LAWYERS, LAW FIRMS & BUSINESS(ES)

It is often said that law as a business, law firms conceptualized as businesses, lawyers thinking of themselves as businessmen (or women), etc. is relatively new to the legal profession, relatively new to the way lawyers conceive of themselves (and their professional establishments).  It is also said to be harmful to lawyers,  harmful to the profession, and disastrous to lawyer professionalism (aka the “legal profession.” 

These propositions are false.

Some simple, undeniable truths, refute it completely. Begin by considering what a business really is. A business dictionary on the Internet, Investopedia, gives the following reasonable definitions:  (1) An organization or enterprising entity in commercial, industrial, or professional activities. (2) Any commercial, industrial, or professional activity undertaken by an individual or group. (3) A reference to a specific area or type of economic activity. If these three definitions are right, then the proposition that lawyers were not in business until relatively recently, cannot be true.

If the practice of law is a principal source of income, then lawyers practicing alone or in smallgroups are business persons. They are persons in business.  They work as persons in markets; they are there to make money; they are usually in competition; they either succeed in that operation or they do not; one cause of success in practicing law is sufficient revenue; one source of failure is so little income the arrangement cannot continue; one sort of a “middling” success is a moderate amount of revenue; one source of a high degree of success is substantial revenue.  These observations have never been anything but true. I talk about revenue because a lawyer’s income may come from other sources–raising pigs, for example.

Law firms are groups of lawyers engaged in the practice of law together. Sometimes they are all on the same level, sometimes not. Sometimes there are vertical patterns of involvement, sometimes not. 

Those at the top of the “ladder” manage those further down. Some rise; some don’t. This has been true from time immemorial.  

About a hundred and fifty years ago and before, lawyers tended to practice in ones and twos.  This was true of Alexander Hamilton, John Martial, and Abraham Lincoln, even they had firms. Money was made; sometimes not. Sometimes a lot of money was made; sometimes not. It is absurd to suggest that in 1800, through 1835, law practice was not business.

Still, these small organizations bought paper, pens, and so forth.  They hired people to work for them: clerks in the original sense, clerks in something like the later sense, i.e., young lawyers doing some legal work and learning at the same time, people to write out documents, runners, people to go to the telegraph office, somewhat later somebody to answer the phone, people to go to the store and buy supplies. 

I’ll bet there were, (1) people to stand around taverns and (2) other places–sewing circles–waiting to help his or her “employer.”  There might even have been (3) people to, as one might say, make friends at the courthouse, (4) people to make friends with law enforcement officials, and (5) people to make friends at newspapers. No doubt, there were many others. Of course, lots of times one person held down several jobs. The general point is that all of this would be a business. It would be concerned about revenues, pay, human relations, billing, profits, and so on. Some of this would be true even for a small office, once it became minimally mature.

All of these propositions are hard to confirm. There is a little general history of law firms and their evolution.  Virtually all the interesting-sounding entries on the Internet are histories of individual firms, and–for obvious reasons–those are unreliable, even when they are written by university professors. In addition, all of those firm histories are of firms that are still “alive” or which “died” very recently.  While I admit that it may be “out there,” I know of no significant law firm history that is found in the autobiographies, memoirs, and biographies of individual lawyers, and those will have to be very detailed and expansive. Material about Lincoln is interesting but mainly focuses on court involvements.  Almost nothing is to be found in Martin Horowitz’s grand historical studies–perhaps the greatest history of American law.

Moreover, a good many lawyers became part of business elites. They represented wealthy people, shippers (both inland and maritime), manufacturers, real estate tycoons, and companies they formed, at least after the Charles River Bridge case. There were elite lawyers, just as there are now, and they were ambitious for money and position, just as they are now.  There were fashions, the elite lawyers dressed more or less in conformity with them. I’ll bet some slept well and others worked long hours.

If there are major differences between then and now, the following are the beginning: (i) the size of some firms, (ii) the existence of law schools, their hierarchy (iii) the amounts of money at stake even after the changes in the value of money, (iv) disputes with other businesses, (v) disputes between the businesses they represent, (vi) and related others (such as railroads and landowners), (vii) the firm being among those regulations by different governments, (viii) the amount and complexity of lobbying, (ix) the existence of labor forces, (x) the existence of labor organized to some degree or another, and so forth. Some of these just give lawyers more to do and things to do of different kinds.

If I am right about even a fraction of the speculations, certainties, and economic truths, the contention that law firms have evolved into business is dead wrong.

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“Cyber Space” Insurance–Part Three

Supplement to Parts #1 & #2 Regarding

In theory, at least, an insurance policy could be restricted to one or more”virtual world(s),” instead of cyberspace.  In the area of insurance, if something can be done in theory, it is likely to be done in practice.

Some of the former types of policies, “real world” policies have taken years to change, at least when the policy started using a form for the main part and then attaching endorsements.  In fact, as to true content, more than one policy has taken 100 years or longer to change the commonly used central ideas, e.g., what was insured, what was not, and what was excluded, not to mention terminology, e.g., “accidence” changed into “occurrence.”

Cyber-world insurance policies will also undergo change, and they will probably go much faster since the technology is and will change much more rapidly. These changes are not those between a 1936 Chevy and one from 1947. They are and will be much larger, and their use is changing at “breakneck” speed.

Cyber-insurance may presently find many sorts of existing policies: homeowners, commercial building owners, some forms of liability insurance, health insurance, and many more. Usually, this is done by endorsement.

Of course, lots of insurance attended to the cyber-world will not change.  The draftsmen of the policy will have gotten it right the first time, and/or there haven’t been relevant changes in that which is being insured.  This is extremely unlikely in any amount of time aside from a short one.  Some cyberspace “objects” will cause damage or injury to tangible objects to be found in the world outside the cyber-world, e.g., human bodies and other types of objects such as wooden objects. That is likely to be controlled by today’s insurance, with new exclusions as needed (or wanted).

 Insurance coverage lawyers working on cyber-space problems will not change much: corporate law, real estate, patent law, parts of patent infringement law (maybe), the law regarding other types of intellectual property, directors and officers insurance, insurance for accountancy, and so forth. Of course, some of the types of patents lawyers work on are changing, and the ideas will as well, but the basics of filing patents, obtaining them, and then disputing them probably will not, at least not much.  

The laws and the rules of civil procedure may not change much.   Parts of the law of evidence may change enormously, as will the context of educating clients, judges, and juries. Still, the general principles of rhetoric will not; though for a time, explaining things to judges, juries, and each other will be more difficult.  See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc. & Rosedale, 487 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D. Pa., 2007).  (This was an opinion on several “virtual reality” issues using established procedural law.  “Bragg contends that Defendants, the operators of the [relevant] virtual world, unlawfully confiscated his virtual property and denied him access to their virtual world. Ultimately at issue, in this case, where the novel questions what rights and obligations grow out of the relationship between the owner and creator of a virtual world and its resident-customers.  While the property and the world where it is found are ‘virtual,’ the dispute is not.”)Some parts of the nature and rules of professional practice for lawyers may also change, so far as content is concerned.  Lawyers are now worried about their use of the “cloud” and their obligations to keep client information confidential. No doubt other existing professions will have similar additions and new twists.

Governmental Regulation of Insurers.  It took a century or so for government regulation to develop to where it is now for the insurance industry. Such regulations are already there for application to the cyber-world, but they will also develop far faster than they did for real-world insurance. New government regulations of insureds will be necessary since there are new sets of immaterial “objects” to be insured together will combinations of them and their uses by insureds.  The extent of regulation may increase or diversify. I would not be surprised to see more insurer regulation shift to the federal government. At the same time as these changes take place, some modes of regulation will not change.  State governments will still require some types of insurance to submit to substantial regulation of various types.    State-approved insurers will still have to use some state-approved forms (when they exist). And surplus lines used in cyberspace insurance will be required to deal with departments of insurance in different ways and diminished ways from those of approved carriers and to different degrees.

Insurer Regulation of the  Cyber-World and Its “Relative,” the Virtual-World.  Let us start with an example from the insurance of yesterday and today. Insurers often insist, as an antecedent condition of issuing a policy, that an organization, group, and/or a person either have something or not have something, before they will insure it, them, or him/her.  Here is such a provision: country clubs, municipalities, and schools are often required not to have high diving boards for their swimming pools before a company will insure them for potential liabilities. Not having filed more than Y number of lawsuits and/or not having more than Z lawsuits filed against it, is another.  These kinds of insurer created regulations are often placed in the application for insurance; then, the application and the answers are made part of the insurance.

It seems obvious that cyber-space and the virtual world will create a whole new and larger group of necessary conditions like these.

To the extent that these kinds of requirements (or others) are to be found in insurance contracts, the insurer will be regulating the market and other behavior of virtual reality and its economic side. law, other kinds of ownership law.

Obviously, some of my assertions about the future of cyberspace insurance are at least somewhat speculative.  We shall see.

Changes.  I should have mentioned in both Part #1 and Part #2, that there have been changes in the so-called “real”-world insurance policies, and there will be changes in the “cyber-worlds” or  “cyber-space,” policies.  The terms “cyberspace,”  “cyber-world,” or any synonym are not intended to be restricted to “virtual world,” although the concept of “virtual world” is included in them.

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Cyber-Insurance & “Established Insurance” Compared–PART #2

All insurance involves the transfer of risk(s).  One party (or one group of parties) obtains value protection from losing–in some matter–something valuable.  This loss can come about in a variety of ways:  a ring is stolen, a key is permanently “misplaced,” a whole set goes now the sewer, a building burns down, a person sustains a bodily injury from a doctor who operated on the wrong wrist, a medical bill that has to be paid, a debtor hasn’t paid a bill, and so forth.  Not all protections from risks are insurance; the use of a security interest, for example, in the loan transaction, illustrates this point. Not everyone who has some sort of transactional assurance of little to no loss has insurance.  Interestingly in England, some of what are uniformly called “insurance policies” in America are sometimes called “assurance policies,” and what is called “insurance companies” in the United States can be called “assurance companies” or “assurance syndicates” in the U.K.  Some might say that surety agreements are not insurance, but that would be a mistake.

The same will be true of cyber-insurance: if a bank makes a mistake; customers’ identities are stolen; the customers sustain actual damages then the bank may be liable and be obligated damages. Some cyber insurance policies may cover the loss.  The bank’s customers may be insureds, or the bank may be the insured.  If only the bank is the only insured, the policy is probably a liability policy or contains a relevant part.  (Sometimes policies are “packages,” and so contain several different kinds of insurance.)

Many liability policies are “occurrence” policies, while others are “claims made” policies.  Each one of these cyber-liabilities will have an enormous effect on what is covered and what is not.

Many policies include a duty incumbent on the insurer to defend the insured in case the insured is a defendant in litigation.  Today, the cost of defense eats up the amount of coverage reduces the monetary size of the policy; and sometimes it does not.

It would be surprising if most cyber-liability insurance policies were not “claims made” type policies, and it is very likely that the policies will be designed so that defense costs eat up and thereby reduce the amount of insurance available to pay the actual loss inflicted on the person claiming a compensable loss.

(A key part of the insurance vocabulary for this distinction is “duty to defend” and “duty to indemnify.  The second of the two duties isn’t exactly what it says it is, but the use of the phrase “duty to indemnity” is more than100 years old.  It was right then but not now.)

A number of tort cases have been brought against different kinds of parties for permitting identity theft. At least usually, these cases are lost because the plaintiffs, those whose identity was stolen, have not sustained actual material losses  Mental anguish without some “genuine injury” (usually physical but sometimes economic only) is not counted as actionable losses.  See Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 18 Tex.  Wesleyan Law Rev. 183, Section II (2011) (helpful list of identity theft cases lost with none won).  See Hammond v. The Bank of New York Mellon Corp., 210 WL 2643307 (S.D. N.Y. 2010). (containing a long list of influential cases where theft of identity cases dismissed since not actual damages).

Most insurance depends upon and requires fortuity.   Most events, the occurrence are not fortuitous, from the point of view of the insured,  are not insurable.  Arson is not insurable if the policyholder starts a fire in his own building.  If I throw my keys down into the sewer, the values of the keys are not insurable.  If A deliberately burns down the building of B, A’s third-party liability carrier may not cover B’s loss, but B’s first-party insurance may.  It might very well, however, pay A’s defense costs.

These points illustrate the difference between most third-party insurance, on the one hand, and first-party insurance on the other.  A’s liability insurance is third-party insurance, whereas B’s insurance on his stuff, his cash under the bed, or health coverage on himself is first-party insurance.

Not all insurance requires fortuity.  This coverage is very narrow, indeed tiny.  Life insurance usually covers some types of suicide.  The type in question is suicide which occurs sometime after the commencement of the policy.  That period is usually two years.  I cannot think of an analogy in cyber insurance[cm_simple_footnote id=”1″].  Of course, life insurance itself will be involved in cyber-insurance arrangements, but it will probably be the same there and then as it is here and now.

Most liability insurance is linked to torts; most cyber-liability insurance is already and/or will be like that.   Some current policies are linked to breach of contract; creditors insurance is like that.  Some policies that cover breaches of contract are included in “mostly-tort-based” liability policies, but not always.  The opposite is also true; there are “mostly-contract-based” policies, and some of them include a few covered torts.

Also arising out of contracts, there are sometimes tort liabilities.  Breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing found in all contracts are sometimes considered torts.  If A breaches a contract with B and then breaches the contract, but by the breach physically injures B or injures C in some way or another, there may be a tort between A and C.  There will probably be coverages like this, although cyber- liability insurers will exclude as much as they can of these configurations, or try to pass them off on other insurers, such as standard liability insurance available today.

Most of the torts existing now will, as is, or as adjusted, will be spread across the “cyber-field.”  (I am ignoring damages caused to physical objects or the human body (a form of a physical object, since they are now covered).  Here are at least some examples of tort theories that will be transposed across the “physical” or “real” world to the “cyber” or “virtual” world.

Negligence:  This is the failure of an insured  to do what a normal and prudent person would do under the circumstances or fail to conduct himself in accordance with the standard of care that is generally accepted given the situation  (What counts as damages, what is compensable under insurance policies, and how the size of covered damages are calculated may all be different.)

Defamation Invasion of privacyInterference with contractInterference with the economic positionstrict liability (necessary adaptations replacing the requirement of there being liability only if a physical object–like a toaster–is at least part of the so-called proximate cause)nuisancefraudmisrepresentationerrors and omissions type torts (These are really a kind of negligence, at least usually.  But they are specialized): lawyersaccountantsbrokers of various sortsthird party managers, administrators, and/or quasi-agents (Some insurance adjusters are like this.)designers of codes, etc.encryptions, etcfirewalls and similar devicessimilar safety measuressimplicity

intellectual-property torts: wrongful use, wrongful acquisition, wrongful imitation, etc.  Imagine using computer hacking to obtain a patented plan for something, then destroying the owner’s plan, and then putting the plan to one’s own use and the list goes on for a long time.

No doubt the reader will have noticed that the concept of negligence is a complex and widespread type of concept across all of human behavior and covers an enormous range of possible damages.  The reader may think of anything s/he can which causes damages to someone other than the “actor,” or some related parties, and negligence will exist in cyber-law and cyber-insurance law.  Not all kinds of injuries and therefore not all kinds of damage will be.  This is one place where there may be a whole variety of alterations needed and provided.

In terms of adjusting, altering, changing, and revising cyber-insurance, first-party coverage will be treated and work much the same way.  It will still, almost certainly turn on the insured having a property interest–or something like it–in that which is insured.

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Cyber-Insurance aka E-Commerce Insurance–Part #1

This is the first “chapter” in a string of blogs focusing on cyber insurance.  This one will concern the look of “yesterday’s” policies–the ones used for a long, long time–and the look of a branch of “tomorrow’s, that is, the cyber policies.  Actually, the two groups will look remarkably alike in the organization.  When you think about it, “Really?  How could it be otherwise?”

The next chapter will concern some aspects of substantive similarity.  Other blogs will list and very briefly sketch some of the currently available policies. Somewhere along the way, there will be some definitions and some explorations or explanations of such. Most significantly, there will be chapters discussing the contents of a few actual cyber insurance policies.

There are not many meaningful, focused, or informative publications about cyber insurance.  (That is the name-phrase that will be used here; it has mostly replaced the term “E-Commerce.”) Most available writings are really ads of some sort for somebody some are attorney firms publicizing themselves and conjecturing about the future, and there are some panel discussions which would probably interest almost no one really interested in the nature of the type of insurance.  Another category of the prevailing literature is the pieces written at law firms.  Much of this is a law firm advertising its services, though sometimes that is combined with guesswork or speculations about how cyber-insurance will develop. There are a few specimen policies issued by some of the best insurance companies, but they do not provide meaningful discussion.  A book published on this topic, and it is the only one so far as I can see, is by George S. Sutcliffe entitled E-Commerce and Internet Risks, Laws, Loss Control, and Insurance (Standard Publishing Corporation, 2001).  It has a helpful essay, which includes far too many diverse topics. The appendices, however, have a glossary, a summary of some policies, and some specimen policies.  So far as I can tell, this is the sourcebook. No doubt, one of the reasons for the absence of a detailed study of the dimensions of cyber-insurance is that there are almost no–or even no–reported cases involving coverage disputes. (I, for example, have yet to find one such case on Westlaw; and law reviews have no informative discussions of the matter. This is not to say that there are no cyber cases–for example, cyber tort cases–that are without hints.  Several large law firm members have told me that their firms each have a dozen or so cases, but they also say that none are in or close to litigation. There is also one (“Westlaw-‘reported'”) case involving identity theft in which a bank offered, among other things free identity theft insurance up to $25,000.00 to its customers as part of a remedy following an identity theft incident.  Alas, the plaintiff class rejected the offer.  Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 2010 WL 2643307 (S.D.N.Y., June 25, 2010).  (Of course, one can see why–if a plaintiff thought s/he might be at the door of big damages–would reject a $25k settlement.) So far as I can tell,  in all court-decided cases (thus not including settlements, if any) involving identity theft, the plaintiffs have lost.  For a survey and discussion of these cases, see Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 18 Tex.Wesleyan Review 184, 187-199 (Winter, 2011).  There is a very recent case in which the plaintiff had not yet experienced a loss, but for that reason only, could still proceed if their injuries were not entirely speculative and not off in the far distant further.  This matter is called a matter of “Standing” under federal court jurisprudence. In re SONY GAMING NETWORKS AND CUSTOMER ATA SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION, _____ F.Supp. ____ (S.D.Cal. 2012)(2012 WL 4849054).  Most of the case was dismissed on other grounds, but an actual already existing injury is not an iron-clad requirement for a right to proceed, at least under some circumstances. Now, before I turn to the analysis of policies and make conjectures, aka guesses, as to what their difficult sections might mean, I start with a few fundamentals for the insurance novice. These come from general insurance sources and therefore are not special when it comes to cyber insurance.  At one basic level, insurance is insurance, and so are some other contracts e.g., bonds and ancient bottom try arrangements. So let’s begin. Virtually all primary insurance contracts have roughly the same form.  Excess and umbrella policies do not necessarily, but they often incorporate significant, if not all, provisions found in the primary policy.  Contracts of reinsurance, although they are contracts of insurance, do not follow the same formula. Here, in broad strokes, is a sketch of common sections.  Often different principal sections are identified by the names I use here and by roman numerals. I. Declaration Page (or Sheet).  This part includes the name(s) of the actual insurer and the name(s) of the policyholders. Often it sets forth the premium, the name of the intermediary, policy limits, etc.  Sometimes they have charts or columns, and the policy includes that which is checked off.  The deductible is specified or set up, as is co-insurance if any. Other named insureds may be named elsewhere. II. Insuring Agreement.  This part sets forth what is insured, i.e., a particular vehicle, a particular building, physical objects, one or more banquets, particular weddings, works of art, and so forth.

These agreements are usually for liability (3rd party coverage) or for things, e.g., belonging to the insured (1st party coverage.)  The agreements usually do not recite a fundamental principle of insurance and that is fortuity.  This is an axiom.  Deliberately caused injuries or damages are not covered; arson is not covered; physically smashing something up deliberately, e.g., a computer, fraud, and so forth.  Intentional acts are covered, so long as the loss was not.  There is insurance for those driving too fast, but not if they deliberately run over or smash into something. Sometimes insurance policies offer both liability and first-party insurance, often covering the physical property.  Sometimes the first party insurance may cover abstract properties, and this is true in the area of cyber insurance, in addition to business loss and trade credit insurances.  Bottomry was like this 3000+ years ago. III. Definitions.  There is usually an indication that there are definitions to be found in the policy: quotation marks, bold lettering, italics, etc.  Sometimes there are only a few definitions; sometimes, as in many cyber policies, the number is much larger than most current policies.  Often, at least to the layperson, the definitions are obscure.  (This is not necessarily a matter of great consequence, since definitions in engineering malpractice policies are also quite difficult for the layperson–so much so that expert witnesses often have to be used for the benefit of the jury.) IV,  Exclusions,  This sets forth what the insurance contract does not cover.  Of course, there are exclusions quietly built into the Insurance Agreement, but this is generally not recognized.  The list of exclusions can be relatively short, or it can be quite long, as it is in most cyber insurance policies, specially packaged policies. Policyholders have to prove that they meet the requirements of the relevant Insurance Agreements. Carriers have the burden of proof regarding exclusions; the burden shifts back to the insureds when there are exceptions to the exclusions.  The content of many exclusions in cyber-insurance policies is likely to be substantially different since there will be few or no tangible objects or situations to exclude. (None like this: “We do not exclude the damages caused by your pets eating your bushes.”) V. Conditions.  They have usually conditioned precedents and there are a few conditions subsequent. Among the best known of conditions are the insured’s duty to cooperate in the adjustment process and their duty of remediating losses, that is, using reasonable efforts to keep those losses from getting worse (e.g., things like storm-damaged buildings) from getting any worse. Some requirements, which are listed in the “Conditions” section, are no conditions at all but covenants, i.e., promises. Timely notice of covered events is often not really a condition but a covenant, i.e., promise.  The requirement of cooperation may be like that. Remediation is perhaps not a condition or a promise irrespective of what the policy says, and so forth.  It is not completely determined what contractual requirements are actually conditions and which are not.  Nevertheless, some other common obligations usually classified as conditions are these: subrogation rights, some features of contract termination, some features of cancellation, assignment, the status of other insurance, and more.  Arguments about what is a condition precedent (or subsequent) versus what is a “mere” promise, are not uncommon, and the truth is not determined by the name of the section.  Just because something is found in a section entitled “Condition” does not mean that it is a condition. VII. Endorsements.  There can be all sorts of endorsements:  adding insuring agreements, cutting them, deleting or adding exclusions, adding or subtracting named insureds from the list, adding insured objects, things, or whatever, and much more. For standard policies, there are closets full of standardized endorsements. In large innovative industries, there will be negotiated policies, but not for long.  Purely negotiated policies make profitable underwriting nearly impossible. VIII. Miscellaneous.  A whole variety of things can fit here. This simple list gives one a beginning idea, at least, as to how insurance policies are divided up. The ordered list of entries is not intended to name the order of parts of the policy. Often, for example, the definitions section comes between the Insuring Agreement Section and the Exclusions Section. It also needs to be remembered that some policies are “package” policies, meaning that they provide several different types of insurance all at once, in the same contract.  First and Third Party insurance often appear like this, e.g., in auto insurance, in homeowners insurance, and indifferent large policies. Usually, the differences are easy to recognize.  There is no reason to think that cyber-insurance policies (that is, contracts) will be much different in form.  Rough versions of similar forms run back hundreds of years. 

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Observations Regarding Depositions

Witnesses and Therefore Lawyers in Depositions, Third Observations

Previously, in another post, I set forth a few ways to proceed in  depositions and  deposition preparation. 

Here are a few more:

(1) When a (W)itness is questioned about anything which is not simple, obvious, and/or certain: hesitate, take your time, &c., before answering. Remember, taking some time is not against any rules; it is not sanctionable; and it is not a likely ground for any impeachment–certainly not effective impeachment.  Jurors will be not be offended if W does not over do it.  “Moderation” in all things. Jurors are always offended is L seems push W around, or tried to do it offensively and/or without good reason.  For Ls the demands of moderation are stringent.

(2) W should not give an answer of which he is certain or at least  really confident.  Here are some alternative parts of answers:

“I don’t know.”“I don’t think I know, just now”“I don’t remember.”“I don’t seem to remember.”“I don’t seem to remember with you sitting across from me.”“I don’t remember;  I can’t think about this anything close to perfectly with you and he video camera staring at me.”“Maybe.”“I think so, just now, anyway.”“Everything I tell you will be an estimate, as we sit here today.”  (Lawyers love the “as we sit here today,” and will try to use it “against you,” i.e., to induce you to give a definite answer, of which you are not sure or reasonably certain–whatever that is.)“My estimate is. . . Remember, this is an estimate you are________.” [requiring? demanding? pursuing? pressing me for?“If I have all the documents in front of me, I think my estimate would probably be this. . . .”“At the time I studied all the documents, as I remember, I think my answer was this.”“Probably, it would be the same now.”  “I think it would be the same now”“I’m not sure what the tone of Jack assertion was, I just remember I heard him say ‘Go fuck yourself.’ Of course, he often says stuff like that.”“I don’t remember precisely what he said. However, at least some of were outraged.”

Of course, the list goes on and on. However, this gives W some ideas. W can teach some of these to himself.  L can suggest some of them, though not too bluntly or dogmatically and certainly not in some booklet.  Be careful of this if the depo is crucial to your case.  It is also important to keep in mind that not every witness an “use” all of these truths correctly (in several senses) and/or honestly (in only one sense).

(3)  Now is not the time to show off. A rare exception  may be the opposite.  Is this one?

Q. “You’ve never flown an airplane just like this one have you.”A.  “I have a PhD. in this type of airplane; given that context [frame] I suppose the answer is ‘No.'”Objection. Answer, my question.A. “I think I have.”Q. “No. You have not.  It’s a ‘Yes or No’ question.”

Alternative #1: “No it’s not.” L’s reply:  “Why do you say that?”
Alternative #2: “To say this is a “Yes or No” question is very misleading. I’m not sure I understand it.”  Q:  “What do you not understand?”  A: “I’m not sure. It just doesn’t sound right.”  Etc. 
Q. “Why do you say that?”  A: “Because I know more about these airplanes than pretty much anyone.”

(4)  The expert does not disdain the deposition or the depositioner when W and L disagree.  Is this an example?  Consider his hypo; I’m sure there are better ones:

Q. What is the relation amongst X, Y and Z.A. In the case of X and Y it’s this.  In the case of Y and Z, it’s this.  In the case of X and Z, I  doubt the answer would make good deal of sense to you.L: “Answer the question. This is my deposition, and I will make these sort of decisions.”W: “Actually, it is not your deposition.  It is my deposition!  I am the one who has sworn to tell the whole truth, and I will not be twisted or shoved into an invalid corner.”

Sometimes there is a threat L will make to W, but usually, nothing comes of it, including at hearings and trial.  Of course, if L tries it again at trial.  “At that time, the gutsy (and perhaps reckless) witness might say, “See I told you that you wouldn’t understand it, and you still don’t.

(5) Often L’s ask this question:

Q. “Can we agree that if you don’t understand a question, you will let me know?”

[Quinn: The correct answer is not “Yes.“]  Alternative #1:  “I’ll even do it if I think I might not understand.  You will be able to tell.  I’ll say something like, ‘I’m not sure I understand.'”  Response:  “What do you not understand?”Possible response, if true:  “What do I not understand.  I’m not sure,  but. . . . [I just don’t].”Alternative #2: I may not know that I do not understand you.  That happens to most of us from time to time–indeed, quite often, it seems to me, I think–and you may ask vague and complicated questions that I think I understand but do not.”

(6) With respect to the oath, here it is:  “Do you swear to tell [1] the truth, [2] the whole truth, and [3]nothing but the truth?”

[1] is fine.[2] is a problem:  First, what does it mean?  (All the true propositions about this case? Can’t be done.  Second, nobody can do it:  (a) not known (b) may be forgotten.)[3] is a problem. It disallows for innocent mistakes.

Quinn: A good way to handle this is to say, “I’ll try the best I can.”  Or: “I hope I don’t make any mistakes or forget something, but otherwise ‘Yes.'”Quinn Again:  I’ve never seen a judge disqualify a witness on these grounds, and I’ve never seen L try to raise hell about it either.

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Quinn Quotes

Granted, the expert witnesses might be a little more interesting; still, while some mathematics is captivating, some is most certainly not.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact