More on “Suez v. ‘Evergreen’/’Ever Given'[*] & Owner”

Suez Ship Disaster of 2021 & Insurance

I wrote a piece about this event and its early aftermath and published it on April 6, 2021. I have been adding new material to it. “Updates” as the computer calls them as the case has developed. Thus, there are several of these included in the April 6, entry.

An early at least tentative settlement agreement has been reached by one of the parties and at least one insurance company, UK Club. An update from the AP  is to be found tacked onto the April 6 post.

One odd thing. The ship has usually called the “Ever Given. Today, however, in a picture on the story-site of AP-NEWS, there is a huge sign on the side of the ship that says “EVERGREEN.”

Something of the same problem arises in the June 24 issue of CLAIMS JOURNAL. In an article entitled “Agreement in Principle Reached” the ship is called “Ever Given.” (As in “The Ever Given containership has been anchored in a lake[the Great Bitter Lake–]….”

Interestingly–or oddly, perhaps–immediately above that sentence is a good-sized photograph of the ship, with a tug boat nearby. On the side of the ship is a huge, easily visible copy of a name, “Evergreen.”

“Ismailia, Egypt–Suez Canal authorities announced Wednesday the release of the hulking shipping vessel that blocked the crucial east-west waterway for nearly a week earlier this year. The Ever Given [aka “EVERGREEN”] after its Japanese owner, Shoei Kisen Kaisha Ltd., reached a settlement with the canal authorities over a compensation amount after more than three months of negotiations and a court standoff. The settlement deal was signed in a ceremony Wednesday in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia, after which the vessel was seen sailing to the Mediterranean” (Publish 7:30 a.m. ET July 7, 2021)

Excellent article and good photos published in NYT Sunday, July 18, 2021. Much more thorough than anything else. Nothing about insurance, however.

Nevertheless, this article states that “Evergreen” is the name of the ship’s operating company and that the ship’s actual name is “Ever Given.”

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Suez Ship Disaster of 2021 and Insurance

Suez Ship Disaster of 2021 & Insurance

I wrote a piece about this event and its early aftermath and published it on April 6, 202. I have been adding new material as the case has developed. For example, I added one more about insurance on June 23, 2021–after the date of this entry. Thus, there are several short posts including in the April 6, entry. Journalistic-level stuff.

Maybe this is the last of these:

“Ismailia, Egypt–Suez Canal authorities announced Wednesday the release of the hulking shipping vessel that blocked the crucial east-west waterway for nearly a week earlier this year. The Ever Given [aka “EVERGREEN”] after its Japanese owner, Shoei Kisen Kaisha Ltd., reached a settlement with the canal authorities over a compensation amount after more than three months of negotiations and a court standoff. The settlement deal was signed in a ceremony Wednesday in the Suez Canal city of Ismailia, after which the vessel was seen sailing to the Mediterranean” (Publish 7:3 a.m. ET July 7, 2021)

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DEPOSITIONS: TRAP QUESTIONS – HONEST ANSWERS

ANSWERING NEFARIOUS DEPO QUESTIONS: HOW TO DO IT

Here are several versions of roughly the same questions asked at (or toward the end) of may depositions.

“Have you understood the questions I have asked you?”

“Have you understood each of the questions you have answered?”

“You have understood all the questions I have asked, where you didn’t raise questions have you not?”

And there are other forms.

Most witnesses answer by saying, “Yes.”

This is always a mistake, although quite often it is a harmless one.

The reason this is a mistake is because people often do not understand sentences asserted before them, including questions, although they think they understand them.

The truthful answer and the safe one is “I don’t know.”

If the depositioner goes further and asks “Why not? or “Which one(s) did you or do you not understand ?”

The correct answer is this, “There are things I believe where I turn out to be wrong.” Or, “Sometimes I think I know something when I do not. This applies to understanding language.” Both of these propositions are true.

If the depositioner asks, “Well, do you understand the question I am asking now?” The correct and safe answer is the same, “I don’t know.”

If the depositioner then asks, “Do you think you do?” An accurate answer might be, “I’m not sure, of course, but maybe.”

If the depositioner keeps going down this path, the witness should resist. Either the depositioner is trying to trap the witness or s/he is on an undignified power trip. Repeating an answer of the form already given is usually OK.

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Texas Insurance Bad Faith Law: “Independent Injury”

The “Independent Injury” in Texas Insurance Statutory Bad Faith Law

The idea of “independent injury” is part of the Texas laws of bad faith. It is about damages with a special origin, and perhaps, a new cause of action; it is as a cause of action that it should be pleaded, I think. As virtually all lawyers know, pleading something as a cause of action will not change how it is treated, by a court, even if it is not actually a separate cause of action. If the insurer files a special exception and the court agrees, then simply replead. One might consider pleading it redundancy, both as a cause of action and as a kind of damages.

The most recent explication of the idea of “independent of,” and therefore “separateness,” is to be found in the Texas Supreme Court’s mandamus opinion in a UIM case partly styled In re State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 19-0791 (Tex, March 19, 2021). See especially its Section III.A. The court calls “independent injury” as a second way to obtain damages under the applicable state, and it is the only way to do this without proving coverage. It is also covered briefly in the short, curiam opinion  Biasatti v. GuideOne National Ins., 18-0911 (Tex. April 17, 2020). The GuideOne case involves an appraisal “proceeding,” something that has yet been a feature in this case.

It is a good thing to keep in mind the U.S.A.A. v. Menchaca [II],  545 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2018), virtually the “Grand Master” of the problems being discussed herein and virtually all of first-party Texas insurance bad faith law. (I am using the word “virtual” and “virtually” in an old-fashioned way, where the term means, roughly, “almost.”)

The inclusion of “[II]” is my notation and is intended to indicate that the controlling case is a rehearing of the whole case earlier decided.

The majority in Menchaca [II]  recognized that the standard way to prove insurer bad faith is to prove-up insurer breach of contract but it recognized (or created) a second route to proving bad faith and it called this alternative approach the “second path to recovery.”  The second route requires proof of a special sort of damage(s) independent of breach of contract, and it must be extreme in nature.—MSQ

The State Farm Mutual case, under discussion here, where there was a majority, is one of the most important cases regarding insurer bad faith in the last few years, even though several cases follow Menchaca [II] in the year or so after it was decided See Barbara Tech. and Ortiz.

In the case I am discussing here, In re State Farm, high Court indicated that an independent injury could be an injury that canceled out (or overrode) the insured’s duty to prove coverage and breach of contract before that insured could proceed on the basis of alleged statutory insurer bad faith. This idea is to be found in a precedential portion of Menchaca [II], 545 SW3d 479 (Tex. 2018), and in a couple of earlier decisions mentioned in Menchaca [II], as well as two of the decisions following Menchaca [II], mentioned in the last paragraph.

To succeed in this move the injury must be “independent” of any claim under–or recoverable under–the policy, and the damages must not be the sort of thing that is or would be covered upon the policy if there is (or were) a breach of the insurance contract. It must also be “extreme.”

A typical example of “extreme” would probably be that the insurer performed actions making it impossible for the insured to report an injury or make a claim. Maybe the insurer’s conduct “being outrageous” is evidence of “being extreme,” but that conduct must be outside processing the claim.

If an insured has proceeded with filing a claim seeking first-party coverage under the policy, and the insurer has responded to it, incorrectly–even wretchedly., it is hard to see how “independent damage” can be established. Then again, Black Swans exist.

Of course, there can be “routine” bad faith damages after coverage is established or put in play, but the bad faith damages  are not “independent” in the special legal sense created by the Supreme Court. Under most circumstances, damages independent of both insurer breach of contract and insurer bad faith are not an “additive” obtainable in addition to damages for breach of contract and statutory bad faith.

Ultimately, if a breach of contract is proved, there may also be damages resulting from the insurer’s bad faith  (i.e. not to be found in the breach of contract, and consequential damages resulting from that breach). However, those damages may not be used to circumvent the requirement of proof regarding the breach of contract.

Of course, that is no problem in this case about that matter, since breach of contract was pleaded, whether or not there is an issue of coverage, as opposed to damages only.

In the case styled In re State Farm Mutual, a mandamus decision of 2021 could be promising, although it must be remembered violations of the applicable statute in processing a claim probably may not fall within “independent injury,” although statutory violations can be a source of damages once coverage is proved.

One might argue that there are two senses of the term “independent” in Texas insurance bad faith law.  (1) One sense is the so-called second route to bad faith outlined by  Menchaca II and its progenies, (2) while the other sens of the word is the kind of damages that are recoverable under the  Texas law of bad faith when breach of contract has been pleaded and proved.

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Paid-to-Appeal Scheme and the Law-of-Lawyering + Legal Ethics

BAYER’S ROUNDTOP® LITIGATION: CAN  BAYER PAY SEMI-DEFEATED PLAINTIFF TO APPEAL HIS CASE?

Bayer put out a product some years ago named “Roundup®.” It was a weed-killer. Allegedly it causes cancer in some, and Bayer allegedly failed to warn purchasers about this danger. There have been many, many lawsuits and more are on the way.  Bayer has agreed to pay as much as $11.6 billion to settle existing cases from about 125,000 customers.

“Enough is enough” Bayer has “whispered.” Thus it wants a High Court ruling on a key aspect of the pattern cases.  To do this, Bayer is financing an appeal against itself. One John Carson, M.D., of Georgia, is the appellant.  I am not clear how or how much Bayer is paying or to whom. Maybe it’s simply paying costs and fees, or maybe it’s paying Dr. Carson himself something, and maybe Dr. Carson will be entitled to recompense(s) if he prevails on his appeal(s).

Whatever their agreement is in totality, Carson will have to pay a penalty if he drops out of the appeal.

Leaders of “the Plaintiff’s Bar” focused on bringing these cases don’t like the Bayer-Carson arrangement one little bit. They denounce it as being a “brazen manipulation of our judicial system.” (I doubt “brazen” is the right word here since Bayer has been, at least pretty, up-front with the appellate court as to what is going on.)

At the same time, what the Bayer-Carson “team” is doing doesn’t fit well into the idea that what we have is an “adversarial system”–something which is celebrated in all parts of the bar over and over again.

“Our adversary system of justice generally depends ‘on the parties to frame the issues for decisions and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiter  of matters the parties present.'” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)—MSQ

Then again, we have two parties who have conflicts of various sorts arising out of the state of affairs continuing with litigation even though they have solved some, many, or most of their dispute.

At the same time, however, I’d bet that Bayer will be in control of the appellate litigation. I would think that Carson would have a sort of indemnity agreement to protect himself if Bayer were to act contrary to his real interests.

The Bayer-Carson arrangement is really better described as a kind of “political” move. It is a move to intentionally obtain a sweeping restructuring of the Roundup Legal Battle Field by getting a single selected case to the Highest Court, thereby antecedently limiting the rights of other plaintiffs.

“But what’s the real problem here?” one might be heard to ask. The rule of stare decisis permits encourages, entails, and demands that this sort of thing happen, and the application of that rule frequently depends on a single case.

Maybe the problem is that cases that are said to be binding precedent should be–and often are–thoroughly fought through as well as carefully thought through. That cannot happen here. It is also important to remember that a stare decisis rule is always to be viewed in a narrow. That is the opposite of what Bayer hopes to achieve.

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Quinn Quotes

Legal systems are inherently conservative. One reason is that one function of legal systems is to make stability likely; that usually requires a reasonable, cooperative, disciplined, and peaceful society. Any cooperative order requires honesty and defeats radical individualism  Furthermore, social stability almost always requires that the present and often some of the further to resemble the past, even if its supports pluralism and the cosmopolitan.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact