Insurance Coverage Litigation: A Few Deposition Questions

INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: 
A FEW DEPOSITION QUESTIONS

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., C.P.C.U., Etc.

2112 Hartford Rd

Austin, Texas 78703
(O & C) 512-656-9759

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes at  www.michaelseanquinn.com)

Insurance bad faith cases can depend on the common law and/or
relevant statutes.  Both sources require
insurer to move “with dispatch” (my term) in handling claims.  Sometimes statutes specify particular
internals, e.g., 10 days, two weeks, etc. Usually, those dates are measured
from the insurer receives needed material from the insured. 

Against that background, consider this
question:

Is
it important for an insurer to determine their coverage position as quickly as
possible?

The correct answer to this question is an expanded version
of “Yes,” matters are actually more complicated
than answering a simple “Yes.” Now for the
problem. In depositions, examining counsel always tries to get “Yes” answers to
questions like this one.  This “push”
needs to be resisted.

The reason is that the idea of the possible is a very complex one. 
The term “possible” is ambiguous, and can easily create confusion.  If the term “possible” means “as quickly as
it could be done,” then such a decision can be made in a matter of minutes, and
that is the intent of the lawyer for the policyholder.  Rhetorically, the goal is to create a trap
where the testifying adjuster or expert will be committed to an absurdly short
period of time.

Here are some of the components that need to be added: (1) being
able to make the decision based upon evidence and reason is crucial, (2) the
use of evidence and reason requiring access to relevant information, and this
often means documents and people, (3) the analysis at the insurance company (or
its managing general agent or its independent adjuster and then itself) needs
stop be able to think about it, and (4) trying to do something in a reasonable
manner takes time. 

It other words the answer should include all of (1)-(4), it
may be advisable to include the world “dispatch,” or a word equivalent to or
like it.  So here are some other
possibilities:

(1) Yes and No.

(2) No and Yes.

(3) It depends on what one means by
“possible.”

I tend to
prefer #(3).  

Often the next question is:

What do you
mean by “possible”?

In that case the answer begins with “It depends on the
situation.”  A witness could stop there,
but that’s ill advised.  It looks like
the witness is trying to avoid answering the question forth rightly.  

It’s better to go this way:

When I say “possible” in dealing with questions like this, I
mean to be saying “when it can be done reasonable on the basis of actual
information provided to or obtained by the carrier. Trying to do something
right may takes time.”

It’s fine to
stop right there, but if examining counsel really wants an answer, give counsel
this:

In this context “possible” means commencing the adjustment
process directly, seeking information as part of that process, thinking about
the problems objectively, obtaining help as needed, and then drawing a
conclusion.  All of this should be done
with dispatch.

Many lawyers will object to this answer: “Objection, not
responsive.” And if the lawyer is a donkey’s behind, this will said, “Now,
listen to my question.” 

In my
opinion, the best response is simply to say,

I don’t have
anything else to say. I’ve answered your question.

If the
lawyer is a large donkey with a huge behind, he might say,

Repeat back
to my question.

This is not
a question, so the witness does not need to response. Our large donkey might
ask,

What
question do you think I asked?

At this point, the witness has three choices. (1) Try to
repeat it. (2) Ask the court reporter to read it. (3) Ask counsel to ask it
again. Of these #(3) is the best.

Above all,
simply keep repeating what you have said, in one way or another.  Examining counsel is eating up his clock.

There is a
variation on this discussion. Suppose the lawyer’s question is this:

It’s
important for an insurer to try and determine and announce its coverage
position asap, true.

This is a
leading question, but a “Yes” or “No” answer should be avoided. Here are
options:

(1) I don’t understand your question,
please spell it out for me.

(2) Depends

(3) Depends on the circumstances

(4) Can’t be answered that way.

(5) I don’t know how to answer what
you’ve asked when you put it this way.

Any of these
will do. There is no—really, NO!–such thing as a “’Yes’ or ‘No’”
question.  

There are always several more answers:

(6) I don’t know.

(7) I don’t understand.

(8) I don’t remember what “asap” means.
(This is a nice way into the idea of the “possible.”)

Examining
lawyers will almost always tell a witness that if he does not understand a
question, ask him/her to explain it. So do this:

(9) I don’t understand how the term “try”
is figuring in here.

(10)                   
I
don’t really see how the term “possible” works in this sentence.

(11)                   
Wait,
what does “possible” mean in your questions.

Try not to
fall into deposition traps!  Go slow. Listen carefully. Hesitate. Don’t hesitate to hesitate. 

Read More

Attorney-Client Relationship–A Formalistic (Hence Archane) Quasi-DefinitialTreatment

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc., Author
Law Office of Michael Sean Quinn
+

Quinn and Quinn

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes: www.michaelseanquinn.com)

This is a formalistic (i.e., if-thens, if and only ifs, definitions, entailments, logical implications,

concepts-only, abstract arguments, etc.) analysis of the nature of the relationship between lawyer-attorneys, on the one hand, and possible and/or actual clients on the other.  It is not explicitly tied to cases and authorities by name, cite, and rank.  At the same time, it is based on governing legal authority of various sorts.

When
there is a dispute between a lawyer (“L”) and a person (human or entity) (“P”), as to
whether P is (a/the) Client (“C”) with respect to L, the burden of proof is generally taken to be
upon P, although at least some burdens of proof shift as between L and an
actual C. (Of course, it is obvious that not all Ps are Cs, even if the P believes he is a C.) There is a range of
considerations that courts review and from which they draw inferences.  Almost none of them are a necessary (i.e.,
required) condition for a client-attorney relationship.  Some of them may be sufficient conditions,
but they are not at the same time necessary conditions.

Here
is a list of a number of propositions (“Prop.-___”) which courts invoke, list,
consider, and from which they draw inferences. 
Some of the elements of the list are followed by a commentary:

            (1)        L
thinks of C as his client.

This proposition
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition, although it is sometimes
correlated with the existence of an attorney-client relationship.  Lawyers usually know who at least their
principal clients are.  Obviously, under
some circumstances C can be L’s client, and L not realize it, or be mistaken
about it, or just never think about it. 
On the other hand, L could regard C as his client and be mistaken.

            (2)        C has explicitly requested that L
represent him, and L has stated that he will do so.

Obviously,
Prop.-2 can obtain without L having started to represent C actively.  Moreover, C can become L’s client without
making an explicit request. 
Representation can exist as a result of interactive conduct without
explicit communication with respect to clienthood.

            (3)        L
states to C that L represents C.

C’s silence does
not automatically imply C’s consent.

            (4)        C
says to L that L represents him as a client.

Again, just by
itself, silence does not imply consent—in this case that of L.  (At the same time, it would be a good
idea—from a pragmatic standpoint—for L to speak up if he is not going to
represent C.)

            (5)        L
discusses the individual legal interests of C with C.

Prop.-5 does not
create the existence of a client-attorney relationship.  L could listen to C, ask some questions, and
then say something like I can’t become your lawyer because there is a conflict,
because I don’t understand the issues, because I don’t like you, or because I
have fallen deeply in love with you.

            (6)        L discusses C’s individual legal
interests with C and provides C with substantive advice                                  thereon, i.e., relevant
or related advice.

Prop.-6 probably
is a sufficient condition of a client-lawyer relationship, if any of these
items are.  That would be even truer if L
provides C not only with advice, but with legal services and some sort of
product.  Consider the following:

            (7)        L discusses C’s individual legal
interests with C and then provides C not only with advice but with a legal
product of some sort.

Prop.-7 is
probably close to a sufficient condition of the creation of an attorney-client
relationship, even if L is not paid. 
It’s only close, however.  What if
C did not want the “legal product,” did not use it, or did not even look at it.

            (8)        C
or someone else pays L to provide C with legal services.

Prop.-8 is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the creation of an
attorney-client relationship.  L might
give the money back forthwith.  She
didn’t want ever to work for C, or anyone like C.  Also, if L sends C a bill for a retainer
which L says she must receive before she will perform any services, then there
is no client-attorney relationship yet. 
If, on the other hand, L sends a bill to C for services already
performed, the sending of the bill would not create the relationship, the
relationship would already exist.

            (9)        If L represents C1, and C2
is the subordinate of C1, but C2 also makes specific use
of L in a                          personal matter, then there is an attorney-client relationship
between C2 and L.

This proposition
does not describe either a necessary or a sufficient condition for an L-C
relationship.  Asking for representation
does not create it.  C2
doesn’t have to ask for representation in order for it to come into
existence.  How C2 used L may
be important.  Reciprocal behavior
may be sufficient.  Thus, if C2
involves L because he has a fiery reputation, no client-attorney (“C-L”)
relationship will thereby be formed.

            (10)      C interacts with L in relation to some of
C’s legal affairs but has another lawyer who                                      represents her.  Indeed, she has an attorney providing
“separate representation.”

This proposition
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for L not being C’s
lawyer.  C may want two lawyers.  She may not like her other one.  She may not trust the other one.  She may think the other one is stupid.  For a variety of reasons, C may want L as a
lawyer over and above some other lawyer.

            (11)      C interacts with L in connection with his
legal problems, L helps C, and C has no other                                  lawyer.

This item is not
a sufficient condition for the creation of a C-L relationship between C and
L.  C can have one or more lawyers and
hire another one with respect to exactly the same task.

            (12)      P1 hears L discuss a
significant matter with P2 and recognizes that the propositions
being                               asserted by L are important to his individual and separable legal
interests.  P1 thereafter
relies                          upon what L stated to P2.

This item does
not create a client-lawyer relationship between P1 and L,
irrespective of whether there was a client-lawyer relationship between L and P2.  Whether a C-L relationship was formed between
L and P1 would depend upon a variety of factors, for example, what L
took (assumed, understood, or inferred) P1 to be doing, as it were,
as P1 listened to the conversation that was going on between L and P2.  P2’s intents and beliefs would
perhaps also be relevant.

            (13)      If L negotiates an arrangement with P1
and L is negotiating for P2, where there is a                                        negotiable deal going
on between P1 and P2, then L is not P1’s
lawyer with respect to the                              transaction.

This proposition
is false.  L may or may not be the lawyer
for both P1 and P2. 
That would depend upon the facts. 
In all probability, however, in the foregoing item, if these are the
only facts that are (or to be) known, L is probably not the lawyer for P1.  This is especially true if L has not
performed any other services for P1 related to the transaction.

              (14) L
states to C that she is not C’s lawyer.

This proposition
is not a sufficient condition of L’s not being C’s lawyer.  L could be wrong.  L could be lying.  L could fail to understand precisely who C is
and has been in his practice, and so forth. 
(These points apply to a past tense variation of Prop.-14.) 

               (15)          
L states to P1 that she represents C2,
who or which is connected to P1 in a transaction or                               relationship.

This item is not
a sufficient condition for the non-existence of an attorney-client relationship
between L and P1.  L might
wish it were true, but it would not always actually be true.  Sometimes in situations described by Prop.-15
P1 is C1.  L might
represent C1 by providing C2 with legal services, such as
advice, information, suggestions, writings, and so forth, but wish to believe
that they were presented only to C2, when—in fact—C2
handed them on to C1, while indicating to L that something of the
sort, is, might, or will happen.  L could
even agree with C2 that there would, at C2’s request, be
two clients, one of whose identity would remain secret from L.  Of course, these are high risk situations, at
least sometimes, and many lawyers will refuse them, if they see them.

                 (16) L
states to P1 that she represents C2 and not P1.

This statement
is not a sufficient condition for the non-existence of an attorney-client
relationship between L and P1. 
If L provides P1 with legal services, then the fact that L
has said that she does not represent P1 as C1 simply
becomes a false proposition not a determinative one.

               (17)      P1
pays L to do work for P2/C2, which L does.

Did L represent
P1 as C1?  The
answer is—based on these facts alone—No.  This pattern is very common in liability
insurance, duty-to-defend situations.

               (18)      P1
pays L to do work for C2 but P1 directs in handling C2’s
affairs.

Did L
consequently represent P1 as C1?  Same answer applies:  No.

                (19)      P1 pays L to work for C2
but P1 directed in handling C2’s affairs, and P1
seek legal advice                            from L regarding its own interests (having to do with
anything including C2), and L provides that advice to P1.

Does L then
represent P1 as C1? 
Answer: Yes. 

            Now consider situations in which
there are two lawyers and two clients. 

              (20)      L1
asserts  to C1 that  L1 represents C1 and
that L2 does not. 

Obviously, this
representation by L1 does not entail, imply, or even suggest that L2
does not represent. This point 
would be true whether or not  L1
did in fact represent C1.  Whether L1 and L2 both
represent C1 would depend upon the circumstances, the facts, who
provided advice, and who provided services. 
The status of one of the lawyers would not depend upon what the other
one said.

            Now, consider the following: 

              (21)      L1
and L2 have a conversation with C2.   L2, after the conversation, tells C1
that L2                                         represents C1, and that L1 does
not, but represents C1.  

Does the fact of
this representation by L2 to C2 entail that L1
does not represent C2?   The
answer, of course, is No.   This would be true if C1 and C2
were doing a deal together, and arrangements evolved over time.  One could easily imagine that  L2 saw the relationship as much
more adversarial—or, at least done at arms length—than it actually was.   L2 might consider himself an
entirely independent counsel, whereas, in fact, he was hired to help L1,
because of differentials in jurisdiction, differentials in the kind of law
involved, such as patent law, and so forth. 
Numerous variations like this are possible, and—indeed—quite frequent in
the real world.  The following often
arises in a variety of different circumstances: 

               (22)      L represents
C1, a corporation.  L is
good friends with C2, a senior management official of                             the
corporation.    C2, runs into
some sort of trouble.  L says to C2,
“I am not your                                       lawyer, you must understand this, I represent the corporation
and only the corporation,”                               and then provides C2 with various legal
advice and legal services, e.g., she discusses the                                background history and facts
of the problem with C2, reviews
letters from counsel for the                              accuser, criticizes them, makes suggestions to C2
about how to handle his problems, and                              so forth. 

Under these
circumstances, does L represent C2?  
The answer is almost certainly Yes.   It is immaterial that L’s statements are
inconsistent with her behavior.  Behavior
trumps explicit statement, when there is inconsistence.  In this area of life, I cannot think of a
situation in which that would not be true.

(23) L never says to C, “I 
represent you,” and L never writes to C and says, ”I represent you,”
although L has said and/or written to C and said I represent somebody who is in
this deal with you.

True or False?  No matter how L
treats C thereafter and no matter whether L does lawyerly things for C,  L is not C’s attorney, so long as the oral
and/or written statements are not withdrawn. 
Answer: False.  Again: Lawyer
conduct trumps lawyer silence, partial statements, and even statements. (Given
the way depositions have gone, the opposite of this conclusion could be
entitled the “Chenowithian Doctrine.”)

The
foregoing observations are valid with respect to custom and practice in the
legal profession, in most cases.  In
summary, if a person desires a court to conclude that he is the client of a
lawyer, the burden of proof is on the person who submits that he is a client,
and in general, he must show that he has received some sort of legal services
from the lawyer which are neither trivial, instantaneous, entirely obvious to
everyone (including him) or frivolous, and the evidence that he presents must
be a type which would convince a rational and objective knowledgeable person
that the lawyer in question has provided some sort of legal information,
advice, suggestions, products, or services to the person claiming that he is a
client.  Some formalities make this proof
easier: written agreements, events involving explicit oral agreements, the
non-existence of conflicts, etc. 
However, those are not necessary conditions of the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, as everyone knows.  Many of the foregoing propositions pertaining
to C-L or L-C relationships are invoked, usually together with others, in legal
reasoning about whether such relationships exist.  All or most of them have been invoked in this
case in an attempt to vindicate the view that no such relationship existed
between H & D and 4CC.  To be clear
that these arguments are unsuccessful, I now turn to more specific discussions
of the facts of this case alone.

Read More

PreLawSchool Education?

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc., Quasi-Author

Quinn & Quinn

2630 Exposition Blvd  #115

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes: www.michaelseanquinn.com)

            In the “On
Work” column of the NYT for Sunday, September 28, 2014, Michael Cascio wrote
and essay entitled Pearls of Career
Wisdom, Found in the Trash.” Cascio is a heavy-hitter executive from the
world of media production.

In his essay he argues that his
summer job during college cleaning up Wolf Trap late at night after the big
time entertainment gigs (“classical, rock, folk, jazz, opera, ballet, musical
theater”) were over.

He learned all sorts of things:

·        Hierarchies of employment are uneliminable and usually need to be observed.

·       
Youthful
bosses near the bottom rung can show both fairness wisdom. (His janitorial
supervisor said this: “Never turn down a chance to take on more
responsibility.” “It may be surprising but it’s true,” says Cascio. So, “[t]he
best career guidance I ever got was from my janitorial supervisor[,] a kid not
much older than he was.)

·       
There
are real class distinctions. Those at the bottom rung know this clearly; those
up the ladder don’t always, or ignore it.

·       
Many
are condescending when addressing those from lower down, and should not be,
from their own career standpoint.

·       
Appreciate
all levels of workers.  Make and keep
permanent bonds.

·       
Prepare
for potentially very unpleasant work. (Example: How to tie trash bags to make
sure they don’t break.)

·       
How
to handle the messes other people leave behind them.

·       
Cleaning
up toilets—now there’s are messes–makes one less squeamish about human
messiness later on.

·       
That
high prestige performers (ballerinas) can be real pigs—way more so than more “ordinary”
performers (folk singers). And so. . . .

“As a boss, I realize that summer jobs don’t have to be
gritty or humbling to make an impact.* But for those summers, my janitorial job
taught me the basics of all employment: You have to show up every day and on
time. You have to appreciate everyone who works around you. You should
acknowledge–and learn to work with—the pecking order in the working world. You
have to exert yourself in ways you may [MSQ: did] not have learned
[MSQ: learn] in school. And you often have to do things that have nothing—and
everything–to do with your career and your life ahead.”*

            *  Quinn’s+ 
Hypotheses: The further up the ladder one was born and raised, the
grittier the job needs to be, and the higher up “the ladder” the career is
going to start and may likely go, the grittier the job needs to be.  The legal profession is often  high on that ladder.

            +Quinn’s
Confession: I wish I had learned all that stuff.  Me? It took me forever to learn that fancied
intellectuals of the late ‘60s had to give a lot of that up in the work-a-day
world—at least in nearly all  of it, most
of the time, no matter how high the prestige is, whether finance or law –and that
being at a Wolf Trap on summer evenings, whether smoking or
stone-cold-clean,  does not cancel that
“rule” out to the slightest extent.

Read More

Reckless Lawyering

Multiple Ways to Enhance One’s
Chances of

         Getting Sued for MALPRACTICE

                                                              Inspired
by Work of

                        Professor Randall W.
Roth University of Hawaii School of Law

                                                               (SF68 ALI-ABA 275)

1.                 
Skip talks and articles on ethics–it all boils down to “the Golden Rule,” doesn’t it?

2.                 
When pointy headed academics talk about potential
problems, just tell yourself “If
it was really a problem, someone would have told me about it before now.”

3.                 
Don’t bother detailing the scope of your engagement in
an engagement (or non-engagement) letter.  After all, you know who your clients are and
what you’ve agreed to do (or not do).

4.                 
Don’t let it bug you if someone’s file has been on your
desk for quite some time (especially if the ball if in their court).  If they aren’t in a hurry why should you be?

5.                 
Don’t bother talking to a client about a theoretical
option if you already know what he or she would eventually decide.  After all, you’re the expert.

6.                 
To heck with specialists.  How hard can it be?

7.                 
Refer your clients to people who will scratch your back
in return.  And keep it simple–provide
just one name.

8.                 
Don’t be a stickler for details and never double-check
info provided by your client.

9.                 
Leave important details to the client’s other advisers
and just assume they are doing a good job.

10.             
Forget about unnecessary paperwork–don’t document oral
communications and always toss your research notes.

11.             
Pay no attention to state lines. Courts, judges, and even state bars tend to be flexible. Besides, if something comes up, a lawyer can always get a “‘pro hac vice’ permit” 

12.             
Never tell clients that they are now former clients.

13.             
Summarize the effect of a complicated strategy in a
simple letter to the client, and don’t mention that it could be misleading.

14.             
Rely on a third party’s description of what the client
wants.

15.             
Never explain the obvious.

16.             
Encourage your clients to make generous gifts to
worthwhile charities; and, be generous with your time in serving on the boards
of those same charities.

17.             
Make sure you are using every new idea being talked
about at tax seminars, and don’t mention that they are untested.

18. Remember: Law is not just a profession; it is a business. Hence, do not permit clients to short change you or walk a away from a contract.  If you are owed fees, sue for them. How could it hurt. 

Read More

“NEVER VOLUNTEER”: SOUND DEPOSITION ADVICE?

“NEVER VOLUNTEER, 

Oh WITNESS, MINE“

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc., Author

Quinn & Quinn

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.com

(Resumes: www.michaelseanquinn.com)

            Depositions are, at least in many
lawsuits, the key discovery events.  After
all, most cases settle.  It, therefore,
makes sense that law firms spend lots of time, spend large sums of money
teaching their young litigation associates how to take depositions, how to
protect the record at a deposition, and how to protect the deponent, when that
is distinct from protecting the record. 
Many organizations give courses on deposition technique.  I’ve taught them myself in UT-CLEs.

            Depositions themselves are live, reported,
transcribed, printed, and frequently videoed. 
Lawyers are exhorted to prepare their witnesses carefully.  Lots of rules are preached about depositions.
Some of them are legal rules, for example, Assert
only the truth. Others are what might be called strategic principles, for
example, Avoid arguing with opposing
counsel. Yet others are tactical rules, for example, Don’t call the opposing party an “idiot.”

            Another tactical rule is this one:  Never
volunteer any information so answer only the question asked! It is a very
popular dispensation from lawyers to client, and even experts. Another way to
put roughly this point without sounding overly strict, rigid, mechanical,
and/or wooden is this: Let counsel come
to you. Both of these tactical rules are eminently sound advice or teaching
tools—often, perhaps even usually. Nevertheless, not all of the tactical
“rules” or “tips” for  deposition
technique are as sound as the admonition to “Prepare Extensively! Prepare Carefully!” 

In
any case, the “’Never Volunteer!’ Rule”
of deposition technique is oft repeated to young lawyers and to witnesses.  It directs witness to provide minimalist
answers to exactly (and only) the questions which are put to them.  This maxim is not actually a sound universal
rule.

            As a universalistic or general
maxim, “Never volunteer!” is subject
to substantial doubts.  A number of
divergent considerations refute the maxim. 
At least five things are wrong with it, and there is a type of witness
who is far more effective if s/he testifies in contradiction to it and
volunteers lots of stuff.

            First, witnesses who
religiously follow the rule often sound or appear cagey.  They sound like they are trying to hide
truths.  If their performances are
recorded on videotape, their verbal bobbing and weaving does not help build an
aura of credibility.  It can be a
particular problem in states like Texas, where the depositions of non-party
witnesses can be used as part of a litigant’s case in chief, and regardless of
the availability of the witness. Looking like one is trying to hide important
information is not a sound tactic.

            Second, proponents of the maxim “Never volunteer!” claim that volunteered
answers may haunt one at trial.  Of
course, this is true.  On the other hand,
some depositions are not particularly effective at trial.  This is especially true if the witness has
given long answers.  A jury can seldom
follow the monotonous third of the deposition transcript if the answers involve
more than 250-300 words.  Thus, at least
some volunteering witnesses are not likely to create a record which can be used
for an effective impeachment if he volunteers at length.  Indeed, the hyper-technical, cagey-looking,
overly cautious witness, who answers in few words may create a more impeaching
transcript than the expansive witness who speaks at involved, interdependent,
and complex length.

            Third, some witnesses can
seldom be induced to follow the “Never
volunteer!” rule.  Many witnesses
don’t like the rule.  The oath they have
learned from television, and elsewhere, including other testifying experience
they have had, is that they are sworn to tell not only the truth, but the whole truth.  The “Never volunteer!” rule seems to be
inconsistent with swearing that you will tell the whole truth.  Moreover, many people are temperamentally
ill-suited to the self-discipline (or, “anal retentiveness”) which is required
of a witness to follow the “never volunteer” rule.  One tactic of lawyers in depositions is to
spend the first 30-55 minutes on trivial matters to get the witness over his
preparatory deposition training and let his/her real—and perhaps
expansive—verbal-self emerge.  This move
can be extremely effective.

            It is probably better to prepare
witnesses to do things which they can do. 
Surely, the expansive witness should not overstate the case.  Obviously, witnesses should be induced to
review documents before making sweeping statements.  Indeed, they should be discouraged from
making any sweeping statements at all.  Sweeping
statements are often not true.  Nevertheless,
if volunteer they will, and most witnesses do, then perhaps it would be better
to hone their volunteering skills and encourage a style which is least
detrimental.  The maxims “Think about your
answer.” And “Avoid wild, huge
generalities!” And “Go slow and don’t leap.” Are all sounder and better
principles than “Never, ever volunteer
any thing!.” 

This
third point is true, even though I concede, and getting witnesses to go slow
can be maximized by discouraging any volunteering.  Often getting a witness not to volunteer is
not easy, particularly if s/he has an inclination toward being loquacious.  This is especially true if the witness has a
prideful streak—a hubris-tic
personality.

            Fourth, it is important to
keep in mind what litigation is all about. 
Most cases settle.  Most cases
settle, at least in part, on the basis of depositions.  There are two features of depositions that
impact settlement.  One of them is what
the witness says.  Another is the
demeanor of the witness.  Lawyers make
settlement calculations based in part on their estimate of the quality of the
opposing witnesses.  Under these
circumstances, does it make sense to hide the ball.  Obviously, sometimes it does.  Frequently, however, it does not.

            Fifth, when a witness is
asked to discuss a document, many lawyers think that they can score points by
having a witness talk about one section of the document, without references to
others.  If the witness is quite familiar with the document, e.g., if the
witness is an experienced insurance adjuster, underwriter, or internal advisor,
it is frequently better for the witness to refuse to let the lawyer taking the
deposition restrict his/her testimony to a single clause.  This is
especially true if the lawyer is trying to create a suggestion usable later
that one part of a document is more important than another, when they are
really about the same thing, or—at least—lap over on the some of the same
matters.  In this kind of case, not only should the witness volunteer, the
witness should insist on talking about both–or, all–of the relevant passages
of the document. 

            This requires not only volunteering
but pushing.  If the witness does not have the type of insistent
personality which is required for pushing examining counsel, if the witness
tries to address a topic and is cut off, then the acts of cutting off from the
taker of the deposition can be used at trial to make counsel look like a
distorter of important matters.  (Counsel defending the record is well
advised to review such matters with the witness on breaks and make the matter
one upon which there is explicit testimony.  Of course, this can be done
by asking cross- or counter-questions when the time comes, later in the day,
usually.) 

            The proposed universal and rigid
witness rule “Never volunteer!”
is a bad one.  It supposes that witnesses are inferior to lawyers in
intelligence, any sense of strategy, articulateness, and perhaps more. 
The truth is that lawyers are often not terribly well prepared for depositions.  In addition, many of them take such joy in
controlling witness that telling them things they don’t expect and don’t want
to hear is frequently rather upsetting. 
As a consequence, these types of lawyers often perform worse after the
negative surprise is, as it were, done to them, than they otherwise
would.  Perhaps this is a sixth reason why “Never volunteer!”
should be rejected as a rule to be taught to witnesses.  Unprepared power-trapping, narcissistic
litigators often perform worse in depositions when and after they are
negatively surprised! Witnesses with imagination and creativity can be a
problem.  They can also be a blessing.

Read More

Quinn Quotes

All aphorisms and adages are false when taken to be universal. Some adages have wisdom.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

The books shown are NOT affiliate links.
MSQ (site) does not receive any compensation for books listed or sold.
Books are shown for the reader's convenience only.

Newsletter

Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact