Judge, Sex, Complainant, Witness, Conviction, and §1983

This is a brief sketch of a case in federal court–first in the district court in Michigan and then before a panel of the  the Sixth Circuit. It involves striking misconduct of a judge that injured the idea of any commitment to uniform justice and left the judge “sullied.” The case is unlikely to undergo further review.

A Michigan judge, Judge McCree (“J”), while conducting hearings, etc., in a felony prosecution resulting from nonpayment of child support, had a passionate affair the woman who was being deprived of child support. The woman was also the wife of the accused.

J said in a disciplinary hearing that sometimes his affair-partner, Geniene La’Shay Mott, would be “‘at the apex of euphoria[,]'”

but would sometimes be “‘at the abyss of near homicidal anger.'”[Id.] The trysts occurred partly in his chambers. (This case and its predecessor did not involve locations of intercourse and did not involve the alleged misuse of public property.)

J terminated the affair with his friend after a lengthy series of time and interactions. Ms. Mott had become extremely angry; she stalked and accosted him several times; eventually she came to the home of J and his wife. At some point she went to local TV station, and hence the cat was out of the bag, so to speak, and thereafter there was a good deal of publicity. Interestingly, and in perhaps the only instance of good sense J showed in this entire fiasco, he told her “not to disclose the affair in order to avoid ‘deep shit.'”

The Michigan Supreme Court removed J from “judicial office and prospectively suspended him without pay for six years if voters should reelect him in November 2014.” The defendant in the criminal case, and the non-payer of the child support, sued J in federal court for violations of section 1983. (Of course, the voters should not (in several senses, anyway) reelect J and will not, even in the Detroit area, elect this insensitive, boor, who lacks not only good sense, but any sense at all.)

So, what happened? What difference did it make that J lent his “partner” a not insubstantial sum,  discussed how to proceed against here husband, how to use jail as a lever to get her the child support, and other “anti-judicial” discussions and actions. 

The case discussed here, King v. McCree, #13-2033 (6th Cir. July 21, 2014), was dismissed under the doctrine of judicial immunity. A panel of the Sixth Circuit held that J was within his jurisdiction and was not undertaking relevant  “nonjudicial actions,” as that term is understood in the law,with one judge concurring and setting forth a noble exposition of judicial ethics.  In reasoning as it did, the panel affirmed the District Judge in dismissing the case.

The court’s opinion is an exemplary piece of legal reasoning replete with cites to precedents some coming from the Supreme Court of the United States. There is a far easier way to get the picture.  The doctrine of judicial immunity applies whenever a judge is doing anything connected to typical judicial activities, e.g., handling pending cases. Here that would be the processing of King’s prosecution. In this case the judge did something which was negatively connected to that activity. It does not matter whether or not the act at issue was a functionally normal act performed by a judge; it is its connectedness that matters.

It is perfectly clear that J’s acts with the wife of the accused, Mr. King, were claimed by the defendant to have denied him due process, in other words, that J’s conduct negatively impacted him in a judicial proceeding.  Under fixed precedent regarding judicial immunity, “‘[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took. . .was done maliciously.'”  Courts recognize “judicial immunity even when a judge’s actions [are] “‘petty, unethical, and unworthy of his office.'” (The reader must remember that judicial immunity does not apply to the removal of a judge or to his/her disbarment.  

The Circuit panel did not need to go further than what was just said.  It did state, however, a due process violation requires a direct connection between an act and the alleging victim.  But even this was not the case with the affair. If there was a due process violation, it would have to occur in the court proceeding.  But when J accepted the defendant’s plea, and “there was a delayed-sentence agreement,” the affair had not begun.

We have four federal judges and those on the Michigan Supreme Court disappointed, outraged, and perhaps even in despair.  At the same time, one wonders if they did not have a little humor in them. It might be found in their quote of exquisite language from an earlier Sixth Circuit case, Archie v . Lanier, 95 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 1996). “Yielding to an unruly libido is not the exercise of judicial power, or somehow like or related to the performance of judicial acts. . . . A judge’s long study of the law does not proceed from sexual appetites, even though we may sometimes say that ‘the law is a jealous mistress.'” Id. at 444.  

See  In re Judge McCree, 845 N.W.2d 458 (Mich 2014) for the decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in this case.

Comments 

It was virtually necessary to quote the Archie passage, and the panel showed an immense commitment to the ideals of the American legal tradition by what it did not even mention: namely, age difference, race, the fact that Ms. Mott was impregnated by J., the marital status of the complainant-witness in the underlying status, and previous quasi-sexual conduct of J. for which he had already been reprimanded (or publicly censured), sending topless pictures to at least several women, including a bailiff, LaDawnn Malone, apparently in 2006. See MyFoxDetroit 12/7/12I would have acted much more harshly than the Supreme Court of Michigan did. Not all of the story has been told here. What about Ms. Mott?  She was complicit in the sordid; she knew it was dangerous in various ways.  If nothing she was taking money in the form of a loan from a public official in the performance of state related acts, and she was providing him sex. This at least sounds much like a bribe. (She may have also demanded money from J after he terminated–or tried to terminate–their relationship.)It seems odd to me that Mr. King could not afford to pay his child support but could afford a lawyer in this case.  This case does not strike me as a contingency fee case.  I am the sort of person who is at least tempted to believe that there is another story lurking in these bushes.  This is not a state of affairs in which Mr. King is merely feeling put upon since he, to himself, and his friends  are asserting to each other and to him that he got “f—–d.”    

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Attorneys, Insurance Agents, Insurance Brokers, Lawyers Suing or Defending Insurance Intermediaries

Sometimes a lawyer representing an insured needs to sue the agent broker-intermediary. This is particularly true if the carrier is denying coverage, and it looks like the middle person has the wrong policies. Intermediaries often articulate a rigid view as to whom the intermediaries owe duties, as well as what kind they owe. Often a “broker” is said to be the “agent” (legal agent) of the insured, while the “agent” is the “agent” (legal agent) of the insurer.  

Sometimes it’s the other way around.  

In Texas the Insurance Code does not draw a distinction between agents and brokers, although they both maybe classified as intermediaries, a non-statutory term. In fact, the Texas Insurance Code can be interpreted as saying that insurance intermediaries are under many, many circumstances the legal agents of the insurers.  Intermediaries tend not to see things this way, as do some coverage lawyers.  See Section 4001.051.

I have spoken on this matter several times, and written on it in the TEXAS INSURANCE JOURNAL. Details about this can be found on my Resume; it is attached to my website and easily findable elsewhere on the Internet.  At the same time, I do not claim to be certain I am right.  I see this as a matter of some controversy.  Still a lawyer representing a policyholder should pursue the idea, even if the informed lawyer representing an intermediary shoots it down.  I would certainly try to do just that.—MSQ

A lawyer representing an insured should as a practical matter classify both agents and brokers as targets and let the court worry about separating them later.  The lawyer for the insured should also keep in mind the criteria for being a legal agent.  This post tries to set at least some of them out. Insurance agents are sometimes called “retail agents.” They sell contracts of insurance (insurance policies) directly to the public. Insurance brokers are sometimes called “wholesale brokers,” but they are also often insurance agents for larger companies.  This is a very odd idea of what a wholesaler is.  Usually such companies are entities selling in mass. A thousand ties to Wally’s Men Store, 10,000 to Brooks Brothers, and a very big box to Walmart. Wholesale insurance brokers do nothing of the sort, though a contract with an insurer could authorize a managing general agent to do things like this. But that is an entirely different story. A repetition: Sometimes people in the trade say that brokers are the agents of the insureds, while agents are the agent of the insurer.  What they are trying to say is that retail agents are the legal agents of the insurer, while brokers, not functioning as wholesale agents, are the legal agents of the insured.  All of these propositions are false, and close to nonsense.  It doesn’t really matter, I suppose, because the real function is to create an image or a mythology for how to think about what this branch of the industry does. And that is perfectly OK.  In the creation of helpful images, not everything has to be true, or even coherent in some precise and detailed ways. To understand what is going on here, it it necessary to contrast insurance agency, insurance broking (a wonderful work from older English insurance practice), being an insurance intermediary (which I think is the better term than any of the others), and being a legal agent.  Insurance intermediaries are seldom the legal agents of anybody.  Legal agents have principal (who used to be called “Masters”), and insurance intermediaries seldom–very, very seldom–ever do. (Sometimes intermediaries, who are not really that at all, who are employed by insurers, are a different case.) There are paradoxes that go with all this, however.  For example, insurance intermediaries are merchants, but–at the same time–they are regulated by parts of state insurance codes which set up statutory bad faith.  All this being true, when they are not fiduciaries of their customers and in fact have no duty to explain to them the policies they are selling them. One of the paradoxes is that insurers have a duty to treats the interests of their insureds as at least equal to their own.  It is by no means established that insurance intermediaries have a similar kind of duty. 

Legal AgencyThe purpose of this blog is to start a discussion of these matters, and the place to begin is with the concept of legal agency and its connection with insurance intermediaries.  The RESTATEMENT is as good as any other source. Here is what § 1(1) says:

Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the othershall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other so to act. Notice that agency is in general a voluntary relationship. It is to be conceived in fundamentally dyadic ways. The agent acts on behalf of the principal. And the principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent. In fact, the law of many states, including Texas, is that a principal has the right to control the details of an agent’s activity. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex. 1998). There is a school of thought and a strand of the law, which creates a division of labor between clients and lawyers. It has been variously described as “ends-means,” substance-procedure, strategy-tactics, or objective-means[,]” Wolfram at 156, with the client in control of what comes before the hyphens and the lawyer in control of what comes after the hyphens. TxDR 1.02(a)(1) provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a clients decision . . . concerning the objectives and general methods of representation[.] Cmt. #1 for this rule states the following: “The lawyer should assume responsibility for the means by which the client’s objectives are best achieved thus, a lawyer has very broad discretion to determine technical and legal tactics, subject to the client’s wishes regarding such matters as the expense to be incurred and concern for third-persons who might be adversely affected.” Similarly, Hazard and Hodes comment on these matters in their commentary, THE LAW OF LAWYERING. Some Central Rules (etc.) of the Law of Agency: Duties of Legal Agents The Fiduciary Rule. Legal Agent (“A”) has a duty to his Principal (“P”) to act solely and only for P’s benefit in all matters related to the agency, absent an informed agreement between P and A to some other effect. P may be more than one person, and/or it may be an actual person or an entity like a corporation. A. A is always a fiduciary of P. (All agents are fiduciaries of their principals, but not all fiduciaries are agents. Consider lawyers, for example; they are always limited fiduciaries of their clients–limited in the sense that the fiduciary duties stretch only as far as the scope of the representation.) B. A is not a fiduciary with respect to everything pertaining to P but only that which is within the scope of the agency. C. Every agency has some scope, whether express or implied. D. The scope of an agency is not always obvious or easy to determine. E. “However, an agent may be in such a confidential relationship to the principal that he has a duty of disclosure and fair dealing as to all matters.” RAg § 390 Cmt d. This kind of rule will apply to some lawyers under some circumstances. F. Agents are in general not in a fiduciary relationship with their principals before the formation of the contract of the agency and while they are negotiating the fee arrangements. The fee agreement is not (usually) within the scope of the agency. 1. “If, however, as in the case of attorney and client, the creation of the relation involves peculiar trust and confidence, with reliance by the principal upon fair dealing by the agent, it may be found that a fiduciary relationship exists prior to the employment and if so, the agent is under a duty to deal fairly with the principal and arranging the terms of the employment.” Id. at Cmt. e. 2. Fees of agents can be percentages, e.g., of profits. G. Obviously, agents must subordinate their interests to the interests of their principals, at least with respect to anything affecting matters within the scope of the agency. 1. For this reason, A may not compete with P, if the competition would affect matters within the scope of the agency, absent a fully informed agreement (“absent . . . .”). 2. A may not undertake an activity for a third party (“X”), where A’s activities for X are outside the scope of his agency arrangements with P if those activities for X would have consequences for matters within the scope of A’s relationship with P, absent . . . . H. A cannot serve the interests of someone other than P if that service would adversely affect the interests of P, insofar as they pertain to matters within the scope of the agency, absent . . . . I. A’s has a duty to P is the same as those of a trustee to a beneficiary. J. One might think that A may lawfully injure the interests of P if A is acting in good faith, is acting outsidethe scope of the agency, and the interests of P are not interests related to the scope of the agency.  This is certainly not true in the case of lawyer and their clients. This results from a special duty of loyalty. K. If A acquires confidential information pertaining to P as a result of the existence of the agency relationship, you may not use that information to the disadvantage of P. L. Because they are fiduciaries, agents have a duty of uberrima fidei (or, uberrima fides, or uberrimae fidae) with respect to their principals. Here is how the terms are defined–the first way: “Of the utmost good faith, a term applied to a category of contracts and arrangements where each party must not only refrain from misrepresenting to the other but must voluntarily and positively disclose any factor which a reasonable person in the position of the other party might regard as material in determining whether or not to undertake the contract. This requirement applies to contracts of guarantee, insurance, partnership, family arrangements, and certain others, but not such contracts as a sale.” David M. Walker, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1245 (1980). Or second way: “The most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight. A phrase used to express the perfect good faith, concealing nothing, with which a contract must be made; for example, in the case of insurance, the insured must observe the most perfect good faith towards the insurer.” BLACK’S LAW 1690 (1968). See Mayes v. Mass Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. 1980), citing Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1927). The phrase is not much used in discourse upon the law of agency, but if agents are fiduciaries with respect to their principals, then they have a duty of utmost good faith.

So, are insurance agents legal agents or not.  The answer is that they are not simply the result of what they are vocationally and professionally speaking.  However, they can be legal agents in their capacities as insurance agents under some circumstances, almost all of them being explicit agreements they have with clients. (An agreement to be a trustee over the proceeds of a life insurance policy would do this. Some that this insurance is not being insurance in that capacity but something else.  This seems “otherworldly” to me.) 

Not even promising to find a client a specific type of policy or promising to see to it that the client receives this or that kind of policy will make them fiduciaries. Those are both merely contracts, although many contracts are not “mere” anything. Not even having an insurance  policy in her hands make an insurance agent per se a fiduciary of the policyholder or–in the case of life insurance–of any of the beneficiaries.Some CommentsQuinn’s First Conjecture: A duty of utmost good faith requires that high level of good faith none higher than which the community can conceive. Otherwise, what would utmost really mean? Another Quinn Conjecture: In the end, if this suggestion actually were taken up by a court, a court would affirm Quinn’s suggestion, but then temper it with some remark about how everyone had to be reasonable (realistic, common-sensical, & c.) at all times. Quinn’s Third Conjecture: The court’s position would actually be inconsistent, those many would say that it is not. An Observation: Some think it errors to count insurance intermediaries as having a duty of good faith and fair dealing, whether by statute or common law, since, it is  said, “They are mere merchants.”  The Texas Insurance Code says or implies that Intermediaries are governed by statutory bad faith, Intermediaries don’t say that sort of thing about themselves very often–“We are mere merchants.”  (It’s the ‘mere’ that’s the problem and they are right about this.  It also needs to be kept in mind that not everyone in the “business of insurance” is an insurance company, that that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not imply that the person having the duty is a fiduciary. Another Observation–This One Possibly Irrelevant.  Lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients. Hazard and Hodes call them “special purpose” fiduciaries. In this regard, insurance intermediaries and lawyers are almost never alike.

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INSURANCE AGENTS, INSURANCE BROKERS, & LEGAL AGENCY

Insurance agents are sometimes called “retail agents.” They sell contracts of insurance (insurance policies) directly to the public. Insurance brokers are sometimes called “wholesale brokers,” but they are also often insurance agents for larger companies.  This is a very odd idea of what a wholesaler is.  Usually, such companies are entities selling in mass. A thousand ties to Wally’s Men Store, 10,000 to Brooks Brothers, and a very big box to Walmart. Wholesale insurance brokers do nothing of the sort, though a contract with an insurer could authorize a managing general agent to do things like this. But that is an entirely different story.

Sometimes people in the trade say that brokers are the agents of the insureds, while agents are the agent of the insurer.  What they are trying to say is that retail agents are the legal agents of the insurer, while brokers, not functioning as wholesale agents, are the legal agents of the insured.  All of these propositions are false and close to nonsense.  It doesn’t really matter, I suppose because the real function is to create an image or mythology for how to think about what this branch of the industry does. And that is perfectly OK.  In the creation of helpful images, not everything has to be true, or even coherent in some precise and detailed ways.

To understand what is going on here, it is necessary to contrast insurance agency, insurance broking (a wonderful work from older English insurance practice), being an insurance intermediary (which I think is a better term than any of the others), and being a legal agent.  Insurance intermediaries are seldom the legal agents of anybody.  Legal agents have principals (who used to be called “Masters”), and insurance intermediaries seldom–very, very seldom–ever do. (Sometimes intermediaries, who are not really that at all, who are employed by insurers, are a different case.)

There are paradoxes that go with all this, however.  For example, insurance intermediaries are merchants, but–at the same time–they are regulated by parts of state insurance codes that set up statutory bad faith.  All this is true when they are not fiduciaries of their customers and in fact, have no duty to explain to them the policies they are selling them. One of the paradoxes is that insurers have a duty to treat the interests of their insureds as at least equal to their own.  It is by no means established that insurance intermediaries have a similar kind of duty.

The purpose of this blog is to start a discussion of these matters, and the place to begin is with the concept of legal agency and its connection with insurance intermediaries.

The RESTATEMENT is as good as any other source. Here is what § 1(1) says:

Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the other so to act.

Notice that agency is in general a voluntary
relationship. It is to be conceived in fundamentally dyadic ways. The agent acts on behalf of the
principal. And the principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent. In fact, the law of
many states, including Texas, is that a principal has the right to control the details of an agent’s
activity. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex. 1998).

There is a school of thought and a strand of the law, which creates a division of labor
between clients and lawyers. It has been variously described as “ends-means,” substance-procedure,
strategy-tactics, or objective-means[,]” Wolfram at 156, with the client in control of what comes
before the hyphens and the lawyer in control of what comes after the hyphens. TxDR 1.02(a)(1)
provides that “a lawyer shall abide by a clients decision . . . concerning the objectives and general
methods of representation[.] Cmt. #1 for this rule states the following:

“The lawyer should assume responsibility for the means by which the client’s objectives are best achieved thus, a lawyer has very broad discretion to determine technical and legal tactics, subject to the client’s wishes regarding such matters as the expense to be incurred and concern for third-persons who might be adversely affected.”

Similarly, Hazard and Hodes comment on these matters in their commentary, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING.

Some Central Rules (etc.) of the Law of Agency: Duties of Legal Agents

The Fiduciary Rule.
Legal Agent (“A”) has a duty to his Principal (“P”) to act solely and only for P’s
benefit in all matters related to the agency, absent an informed agreement between P and A
to some other effect. P may be more than one person, and/or it may be an actual person or an entity like a corporation.

A. A is always a fiduciary of P. (All agents are fiduciaries of their principals, but not all
fiduciaries are agents.Consider lawyers, for example; they are always limited fiduciaries of their clients–limited in the sense that the fiduciary duties stretch only as far the scope of the representation.)
B. A is not a fiduciary with respect to everything pertaining to P but only that which is
within the scope of the agency.

C. Every agency has some scope, whether express or implied.

D. The scope of an agency is not always obvious or easy to determine.

E. “However, an agent may be in such a confidential relationship to the principal that
he has a duty of disclosure and fair dealing as to all matters.” RAg § 390 Cmt d.
This kind of rule will apply to some lawyers under some circumstances.

F. Agents are in general not in a fiduciary relationship with their principals before the
formation of the contract of agency and while they are negotiating the fee
arrangements. The fee agreement is not (usually) within the scope of the agency.

1. “If, however, as in the case of attorney and client, the creation of the relation
involves peculiar trust and confidence, with reliance by the principal upon
fair dealing by the agent, it may be found that a fiduciary relation exists prior
to the employment and, if so, the agent is under a duty to deal fairly with the
principal and arranging the terms of the employment.” Id. at Cmt. e.

2. Fees of agents can be percentages, e.g., of profits.

G. Obviously, agents must subordinate their interests to the interests of their principals,
at least with respect to anything affecting matters within the scope of the agency.

1. For this reason, A may not compete with P, if the competition would affect
matters within the scope of the agency, absent a fully informed agreement
(“absent . . . .”).

2. A may not undertake an activity for a third party (“X”), where A’s activities
for X are outside the scope of his agency arrangements with P, if those
activities for X would have consequences for matters within the scope of A’s
relationship with P, absent . . . .

H. A cannot serve the interests of someone other than P, if that service would adversely
affect the interests of P, insofar as they pertain to matters within the scope of the
agency, absent . . . .

I. A’s duty to P are the same as those of a trustee to a beneficiary.

J. One might think that A may lawfully injure the interests of P if A is acting in good faith, is acting outside
the scope of the agency, and the interests of P are not interests related to the scope
of the agency.  This is certainly not true in the case of lawyer and their clients. This results from a special duty of loyalty.

K. If A acquires confidential information pertaining to P as a result of the existence of
the agency relationship, you may not use that information to the disadvantage of P.

L. Because they are fiduciaries, agents have a duty of uberrima fidei (or, uberrima fides,
or uberrimae fidae) with respect to their principals. Here is how the terms are
defined–a first way:

“Of the utmost good faith, a term applied to a category of contracts and arrangements where each party must not onlyrefrain from misrepresenting to the other but must voluntarily and positively disclose any factor which a reasonable person in the position of the other party might regard as material in determining whether or not
to undertake the contract. This requirement applies to contracts of guarantee, insurance, partnership, family arrangements, and certain others, but not such contracts as sale.” David M. Walker, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1245 (1980).
Or  second way: “The most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect cando, openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight. A phrase used to express the perfect good faith, concealing nothing, with which a contract must be made; for example, in the case of insurance,the insured must observe the most perfect good faith towards the insurer.” BLACK’S LAW 1690 (1968). See Mayes v. Mass Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 616-17 (Tex. 1980), citing Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1927). The phrase is not much used in discourse upon the law of agency, but if agents are fiduciaries with respect to their principals, then they have a duty of utmost
good faith.

So, are insurance agents legal agents or not.  The answer is that they are not simply as the result of what they are vocationally and professionally speaking.  However, they can be legal agents in their capacities as insurance agents under some circumstances, almost all of them being explicit agreements they have with clients. (An agreement to be a trustee over the proceeds of a life insurance policy would do this. Some that this insurance is not being an insurance in that capacity but something else.  This seems “other worldly” to me.)

Not even promising to find a client a specific type of policy or promising to see to it that the client receives this or that kind of policy will make them fiduciaries. Those are both merely contracts, although many contracts are not “mere” anything. Not even having an insurance  policy in her hands make an insurance agent per se a fiduciary of the policyholder or–in the case of life insurance–of any of the beneficiaries.
Some Comments
Quinn’s First Conjecture: A duty of utmost good faith requires that high level
of good faith none higher than which the community can conceive. Otherwise, what
would utmost really mean?

Another Quinn Conjecture: In the end, if this suggestion actually were taken up by a
court, a court would affirm Quinn’s suggestion, but then temper it with some remark
about how everyone had to be reasonable (realistic,common-sensical, &c.) at all times.

Quinn’s Third Conjecture: The court’s position would actually be inconsistent,
those many would say that it is not.

An Observation: Some think it error to count insurance intermediaries as having a duty of good faith and fair dealing, whether by statute or common law, since, it is  said, “They are mere merchants.”  The Texas Insurance Code says or implies that Intermediaries are governed by statutory bad faith, Intermediaries don’t say that sort of thing about themselves very often–“We are mere merchants.”  (It’s the ‘mere’ that’s the problem and they are right about this.  It also needs to be kept in mind that not everyone in the “business of insurance” is an insurance company, that that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not imply that the person having the duty is a fiduciary.

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Insurance Policies: “Cyber Space” Insurance

Some Significant
& Representative

Cyber Insurance Cases

First Period 

Michael
Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

1300 West Lynn #208

Austin,
Texas 78703

(o)
512-296-2594

(c)
512-656-9759

mquinn@msqlaw.com

There are not very many reported cyber
insurance cases.  There are plenty of
civil (and criminal cases) about the so-called cyber-world), but direct,
focused, coverage, or similar cases are very few in number—almost none in the
Twentieth Century.   There were more in
the early Twentieth Century, but as they have evolved, the topics of those
cases are probably passé.  There are many
more cases now; that arises from (1) the exponential growth of computer
technology, following what is called “Moore’s Law”—something which is not a
scientific law at all, (2) the increasing number of diverse insurance policies
offered, sold  and bought, and (3) the
growth of the market’s need for cyber-lawyers. 
Category (3) to a degree of certainty vastly exceeding that of  Moore’s Law, where the market wants
transactional lawyers, it will need litigation lawyers.

I.                  
Two Cases of the
“Early Period”

Most cyber insurance judicial analyses
of 10 or more years, 1994-2004 approximately, concerned two principal issues.
They concerned insurability of interactions between the cyber-world and the
real-world.  There were a number of these
cases, but most are not worthy of 
substantive, attention nowadays, at least for the purposes of this blog,
given what the insurance issues turned on, to wit: what counted as a material
object and how the various policies interacted with that conceptualization.
(Don’t let me mislead you into the idea that they are unworthy of being cited
in briefs, etc.  Many of the subordinate
citations in briefs, coverage opinion letters, law review articles, and so
forth are designed to show that there is or has been wide agreement as to some
proposition(s) of law under at least some circumstance. This is valuable in and
of itself, though not always necessary, for example, in this essay.)

It seemed and seems obvious that
cyber-world events can causally impact the real-world in a variety of insurable
ways. Elements of the cyber-world can inflict damages on material object. They
can cause physical injury to tangible property and/or the loss of the use of it
whether physically damaged or not. They can also cause bodily injury. Here is
an example, sort of.  According to a
recent article in the trade periodical Business
Insurance, insurance companies are designing a new maritime policy designed
to insure against bodily and property damages caused by cyber risks. AIG is
apparently the leader of this fraction of the industry, it is reported. Judy
Greenwald, Insurers Develop Cyber Cover
for Maritime Industry (May 12, 2014).

The question asked in lawsuits and
elsewhere is the reverse of this. Can events in the real world cause injuries
to parts of the cyber world, e.g., data. The insurance questions asked are like
this: Can negligent work in the real world cause covered injuries to
inhabitants of the cyber world?  And
here’s another one: If there is negligent work repairing a computer that
damages the computer, do consequences of the damage to a tangible physical
object cause insurable injuries in the cyber world?

  

These are questions about interactions
between the real world and the cyber world. Notice that the cyber insurance
questions are to be answered differently, perhaps, than the non-insurance
questions.  This makes the meaning of the
insurance policies crucial to these disputes. 
That should come as a surprise to no one.

Although the current near consensus on
the insurance is “No,” at least for standard policies of the real world, e.g.,
the CGL policy, there are aggressive plaintiff’s lawyer who try to pursue the
opposite conclusion, for example, in some class actions. The now established
proposition regarding insurance questions was recognized as nonsense for bodily
injury and property damage quickly because of the idea that tangibility
was built into the idea of property in most first and many third party
policies.

At the same time, it must be remembered
that CGL policies also cover some physical non-injuries. An example of the
opposite in the first party case is the insuring of money, stamps, bonds,
ideas, and so forth. All of these ideas are built into some third party
policies, CGL’s coverage B is like this. There are more. Legal malpractice is
like that, as will be discussed briefly in §IV, as are copyrights on music. It
has been mostly taken as true that a physical object could not cause physical
injury to components of the cyber world, since they are usually understood not
to be material objects, though it was conceded that such a thing could happen
in a number of ways, (none of them leading to insurance under a CGL type policy).
It doesn’t even work for legal malpractice, etc., because the immediate injury
is what is inflicted on a person, whether a real person or an abstract entity,
often also called a “person.” 
Nevertheless, a few—very few—“ancient” cases reached an opposite
conclusion, saying that the destruction of data can, under some come
circumstances, be property damage.

The second question is the reverse of
the first question. How should damages inflicted on components of the
cyber-world by the real-world be thought about? 
The received answer is that since the components of the cyber-world are
not tangible, they cannot be property, and so there is no coverage under
CGL-type policies. This observation is true even if what is called “the
cyber-world” and the “real-world,” i.e. the material world, are really part of
one world.

Here, are two examples of cases in those
early days. In one case, the court found that the definition of “property
damage” was ambiguous and therefore covered data.  The opposite, however, was decided in the
other case.

One case that is regarded as a leading
case is Ward General Insurance Services
v. Employers Fire Insurance Company, 114 Cal. App. 4th 548
(2003).  The facts are simply described,
even if they were not simple in real life. 
The plaintiff was working on a computer; there was a human error; data
was lost. It cost the plaintiff over $250,000 to restore the data and caused
business interruption. The question was whether the loss of the data was a
“direct physical loss.” Both the trial court and the court of appeals said
“No”:

The
word “physical” is defined, inter alia, as “having material existence” and
“perceptible esp. through the senses and subject to the laws of nature.”
(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 875.)
“MATERIAL implies formation out of tangible matter.” (Id. at p. 715.) “Tangible” means, inter alia, “capable of being
perceived esp. by the sense of touch.” (Id.
at p. 1200.) Thus, relying on the ordinary and popular sense of the words, we
say with confidence that the loss of plaintiff’s database does not qualify as a
“direct physical loss,” unless the database has a material existence, formed
out of tangible matter, and is perceptible to the sense of touch.

A
“database” is a “large collection of data organized esp. for rapid search and
retrieved (as by a computer).” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th
ed. 1993) p. 293.) “Data is defined, quite simply, as factual or numerical
“information.” (Ibid.) Thus, the loss
of a database is the loss of organized information, in this case, the loss of
client names, addresses, policy renewal dates, etc.

 We fail to see how information, qua
information, can be said to have a material existence, be formed out of
tangible matter, or be perceptible to the sense of touch. To be sure,
information is stored in a physical medium, such as a magnetic disc or tape, or
even as papers in three-ring binders or a file cabinet, but the information
itself remains intangible. [Emphasis added.]  Here, the loss suffered by plaintiff was a
loss of information, i.e., the sequence
of ones and zeroes stored by aligning small domains of magnetic material on the
computer’s hard drive in a machine readable manner. Plaintiff did not lose the
tangible material of the storage medium. Rather, plaintiff lost the stored
information. The sequence of ones and zeroes can be altered, rearranged, or
erased, without losing or damaging the tangible material of the storage medium.

A case cited for the proposition that
data is a physical object and therefore sustains “property damage” when
destroyed or made unusable, is a Texas case. (This does not say that “data
damage” is “property damage,”). Lambrecht
& Associates v. State Farm Lloyds, 119 S.W.3d ___(Tex.
App.–Tyler, 2003 pet.). There were two separate arguments being used in this
case, although they are not separated. 

The court noted that, there are cases
holding that data are physical objects and hence that they sustain “property
damage” when injured. Those cases “focus on the physical nature of the data
itself and debate whether or not it can be dissolved into a quantitative mass
or is merely transcendental.” Instead, “the losses alleged by [the plaintiff] are
covered by the policy as can be determined by analyzing the policy itself.  We need not attempt to compose such an
erudite thesis because”  the issue can be
resolved by analyzing the policy.

Here the policy contained provisions
that explicitly determined coverage. First the policy indicated that it covered
damages to personal property of a business of the policyholder at a covered
location.  What was damaged was the
server; it is incontestable that servers are physical objects; and it was
rendered useless.  That’s obviously
covered.  In order to fix it, or restore
it, there had to be the finding of, or otherwise dealing with, the server’s
function, and the sort of substance upon which it did its work. (It seems to me
that it would not matter whether that was physical or not. That, however, was
not an explicit issue in this case.)

The court’s also considered that the
policy explicitly said in its loss of income section that “electronic media and
records” are covered.  In turn, that
phrase is defined in part as [a] “electronic data processing, recording or
storage media such a films, tapes, discs, drums or cells; [b] data stored on
such media; or [c] programming records used for electronic data processing. . .
.”  On the basis of this language, the
court held “that the plain language of the policy dictates that the personal
property losses alleged by [the plaintiff] 
were ‘physical’ as a matter of law.” 
Section [b] it seems to me, makes this conclusion obvious and iron
clad.  This conclusion, however, implies
nothing about policies that do not have this or this kind of language in them.

Alas, the issue regarding property
damage in these kinds of cases has not completely croaked.  It gets revived from time to time.  However, it usually arises about cases in
which huge amounts of information are released; the insured commercial entity,
often a large retail entity, is subject to a class action, and it sues its insurer
for coverage.  Bodily injury and property
damages claims in the underlying lawsuit usually were never serious, except to
try to trigger a duty to defend, and they drop out of serious contention
quickly.  

The question asked in lawsuits and
elsewhere is the reverse of this. Can events in the real world cause insured
injuries to parts of the cyber world, e.g., data?  The insurance questions asked are like this:
Can negligent work in the real world cause covered injuries to inhabitants of
the cyber world?  And here’s another one:
If there is negligent work repairing a computer that damages the computer, do
consequences of the damage to a tangible physical object cause insurable injuries
in the cyber world?  Remember. Two of the
main categories of covered injuries or damages in standard policies in the
so-called real world are bodily injury and injury to tangible
property.

These are questions about interactions
between the real world and the cyber world. Notice that the cyber insurance
questions are to be answered differently, perhaps, than the non-insurance
questions.  This makes the meaning of the
insurance policies crucial to these disputes. 
That should come as a surprise to no one.

Although the current near consensus on
the insurance is “No,” at least for standard policies of the real world, e.g.,
the CGL policy, there are aggressive plaintiff’s lawyer who try to pursue the
opposite conclusion, for example, in some class actions. The now established
proposition regarding insurance questions was recognized as nonsense for bodily
injury and property damage quickly because of the idea that tangibility
was built into the idea of property in most first and many third party
policies.

At the same time, it must be remembered
that CGL policies also cover some physical non-injuries. An example of the
opposite in the first party case is the insuring of money, stamps, bonds,
ideas, and so forth. All of these ideas are built into some third party
policies, CGL’s coverage B is like this.  There perils in that coverage—its “Coverage
B”—that do not require tangibility as the human body and physical property do.
There are more; copyright violations, e.g., on music and videos are a couple;
sometimes patent  torts are another; and
most important some forms of privacy are yet another.  (Various kinds of malpractice are covered in
real-world policies, and some of them may cover conduct “in” the cyber
world.  Med mal cannot be like that, for
obvious reasons.) It has been mostly taken as true that a physical object could
not cause physical injury to components of the cyber world, since they are
usually understood not to be material objects, though it was conceded that such
a thing could happen in a number of ways, (none of them leading to insurance
under a CGL type policy). It doesn’t even work for legal malpractice, etc.,
because the immediate injury is what is inflicted on a person, whether a real
person or an abstract entity, often also called a “person.”  Nevertheless, a few—very few—“ancient” cases
reached an opposite conclusion, saying that the destruction of data can, under
some come circumstances, be property damage. There will be further discussion
of Coverage B a later blog.

The second question is the “reverse” of
the first question. How should damages inflicted on components of the
cyber-world by the real-world be thought about? 
The received answer is that since the components of the cyber-world are
not tangible, they cannot be physical property, and so there is no coverage
under CGL-type policies. This observation is true even if what is called “the cyber-world”
and the “real-world,” i.e. the material world, are really part of one world.

Whether there is coverage for something,
and this will be determined by analyzing the insurance policy itself.  We need not attempt to compose such an systematic
and erudite theory as to potential coverages, because the issues can be
resolved by analyzing the relevant insurance policy, and—actually—not
otherwise.

Here the policy contained provisions
that explicitly determined coverage. First the policy indicated that it covered
damages to personal property of a business of the policyholder at a covered
location.  What was damaged was the
server; it is incontestable that servers are physical objects; and it was
rendered useless.  That’s obviously
covered.  In order to fix it, or restore
it, there had to be the finding of, or otherwise dealing with, the server’s
function, and the sort of substance upon which it did its work. (It seems to me
that it would not matter whether that was physical or not. That, however, was
not an explicit issue in this case.)

Alas, the issue regarding property
damage in these kinds of cases has not completely croaked.  It gets revived from time to time.  However, it usually arises about cases in
which huge amounts of information are released; the insured commercial entity,
often a large retail entity, is subject to a class action, and it sues its insurer
for coverage.  Bodily injury and property
damages claims in the underlying lawsuit usually were never serious, except to
try to trigger a duty to defend, and they drop out of serious contention quickly.
 Nevertheless, a few—very few—“ancient”
cases reached an opposite conclusion, saying that the destruction of data can,
under some come circumstances, be “property damage.”  This view can’t be right. Property in the
cyber world is not tangible.

Just how dead the property damage issue is during the Second Period will be come clear at the end of the next section. Early
in 2012 the Appellate Court of Connecticut decided a case styled Recall Total Information Management v.
Federal Insurance Company, 147 Conn. App. 450 (Conn. App. January 14,
2014). Some have suggested that it may have been an attempt to  resurrect the themes of the “First
Period.”  That’s the wrong answer, but
this is not the place to prove it.  It isn’t just the wrong answer; rather it’s like saying the Trojan House is an Andalusian given to the Greeks by the Trojans as a comforting gift for the Greeks once they had accepted their defeat and decided to go home across the blue Aegean and to leave Helen behind in Turkey to tend her 6 kids. 

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Insurance Bad Faith, Expert Witnesses, and Lawyers–Part II

Expert Witnesses (Sometimes Lawyers) in Insurance Bad Faith [IBF]Cases[1]:
An Mostly Elementary Introduction to Some Fundamentals in Two Parts

(Part II)

This is Part II of an essay that contains a number of short “chapters.”  The first three are in Part I, so we begin with Chapter IV.
___________________________________________________________

IV.  Typical
Issues and Conduct of Insurers & Adjusters in Bad Faith Cases: The Expert
Witness

A.      In virtually all bad faith cases, an
expert (as well as the adjusters) will have to know the meanings of the operative words in insurance contracts, their accepted usage in the insurance
“industry,” and how they might be ambiguous,[2]
whether they are thought to be or are argued to be.[3]
Of
course, the adjuster has to—or should—know the things during the adjustment
process itself before any testifying expert is involved.  It is not entirely uncommon for field
adjusters not to recognize ambiguities in policies.  The same is often true of supervising desk
examiners, and it can be true of more senior officers in adjustment
departments.  Amazingly, teams of
adjusters conduct “round table” discussions, and the claims file indicates a
50/50 disagreement as to what relevant language policy means.  Sometimes those in underwriting can be helpful,
but they have a tendency to talk about what they intended, as if that is always
clear.  Lawyers in the Adjustment
Division of the general counsel’s office can be helpful, but they have a
propensity to advocate the insurer’s “official” position and not examine the
language of the policy with objective skepticism.
B.      In
virtually every case, the type of expert witness discussed herein will have to
be able to relate that which is alleged to be a loss and the descriptive
language in a policy.  Here, are a few
examples of which there are many, many more:
1.
What is “wind damage”?  (Notice how
quickly this meaning links to other matters—How does it relate to other
damages?  How does one look at its order
and timing?)  Remember, there are subsidence
exclusions in or added to many policies, e.g., liability policies, when
construction projects are involved. What is “subsidence”?  Here is a typical passage, from a typical
endorsement, sometimes attached to CGL policies:
a. Would any sinking or settling whatsoever of the ground under a parking
lot, say, being built constitute subsidence?

b. What is sinking anyway?  Obviously, it is different from subsidence.
c. Is “subsidence ambiguous?  Some dictionaries define it as a “deep” drop,
at least as one alternative.  Others
describe it as a drop at or close to a bottom.
d.
What if it were 1/10th of an inch?

e. What if it were the contents of a
bottomless sand box?  Bought
yesterday?)
f. What if a dozen different
companies worked on the initial project and it is not clear who caused the
problem.  What if the subsidence
exclusion is applicable only if the policy holder caused the problem, and it
cannot be told which company caused the sinking? All these are problems of
meaning and interpretation.
2. What is “ACV”?
What is the real meaning of this term spelled out, “Actual Cash Value”?  How is this figured?  The phrase is usually-pretty-much-always
taken to mean actual sale value minus
depreciation.   What counts as
evidence or what?  How is actual sale
value of a partially damages complex building reliably computed?  Why can there be so much disagreement between
policyholders and insurers?  And between
the people hire to each?  Is it fair to
treat building which is worth one thing before a real estate bubble bursts and
less during the burst period, but which will rise again in the normal courts of
things?  Should this be true when the
policyholder paid premiums on an property evaluation double what it is during
the burst-period?[4]   How is evidence gathered and calculations be
done for current estimates of a building which has been entirely destroyed work?)
3.
Can a building which has been completely destroyed be restored, as that undefined term is used in many property policies?  As it is used in ordinary language?
4.  If only the equivalent of and/or accidents,
i.e., “occurrences,” is within coverage, what makes something not an accident,
and therefore not within coverage?
a.
Consider this in a FPC:  Suppose a
homeowner had large quantities of a highly flammable, explosive substance in
his garage, where he smokes!  What if the
material is highly explosive and the homeowner not only smokes in the garage,
but also fixes his motorcycles, two or three at a time, and keeps Widespread Panic, the focus of his broad
and focused musical taste at a high volume?
What if he, alone with Verdi operas, is distracting and reduces his
concentration?
b. Now consider a different problem in
an LI policy.  Suppose
an adjuster
believes that the word “occurrence” refers to “property damage” which has
occurred and not the negligent act which occurred somewhat earlier—or a lot
earlier—and which caused the “property damage..”  Can it get any worse?
5. What if a
business which calls itself “The Fun House,” and has a well known business
motto, “What happen in the Fun House, stays in the “Fun House,” burns a good
bit, including all of the picturesque bedroom furniture, most of which came
from the Romantic period, or its starts a bigger fire that spreads throughout
the building and burns the whole ting down.
Suppose The Fun House is situated over a “strip joint,” which itself burns.  Is the insurer obligated to pay for the
property damage?  What if the “House of
Fun” is situated over a casino?  What if
all the establishments in the building are used by the insurer’s in-house
adjusters?  Its underwriters?  Its executives?          (How are these latter facts about “meaning” of the
relevant policy, if at all?)
6. What some
insurance adjusters, all in the same insurer, keep confusing the word “’occurrence,’”
a defined term in the policy which essentially involves the idea of an
“accident,” and word “occurrence,” which is not a defined term and has only to
do with something happening.  (Remember,
in insurance policies defined terms are distinguished from others by some sort
of special designation.  Here are some
typical ways of doing this: italicize the defined term, underline it, or place
it in quotes.  The case just described
turns on this differentiation.[5])  Here is a three-pronged  example of what I’m describing: :
a. The
“occurrence” must occur within the coverage period.
b. The
“property damage” must occur within the policy period.
c. The
“property damage” need not occur during the policy period, thought the
“occurrence” must.
C. Not all
IBF problems arise out of individual errors by “idiot,” “dozing,” “revengeful,”
or mean-spirited adjusters. Sometimes IBF arises out of the insurer—often
through senior “officials” in the adjustment department—establishing an
adjustment rule.[6]  Here are the related rules I saw recently.
1.  Supposedly the Carrier Insurance Company
(“Carrier”) believes that its FPC property policy does not cover lifted (or
uplifted) roof shingles resulting from a hurricane. Thus a roof shingle merely
having been uplifted by even severe wind cannot have suffered physical damage.
2.
Carrier has also prescribed that an adjuster can and should determine whether a
roof shingle is a lifted single simply be looking at it while standing over
it.  Thus, an adjuster must go on the
roof and walk around to perform a reasonable adjustment, but it need not crawl
on the roof or made a close-to-the-eyeball inspection.
3.
Carrier was prescribed that in big storm loss situations, e.q. hurricanes,
adjusters should work much its internal records set forth three reasons :
a.
more insured submit phony (fraudulent) claims after a big storm when many are
submitting claims;
b.
this adjustment method speeds things up and saves carrier/money, and
c.
this “method puts quickly calculated suits in the pockets of honest
policyholders more quickly.”
4.  Carrier believes that the mere ripping of the
seal between a lifted shingle and the wood roof under neither it is not
“physical damage” as defined in the policy.[7]  After all, a torn shingle which is not worn
out will repair itself in a couple of years at most.
Each of the immediately
forgoing involves an insurer creating a rule of establishing coverage and handling
adjustment without a reasonable basis.
This is especially true if the insurer has not really thought about the
problem, has not researched, performed, or relied upon relatively certain inquiry
which is not subject to genuine controversy.[8]  Notice the insurers actions precede any
actual adjustment process.
D.
Of course, something else an expert
on adjustment has to know about, is how reasonable adjustments are conducted.  I will return to this presently.
E.
In the meantime, it must also be remembered that there are lots of other
things expert witnesses need to know, and other terms they have to be attentive
to.
F. Now we come to some really BIG stuff including core principles and
tests.  (This was just hinted at a
couple of subsections ago.)  Obviously, findings
of common law and/or statutory insurer bad faith can essentially turn on these
kinds of principles or results.  These prescriptive
considerations need to be conceived of in several ways as setting forth, as
customary conceived in terms of common sense and then measuring against  industry standards:[9]
1.       The more thorough the insurer’s investigation, the more carefully it is
reviewed, discussed, objectively and rationally debated within the company
(or the office of the high prestige independent adjuster)[10]
2.       The more logical the adjuster’s reasoning in the context of investigation, reporting,
and decision-making the more thoughtful
and reasoned the insurer’s final
decision(s) will be (or will plausibly appear), and so on, the less likely the
insurer will likely be found to be in bad faith.
a. The more
reasonable the insurer’s conduct is the more it matches the opposite of bad
faith.
b. They may
all be called Epistemological-Logical Principles
3. An
insurance adjustment expert should be able to articulate and highlight the
logic-and-reasonableness reasonableness, or lack thereof, of the claims
handling actor and decision makers.
4.       It is also crucial that the insurer have
the right attitude.  The expert witness
(as with claims handlers in general) must articulate the principle “Look for coverage!”[11]                                       a. An
insurance adjustment expert must also be able to formulate and describe how the
insurer did or did not fulfill this standard.
b. The vast
majority of adjusters will do so as well, say, in deposition when this happens
the expert’s function is to trace out the consequences of applying this noble
axiom.
c. A “right
attitude” in this context should not be confused with a mental state.  Corporations do not have mental states; they
have activities which will not happen without a section with an attitudinal
consensus, at least among section leadership.
5.       An insurer under performance assessment
should never deviate from any genuinely fundamental adjustment principle.       This includes the “look for” Principle
and all of the Epistemological-Logic Principles mentioned above.
6.       An insurance adjustment expert witness
must, in most cases, know and be able to set forth how to do this.[12]
7.       The same points apply to cause and origin.
8.       All the same just stated points must be
true for the entire adjustment team—or at least—that part of the team involved
in a given case, up to and including the senior decision makers.
9.       Insurance Adjustment experts should be
able to recognize and explain insurer misrepresentations, no matter how they
occur.
V.
Other Uses for Insurance Expert Witnesses

A.
Insurance expert witness can also be
used in an insurance case for the following:
1.       Explain
the policy, if that is permitted by a court;
2.      Discuss the policy in order to explicate the
idea of “distance” between insurer adjustment an the policy, assuming that is
the real problem (or part of it);
3.       Explain
structures and processes leading up to policy insurance
a.
marketing;
b.
retail agents, wholesale agents and/or MGAs;
c. the surplus lines carrier and its
relation to state agencies; and
d.
underwriting.
4.
Explain a variety of other assorted matters, such as:
a.
the issuance of Certificates of
Insurance
(i)
nature;
(ii) purpose;
(iii)
text;
(iv)
who—may and/or does issue;
(v)
to whom;,
(vi) why;
(vii)
meaning of language; and/or
(viii)
problems.
b. ACORD forms for the adjustment
process—who is and who should not be involved and what should involvement look
like?
5. Can
erroneous information utilized by an insurer constitute the insurer’s
commitment to that false “information’?
a. One would
think so, although obviously it would not be waiver, if unintentional.
b.What would
count as an actionable misrepresentation?
6.  Describe and explain the structure of the
insurance industry, e.g., sales, intermediary group structure regulation,
relations with other types of institutions and “players” (e.g., governmental
commissions, banks, &c.)
7. Explain
facts about differences in adjustment processes, e.g., CGL versus commercial
property insurance, business interruptions versus non-payment of loan
insurance, maritime v. commercial airplane insurance
a.     most significantly: how are different
types of  adjustment done, e.g., at what
pace
b.     how different types of adjusters
usually behave
c.      how different adjustment
departments—those working on different types of cases–conduct communications
with policyholders and others:
(i)    oral
(ii) written: such as
·
denial
letters,
·
reservation of rights communiqués,
·
“You
can count of us letters”
Of course, experts will not just be
describing how all these things work.
They will also often be describing whether various functions have been
correctly or reasonably performed.  This
need not be in a bad faith case, of course.
It is often necessary in complex contract cases, and occasionally in
super-twisted-in-all-directions securities cases, and the like.
7.  Of course, some experts will be good at one
area and        incompetent at
another.
a. Some
adjusters and/or experts can testify about the way intermediaries related to
each other, to different types of intermediaries (e.g., retail agents and
MGAs), and/or to insurers. But  not at
all types of experts to how long it takes to adjust this or that type of specialized  or esoteric claim, the order in which
reasonable adjustment should be performed in a given case, whether engineers
are needed, what type is needed, how an engineer would fit in, what is sound
engineering, the same for sophisticated accounting,  how liability insurers and their adjusters should
observe, track, and direct defense counsel, and so on and on.
b. Why and
how insurers or their lawyers should not expect what might be called “thorough
horizontal knowledge.”
VI.
Qualifying
and Preparing Experts[13]
& Other        Recommendations

A.
Challenges
as to Qualifications:  Often it is
argued that a proposed expert is not really qualified to testify.  Experts are challenged by way of a “Motion to
Disqualify.” They are numerous, but with some witnesses, they get less routine,
as time goes along.
1.
The usual ground urged for disqualifying a proposed expert is that s/he doesn’t
know enough.
2. Often
opponents of the witness argue that the proposed witness does not have enough
experience of the relevant sort.  (E.g.,
the witness primarily has done worker’s comp claims so s/he should not be
permitted to testify in an adjustment case involving Financial Institution
Bonds.)
3.
Sometimes the claim is not just that
the proposed witness doesn’t know enough, but that s/he does not have sufficiently
scientific training or knowledge and/or that there has been no experiments,
and/or there has been no peer review of the proposed experts polished work.  There is a U.S. Supreme Court case, which
some lawyers use as the foundation for this.[14]  It’s the wrong case for challenging insurance
experts.  Nobody adjusting claims is a
“scientist” and there is no science or technology involved.  It’s like complaining that a historian is not
a scientist.
4.
In any case, sometimes experts are
qualified—in fact, in the area of insurance adjustment, usually, if proposed
experts are any good at all they are permitted to testify; but sometimes they
are not.  Difficulties arising in
conjunction with disqualification get more pronounced as the complexity and/or
value of the case go(es) up.
5.
The fact that a proposed expert
witness of some experience has been disqualified completely once—or a few
times—is not a certainty as to what will happen in a particular case.  Judges decide these issues and have wide
discretion in their rulings.
B.      Other Recommendations.  Expert witnesses must be prepared for
testifying, whether in depositions or for trial.
1.       They
must prepare themselves.  This
happens by study, by writing a report (if required), and by rehearsal-speech.  Experts should think about the questions they
will be asked and construct the right sorts of answers and the right sorts of
arguments.  They should avoid humor and
witty sarcasm most of the time and incivility all the time, even when pointing
out the outrageous incivility of examining counsel.  (This must be done even though it makes the
testimony less interesting and more boring.
Well, maybe a little bit here and there.
It better be less than too much, and it better be good.  Usually don’t tell jokes.)
2.  Advocating
lawyers in the case at hand should prepare expert witnesses.  Except in monetarily smallish cases, this
should be done carefully.  It takes
time.  Sample questions should be
used.  The expert’s degree of knowledge
and preparedness should be quizzed.
Videotaping is particularly helpful.[15]  Previous deposition and reports should be
reviewed.  These can be found on WestLaw,
and—more significantly—on association, society, or
common-interest—organizations, amongst lawyers, for example.
3.       Restraint.  All expert testimony should be presented with
restraint.  This is true both with
respect the lawyer offering the witness and the witness himself. An expert
witness is not an advocate.  S/he is an objective authority.  Expert witnesses
are supposed to be characterized by objectivity,
a sense of seriousness, perhaps a semi-academic-like quality, affability, and so forth. Remember the
teaching at all times.
4.       Most of the time expert witnesses should
regard themselves as “teachers.”
5.
Arguably, expert testimony should
have that which might be called a “Christian” quality.  Of course this has nothing to do with
religious or internal belief.  Perhaps,
under most circumstances, an expert witness should not wear a cross or any
other religious symbol on his lapel or around her neck.  The point here is that there should be a
degree of friendliness, love of neighbor (including strident and even insulting
lawyers), and sometimes even a tenor of forgiveness.  (Some might believe that this is nothing but
secular cynicism in disguise. The expert and the presenting lawyer must be
cautious and careful.)
VI.
Lawyers
as Expert Witness:
In
Insurance IBF Cases

A.      Sometimes lawyers are perfect
witnesses.  What if the problem arises
out of the insurer’s General Counsel Office, or the adjustment division?  What if the real problem arises out of the
insurer failing to supervise defense counsel in an appropriate and reasonable
way?  Surely, an insurance lawyer may be
very helpful in testifying about an insurer’s internal guidelines, behavior
rules, and so forth.
B.  Often lawyers, no matter how experienced or
knowledgeable they are, get challenged because they have never been a salaried
employee of an insurer.
1. This happens to me even though I
have given over 100 insurance-related depositions, testified in over 35, or so,
trials or arbitrations, many more mediations, and have published scores of
times, not to mention spoken, on insurance topics.
a. It does not seem to matter that I
have licenses in both adjustment and in being an intermediary.
b. It never seemed to stop, except
for litigants for whom I have been retained before.  It seems to true much more with insurers than
it is with policyholders.  Some years
ago, the last point was not the case.
2. All this happens to virtual all
lawyers who are retained to testify as expert witnesses.  It is even true of lawyers who once worked
for insurers, if that took place years before.
3.
Both of the two preceding points apply to testify as to intermediaries.
4.
Of course, all this happens to all expert-witness candidates, but more
so with lawyers.  Perhaps an exception is
a fulltime law professor who has worked on insurance law for many years.
B.      Then
again, experienced insurance lawyers with enough of the right sort of experience
and/or training are probably as well qualified as many or most actual
adjusters.
1.
This point is true, if for no other reason, than because lawyers have a
good sense of what counts as a convincing argument, even when empirical facts
are central to the decision.
2. It is not being suggested that
lawyer-witness should give these types of arguments.  Rather, they are prepared to recognized them
(and their opposites) when used by the claims or adjustment departments of
insurers.
C.      There
is usually an attempt to disqualify experienced insurance lawyers on the
grounds that they have not been employees of insurance companies, usually in
adjustment departments.   This is an
illogical argument, even if it sometimes works.
If a very experienced insurance lawyer is presented as an expert and
that lawyer has worked for insurance companies over and over again on may sorts
of problem, the chances are that such a lawyer will be at least as qualified to
testify to the issues at hand as employees of insurance companies, e.g.,
adjusters.
D.
Earlier the matter of “distance” was
discussed.  In bad faith cases, the
conclusion may depend upon the “distance” between how a policy is or should be
understood and how the insurer actually understood it.  Lawyers are often very good at this, so long
as they do not come off as advocates.
E
One last thing, lawyers as expert witness have little danger of exposure to
malpractice liability—of that founded upon fiduciary-ness—either.  First, such an expert I not functioning as a
lawyer.  Second, the duties and danger of
lawyers do not apply here.  Third most
states have refused to recognize such cause of action.  Alas, that established may be subject to a
new trend.  It is still a minority,
however.[16]  Nevertheless,
have expert witnessing explicitly included in your malpractice insurance.
VII.
Conclusion
One of the most important things to
remember about expert witnessing is this:
The testimonial function of an expert witness is teaching.  When
testifying an expert witness should regard her/himself as a teacher.  In preparing to be an expert witness, that
person should keep in mind past teachers who were the most instructive, the
most likable, the most authoritative, and the least irritating.  Then, try to generalize their attributes; in
this regard, think about not just you, but your spouse, your kids, your Xs,
your Ys, and your Zs.  Call up you
“brothers” and “sisters” from college.
Now, try to put it all together.
You will be amazed how often the stories and evaluations match up.  The expert witness should be like that.   However, s/he should avoid advanced physics
teachers, actual chemistry teachers, usually accounting teachers, and certainly
those who taught differential equations.
These people are too hard to understand; they go too fast; and they are
usually boring.  Above all, though for
different reasons, AVOID THE USUAL LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR TYPES !  Actual law professors are OK, so long as they
don’t act or talk like it.  As already
been stated, restrained semi-academic knowledgeableness is fine, but ostensible
learnedness is usually not.[17]  Alas, this means you have to avoid the entire
faculty at, Chicago or Yale—and their “family relations”–and a good number of
their mentally-high-powered graduates—namely those who exude it.  (Elitism is a good thing in some contexts,
but this is not one of them.)

[1]  This
is a revised version of a speech-paper distributed at a Continuing Legal
Education program held in the at South Texas School of Law.
[2] It
is advisable for an insurance expert to keep in mind the simple fact that a
term is vague or difficult to understand does not make it ambiguous.  Vagueness and complexity are separate
issues.  (Consider this: the more complex
the policy and/or that which is insured by it, the more likely that some of the
terms will be difficult to understand.
Sometimes engineers or physicians, or physicists, not to mention
chemists, have to be brought in to explain the terms and both its meaning and
its common usage.  Obviously, adjusters
cannot usually do this.)  QUESTION: Is
accounting the same sort of thing?

[3]
Notice again a good deal of this has to do with knowing whether an insurer is
interpreting its contract in an acceptable “insurance industry” way.   As
a general rule, insurers and insureds need to be quite literalistic in
interpreting insurance contracts.  This
was centrally involved in the application of the Ambiguity Rule in insurance
contracts, although it applies to all contracts.

[4] There is
also, of course, another question entirely.
If the phrase is “actual case value,” why should depreciation figure in
at all.  That is a deduction from ACV,
nor part of it.
[5]
This problem can rise to the absurd.  I
have been asked in a deposition for legal authority about the idea that a
defined term, such as “occurrence,” indicated in the policy to be defined, must
be treated differently than the same term when not in quotes, italics or
underlined. Of course, no competent insurance adjuster or coverage lawyer could
make this mistake.  Still “idiot”
adjusters are not the only people who can make this kind of mistake. “Idiot”
lawyers made too, as happened in my deposition.

[6] Of
course some of these people can be bigger “idiots than a bumblers and
relatively ignorant field adjuster.  Here
is an example.  No long ago in a
deposition, a senior adjustment official, who was also a lawyer, was asked to
formulate and set forth at least some of the
rules of adjustment his company formulated and used in any adjustment
process.   Here is roughly what he
said:  “A rule is how a company does
things.” (In other words, it is not a prescription.”  Perhaps the fellow simply confused “rule”
with “as a rule.”
[7] Property
insurance policies—whether residential
or commercial—usually define “property damage” to contain the following
words, or something equivalent to them.
“Physical damages” has occurred if there has been “physical damage to tangible property.”

[9] In this
regard, proving bad faith and defending against it, resemble proof of and
refutations of allegations of negligence.

[10] ?
[11] There
is universal agreement (or close to it) about this principle in the insurance
industry. Of course, like any foundational principle, based upon values, which
is not in the self-interest of the person or entity, there is not always
universal “follow-ance” of this principle:
sometime by accident, sometimes by inexperience, sometimes by
sloppiness, sometimes by “idiocy,” sometimes by negligence, and sometimes by
design.  The worse it gets on this
“spectrum,” the more it is or indicative of insurer bad faith.  All adjusters should be fit and ready to
testify to this evaluation and stating it, or it’s opposite(s).

[12]
Some cases are unusual, vastly unfamiliar, or hugely complex.  In this sort of case, and adjuster cannot be
expected actually to do the calculation.
[13] Of
course, merely proposed experts may need this sort of thing too.
[14] Daubert [MSQ]
[15]
Of course there are document discovery problems right here.  Expert witnesses should not get or retain
videotapes of training or practice sessions.
Lawyers should not save them either, if at all possible.

[17]
Of course, an accounting professor in a business interruption case, an engineer
in a property damage case, a wind scientist (what few there are) in a hurricane
case are all exceptions to this general point, though my point as to
self-presentation remains true, but to a more limited extent.

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Quinn Quotes

Granted, the expert witnesses might be a little more interesting; still, while some mathematics is captivating, some is most certainly not.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact