone: 512-296-2594

Cell:512-656-0503

Fax: 512-344-9466

Email: mquinn@msqlaw.com

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LOCAL COURT RULES: FORGET THEM NOT

Local Court Rules: Know and Uniformly Obey Them

Michael Sean Quinn*

In my experience lawyers, including litigating lawyers, do not take seriously the local rules of court. This is a bad idea. In one recent case, for example, two lawyer from large prestige law firms–what are called BigLaw lawyers from BIGLAW firms, were money-sanctioned for telling their client that he didn’t need to come physically to a mediation. Sporadic attendance by Skype would be sufficient.

 Alas, there is a Local Rule 16.2 in at least one of the federal district courts in the Southern District of Florida that controls mediations, and subsection e of it requires parties to actually show up without written consent of the presiding judge. (Not only do parties have to show up, but so do “required claim professionals (e.g., insurance adjusters)[.]”)

The defendant did not show, since his Ls told him didn’t have to. Consequently, those Ls were ordered to pay $13,058.82 in sanctions. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f). Most of this sum, which the two Ls owed jointly and severally, was for the travel expenses of the plaintiff and his Ls. (The court excluded amounts that the plaintiff and his lawyers would have to pay to come back to where-ever for the next–the actual–mediation. It also excluded attorney fees for the plaintiff’s Ls to “reprepare” for the future mediation. The plaintiff’s motion to strike was also denied.)

This is the sort of thing lawyers are reminded of over and over again. And yet they still, at least sometimes, do not pay attention. Maybe the facts in this case will draw some focus.

 The plaintiff was an unsightly fellow. He has some sort of rare genetic disorder which caused deformities of his face and tooth loss. The defendant was Shaquille O’Neal, a basket ball player (for any reader who is wondering). It seems that Shaq had published a photo in two social amusement internet places of himself imitating the look of the plaintiff with an actual photo of the plaintiff next to his.

There being no cause of action or poor manners that have arisen to torture and humiliation of the innocent, the plaintiff sued for defamation and invasion of privacy. One can guess the defenses without difficulty, though I must say I am now tempted to conceive of a new tort, that defamation by tasteless comparative visualizations.

 Interestingly, the opinion of the court itself does not set forth the facts as pleaded in its ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYINT IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS. Binion v. O’Neal, 15-60869-CIV-COHN/SELTZER (S.Fla. February 16, 2016). But see various news sources. It does point out, however, that the plaintiff’s Ls had indicated that they wanted the defendant there and had received no reply. 

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D. and J.D., Etc.
Quinn and Quinn

1300 West Lynn Suite 208

Austin, TX 78703

Office Phone: 512-296-2594

Cell:512-656-0503

Fax: 512-344-9466

Email: mquinn@msqlaw.com

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Quinn Quotes

Reasonable minds almost certainly adapt to, or change, in some strikingly different situations. When advocates argue different positions at different times, they have not necessarily changed their minds about anything.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact