LEGAL MALPRACTICE SUITS: ANTIFRACTURING RULE

HOW TO SUE YOUR LAWYER

Michael Sean Quinn*

Suppose you are a client (C) of a lawyer (L) and you believe that your lawyer has done a lousy job.  So, C wants to sue L for something. What types of claims can C use?  Many states have a so-called “antifracturing rule.” This means–according to some courts–that C cannot sue L based on different parts of the law–different “causes of action” or distinct “compensable claims”–but can use only one part of the law, namely the cause of action commonly called  “legal malpractice” (LM).

One problem built into this idea is that LM is frequently “defined,” “spoken of,” or “though about” as a type of negligence–lawyer negligence. But negligence is a legal idea covering only unintentionally caused injuries.  Consider a car accident. If one driver drives poorly, e.g., using a cell phone, sat, and accidentally hits someone else, a car being driven by another, for example, that’s negligence. If the driver causing the collision by deliberately running into the car he hits, then that is not negligence; it is an intentional wrong.

If legal malpractice is restricted to lawyer negligence, then there are a lots of  causes of action C cannot use to proceed against L.  One of the most important is the cause of action fraud.  Roughly speaking, fraud occurs when one person lies to another person and as a result causes the person lied to some sort of injury, usually at least financial.  Lying of course is intentional conduct; there is no such thing as unintentional lying. Does it make sense that C cannot sue her lawyer for lying to her and thereby causing injury, i.e., suing for fraud? 

Surely, it does not. So what solutions might there be? If there were no solutions, then the C-can-sue-L-only-for-professional-negligence would be nothing but a wall set up around Ls to prevent Cs from suing them for many types of wrongful conduct. 

Here’s a solution. Forget about the word “negligence” and think about the real elements of the cause of action, namely, that L was rendering services without meeting the standard of care governing lawyers, namely that L is performing as reasonably competent lawyers would behave under the same or similar circumstances. 

Arguably this view, if followed, would solve the “antifracturing” problem, simplify pleadings, and protect clients. Again consider an action for fraud.  It is surely the case that a reasonable lawyer will not deliberately lie to his client. For a lawyer to do that is outside the bounds of professional rectitude. That fact would make an L-lie a type of legal malpractice. Hence, L-fraud is actionable but as a form of legal malpractice. 

Interestingly, one way courts, commentators, and lawyers deal with this problem is as follows: “Granted, many courts have described legal malpractice as professional negligence. However, they don’t really mean it.” This is a poor solution since it is misleading to everyone.  Hoz’about this one. “Granted, that could defined legal mal in terms of negligernce, but the judge wasn’t thinking.” Not like that one either?  

What about this one: “Well what happened here was that the fact pattern before the court was negligence and that was what was pled, so the court was simply formulating something about one of the key components of the standard of care namely negligence which falls below the standard of care.  The court did not mean to say that nothing else was below the standard of care.” Surely many other acts and omissions are down there, some further down than others.  

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
Law Office of Michael Sean Quinn

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Austin, Texas 78703

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Natural Law Versus Legal Positivism

AGE OLD CONTROVERSY

Michael Sean Quinn*

Legal Positivism (LP) is (roughly writing) this: laws are commands of the sovereign, and in legal matters, the law always trumps moral principle, even if the principle is actually best.  Natural Law (NL) theory is the idea that sound, correct moral principles trump the commands of the sovereign.

(In the Middle Ages and, maybe before, moral principles were commands of the real sovereign, God himself, so that it was easy to have them trump the commands of the underling sovereign, i.e., the king.) 

In the modern world natural law can win out only if there are objectively valid moral principles, especially as they are linked to justice.  There are such principles, of course precisely because justice is what it is: the most desirable of all social states of affairs in a human society.  

Logical Positivism is now, and often is, the accepted view.  How could it be otherwise when justice is linked essentially to adversariality, and it is considered that Hobbes and Machiavelli were right about human nature, to wit (1) Hobbes–the pursuit of self interests is nearly all, and (2) Machiavelli–the lust for power is the rest of it. 

Of course, usually, there is no conflict between law and morality, especially where the rule of law is an important, deeply-felt ideological principle and is regarded as applying to everyone.* Also, to a considerable extent in the mundane, routine, ho hum world, law and morals fit together reasonably well. (* Of course, it is also a good thing if many people know when to fold and know when not to look.)

So conflicts between natural doctrine and legal positivism are rare. American, however, has been treated to one this week. The Acting Attorney General refused to argue cases in favor of President Trump’s Executive Order excluding a great many muslims. She pointed out in defense of doing this that the Department of Justice was required to do right and to refrain from doing wrong.  She also indicated that, at least in here view, the fact that the department was named “Justice” and not “Public Prosecutor” was significant. 

The President said, I am the commander, I make the law in this area at this time, so, in his already famous words, “Sally, your fired. You have betrayed the Department.”

There’s the conflict Natural Law Versus Legal Positivism.  Many people think that one person conceiving himself as “the commander” in a democracy and in a society where consultation by political executives i.e., group think, before brash actions are undertaken is dangerous to the polity.  Some even feel that it is not just authoritarian but  a step onto the road toward dictatorship and fascism. Some even this that Donald is disgraceful. 

So a question for lawyers is, “How should I think about (and what should I think about) NL v. LP.” 

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
Law Office of Michael Sean Quinn

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas 78703

512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.com

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LAWYERING, LEGAL ETHICS, AND PHILOSOPHY

CONFUCIUS (551-479 BC) FOR LAWYERS

Michael Sean Quinn*

Before (and after) I became a lawyer, I taught philosophy, and one of the areas  in which I “specialized” was ethics.  After I became a lawyer, I continued thinking about such matters and took up “legal ethics” as a topic of reflection.  (I guess I also taught the topic some too.)

Often the phrase “legal ethics” refers to a code (or set of codes) governing the conduct of lawyers. There are a number of them in America. They vary slightly on a state by state basis, and there is something like a code for federal courts. These codes are like statutes, but vaguer and created by state bar associations then “stamped” by Supreme Courts in various states. To a considerable extent these sets of rules govern penalties lawyers may suffer for more or less specified misconduct up too and including disbarment, i.e., expulsion from the realm of legal lawyering.  

Of course, lawyers have a very special status in all countries and communities. For this reason, their conduct is especially important.  Thus there must be ethics for lawyers in addition to “legal ethics.” I’ve always wondered what various philosophers might have said that would provide relevant wisdom. In fact, all philosophers who think about ethics have had (and continue to have) relevant things to say regarding proper, acceptable, superior, etc., lawyer conduct.  Often they didn’t realize the implications what they said had for the bar. 

Quite by accident, one day,  I ran across a then new translation of the ANALECTS of Confucius.  I had never read it. After spending a rainy weekend reading it, I came to the conclusion that his outlook–his system of wisdom–should be shared with other lawyers.  The link to this “preface” is what I came up with. 

Analects for Lawyers

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
Law Office of Michael Sean Quinn

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“Patrick’s Case”: A Long Short Story

SEX, CONDUCT, LAWYERS AND  LAW FIRMS

Michael Sean Quinn*

Some years ago–a mere couple of decades, really–I was involved in some informal teaching and counseling of other lawyers and assorted students.  I wrote a short story, and tacked on a set of questions for the purposes discussion.  The link to a copy of the story.

Patricks Case (Fall 1995)

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.*
Law Office of Michael Sean Quinn

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas 78703

(o) 512-296-2594

(c) 512-656-0503

mquinn@msqlaw.com

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Tired and Tiresome Legal Cliches

WORNOUT LAWYER CLICHES
Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.*

When a word is used too often, it wears out, and becomes insignificant, unconvincing, and ignored by the listener or the reader. Some terms used by lawyers are like that. Important terms become distractions of no interest. Some even become laughable when used.

Ordinary Life

There are a number of clichés, which have invaded our language, of which I am sick. Here are two examples from ordinary life. “Amazing” is one of them. If someone has lost 10 lbs in a month, it is said, by some, to be “amazing.” If someone who usually gets a grade of C on tests and gets a B, that is said to be amazing. Alternatively, some say that they are amazed. With respect to me, if an essay contains very few typos, that is said to be amazing. (Well, maybe the last one is true.)

Here is another example: awesome. It seems to me that every child who participates in a ballet recital is told (usually) by her parents and their friends, that her performance was exactly that, “awesome.” Each of the parents of each of the children tells every other child and every other parent, that their particular child’s dance was “awesome.” (Deep down, I suspect that the children are on to the practice and ignore it. At the same time, if they do not get the meaningless adulation, they recognize that fact, and. . . .) 

Language of Lawyering

Similarly, there are a number of worn-out cliches lawyers regularly use and misuse. Sometimes they are to be found in pleadings; sometimes they are found in reactions to pleadings, often when they have just been filed—or close to it. Some are used in pro-client public rhetoric. Consider the following:

muckraking:  As in, “The plaintiff’s case is nothing but muckraking.” Like other clichés, it is used excessively both in a single case and for other cases as well. Actually, users might pay attention to the apparently received fact that the term originated as a method of referring to investigative journalists, around the turn of the 19th Century into the 20th. “Everyone” then, knew who they were and that they investigated people such as, “Robber Barons,” “Corrupt Politicians,” and factories manufacturing dangerous food, together with their criminal—or, near criminal—owners. Many of us who paid attention in American history classes also know this, more or less. Hence, actual muckraking was then, now—and still is—a good thing. It is easy to see that “nothing but muckraking,” is a bad idea to assert, To repeat: some cases of muckracking are a very good idea indeed. Some much needs to be rakes.  There may be shit in muck. This is illustrated very nicely by some recovers by the U.S. against some business.  Consider, for example, the billion dollar plus settlement made with Standard and Poor, a supposedly objective company the performance was certainly neither standard nor anything but poor during the period of the later 2000s. 

outrageous:  To say that someone’s legal position is outrageous, is to say that it is completely implausible in every way; hurtfully false, and could not be accepted by any reasonable knowledgeable person.  An assertion is outrageous if it drives–or would drive–the normal person–an otherwise reasonable person–into a rage.  Paradigms of  rage are not merely irritation, a modicum of anger, some anger, or even quite a bit of anger.  Rage involves intense passion, and–at least metaphorically– screaming, shouting, pulling his/her own hair, closing both fists tightly, and/or beating on a table, gritting of teeth, and perhaps a desire for or an acceptance of  vengeance accomplished by another person—all this arising from what has been asserted.

Almost nothing in normal legal conflicts, including pre-suit harangues, is actually outrageous, and calling locutions or assertions outrageous too many times, undermines its legitimate and effective use. When I hear or see a lawyer claim that something or somebody is outrageous, I seldom pay much attention. If uses of the term were restricted to the actually outrageous, as opposed to the routinely and perhaps irritating, its use might be meaningful and influential.

It may be too late for appropriate usage to be restored to its genuine status and to do the same for the impact of usage, unless the term (and its linguistic sampling) is given a vacation from use, at least by lawyers.  Instead, we have the destruction of a wonderful, even magisterial word.

Here are appropriate uses of the terms “outrageous” and/or “outraged.” On January 2, 2013, a number of American politicians expressed outrage about the failure of the House of Representatives to pass the relief bill for victims of Hurricane Sandy. Here is another and very different situation of the term outrageous: what happened in Pakistan recently arising out the terrible rape of a young woman on a bus, followed by her being thrown off the bus and to her death. To be sure, the event in Pakistan is more outrageous  than the refusal of the House to pass the relief bill for the victims of Sandy, but both situations were outrageous, and it was appropriate for observers to be enraged. 

One has to admit that there are degrees of being outrageous. At some levels comparing and contrasting different really outrageous incidents is impossible, rationally speaking.  Consider the Pakistan event and the general culture of the country permitting (if not encouraging) damage to women versus the Newtown event and the very different culture surrounding it. Or, compare either of them with the Madoff Ponzi scheme.  Whatever else can be said, there are limits on the “underside,” however, and those are high. Those with common sense about human relationships and those with knowledge of the English language can quickly tell the difference.

fail & failure: These words fit the situation. Frequently, any refraining is often described as a “failure to do ‘something.'” “She didn’t give ‘Argument #5,'” is not the same as “She failed to give ‘Argument #5.'” In addition, it does not support the silent and implied assertion, “Since she failed to give ‘Argument #5,'” her whole [complex and multifaceted] argument is a failure, [and so is she]. Of course, this is false.

Scapegoat:  Often, lawyers for defendants say, “The plaintiff is trying to use my client as a scapegoat.” This is supposed to mean that the lawyer’s client has done nothing wrong, so far as the lawsuit is concerned, and that the plaintiff is trying to blame the defense lawyer’s client for the “sins” of the plaintiff. This word and this concept are used often. The expression is far too complex in its history for this use.

In the Old Testament (Leviticus 16:5-10), the people, through Aaron, would bring to the Temple two goats. They are there to provide atonement for the sins of the community. One of them was to be executed in the Temple, virtually then-and-there on the appropriate alter. The other one, would be permitted (or forced) to escape into the desert. That goat usually died, just as the first one did, but stayed alive for a while, so that the second goat might live, but probably not—indeed, almost certainly not.

I speculate that some of these goats were killed by heat; others were eaten by other animals; and yet others were pilfered by the least honest, killed, and eaten. From time immortal, it has been suggested that the second goat was being sent to Azazel who may have been some sort of demon. The virtual certainty of the death of the scapegoat as atonement is not what  the defense lawyer has in mind, nor is the idea that he is playing a legitimate role, selected by a part of the community, in an honored religious practice that may have lasted (what?) maybe 2000, or so, years.

Frivolous: It is amazing—really, “amazing”—how many lawsuits are called “frivolous,” even before they begin. To be sure, there are rules against filing “frivolous” lawsuits, especially if a lawyer does it too many times, whether regarding a single strand of facts or completely different facts. Nevertheless, anyone experienced in civil litigation knows that many, many more lawsuits are called “frivolous” than are found by judges to be so or which even are. 

Not every lawsuit that is dismissed for failure to state a claim is actually frivolous.  The facts may be shocking and grave, but it is simply not the sort of thing, which is actionable. Governmental immunity sets up this situation, even if an inventive lawyer convinces himself that he can twist, turn, and prevail. 

For now, enough is enough. The reader will have gotten the main idea. As awesome as this topic is, as outrageous and amazing as it is for real lawyers to engage this sort of frivolity, as these “numb skulls” may be, this essay does not seek to make them into scapegoats, and certainly not in the long established sense. There may be more later on this topic, for that is the nature of muckraking.
Preposterous: Something is preposterous when it it is radically implausible, at striking variance (or strikingly at variance) with what is thought to be commonsensical, very very implausible, “totally implausible,” laughable, deserving of ridicule, something only an “idiot” might suggest.  The trouble is that the law (or the life of the law) is fully of the preposterous, starting at such  conceptual places as the idea that a devout monastic priest would be seducing a youngster in the shower, lots of different kinds of ideas of the unexpecteds, arrests, breaches of  intra-family contracts and/or sacred agreements, some passionate pursuits of self-interest, e.g., by pastors preaching Christian altruism) is full of states of affairs, actions, omissions, situations, and wealth just like this.  
Ludicrous: This one is just like “preposterous” and its cousins.  

Additions and Amendments

March 13, 2015

Maybe there are some words that aren’t used much but convey the same sense of semantic overreach. Or maybe not.  Maybe since there are extensively unused, one might be able to do something with them, under the right circumstances. Obviously, I really don’t know. But here are two: 

Astonish, Astonishing, Astonished, Astonishment, as in “It is astonishing that someone would give this argument.”

Astound, Astounding, Astounded, as in “The court may find it astounding that counsel would rely on a case which was reversed a generation ago.”

*Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin, Texas 78703

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In different situations, even propositions which appear undeniable may not be true in all situations.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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