COURT DRESS: LAWYERS AND VIRTUAL HEARINGS

 PROPER DRESS FOR LAWYERS AT VIRTUAL COURT APPEARANCESMichael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D, Etc., Austin, Texas LawyerJudge Barbara Lynn, of the Northern District of Texas, a highly distinguished district jurist, recently remarked at a significant conference held on April 14, 2021 that it was shocking how informally some lawyers were dressing for hearings conducted on ZOOM. She mentioned the wearing of baseball caps, some forward, some backward.  Her unequivocal statement has touched off a respectful though spirited debate, to some extent online. One position in the debate is that ZOOM-type hearings are by their nature–by their “virtual constitution”–less formal than courtroom hearings and so the judge’s reaction is, one might say, untimely. One of the participates in the controversy stated while s/he agreed that baseball and MAGA caps, among others, are inappropriate, there is no problem about not wearing pants, of any kind or level, not to mention shoes. (So far as hats are concerned, I doubt anyone would doubt forbidding the wearing of KKK headgear. Surely, no one would argue that wearing such a garment was a First Amendment Right.)In any case, I dissent from the arguments favoring informality and for several reasons. My position is not simply based on slippery-slope concerns. First, more formal dress creates at least an appearance of dignity, and that affirmation is an important quasi-worshipful side of participating in the process of achieving justice. I remember pledging allegiance in elementary school, and we were all required to place one of our hands over our hearts.Second, for men anyway, wearing a suit-and-tie or similar outfit enhances one’s own sense of one’s self as participating in something worthy and civically important–justice achievement. I suspect the same is true for many women. (In no case, am I arguing for enhancing a sense of self-importance, as that phrase is usually understood.)Third, appropriately dressed lawyers give clients an appropriate sense of what is going on, although this principle may not apply to some criminal defendants, though not all.  I know from near-personal experience, that the upper class and even mafia defendants fit my paradigm. Fourth, I’m sure that judges of all types, persuasions, genders, and ranks would agree with Judge Lynn’s admonition insofar as it applies to themselves. Who wants to appear before a judge who is in less dignified attire. What worthy judges feel good about providing over a proceeding without anything on under his/her dignifying robe.  I remember that during the most intense days of covid separatism, some judges presided from their bedrooms. I didn’t like even that, though to my knowledge no judge presides from her/his lavatory. (Presiding from one’s “judicial” bedroom is really not problematic, but it shows what a prude with an imagination I really am. One of my colleagues was like me in this “feeling,” especially in divorce cases.)Someone else in the discussion indicated that there was a solution to the no-undergarment arguments by suggesting that judgers adopt a court practice rule requiring lawyers to stand up together outside a table or podium to be viewed, at least at the beginning of every hearing. However, one participant wondered whether judges should require themselves to do the same thing together with the lawyers, even though they are “enrobed.”Someone else went further and suggested that a variant of the Sunday School Song, renamed “Stand Up. Stand Up for Justice” be ordained as compulsory for all lawyers appearing before the court. Yet another argued that all of them should be required to sing it together, the lyrics having been provided by the bailiff.  I thought this last contribution was actually some sort of satire or sarcastic humor. After all, I thought, what analog would apply to judges? (I also wondered who would write the lyrics, though I confess I immediately started to experiment in my perverse mind.)Hon. Jacqueline Bonilla, one of the judges sitting on the panel with Judge Lynn agreed with her and went “further”–or at least, in a different direction–suggesting that there should also be a requirement of proper lighting.  I’m not so sure about her suggestion. Why, in fact, should not lawyers be permitted to adjust the lighting for rhetorical purposes? Suppose, for example, that a lawyer could create a setting in which all of the background to her/his face or hear–and, perhaps, upper body–is completely black, or, at least, midnight blue.  That set would not be disrespectful or contemptuous, and it might contribute to the drama of the process. If done well, I cannot see that there would be any danger of improper discrimination against any race or ethnicity, not to mention gender identity.MSQ

Read More

LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW–MULTIDIMENSIONAL

LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Do you wonder why the recovery approach is called “legal malpractice,” rather than “lawyer malpractice” or “attorney malpractice?” 
I think the reason is that persons other than lawyers can be sued for this and can suffer judgments against them. Why is that when only lawyers/attorneys can practice law? It’s because lawyers have people working for them who can be liable for poor performance or other violations of law within the scope of their work and can be individually liable. Moreover, they can be insureds under the lawyer’s malpractice policy, and–probably–they can have policies of their own. (I suspect that even someone who is practicing law without a license and thereby committing a crime in many states, including Texas, could have professional liability insurance, at least in theory.)

Now, does the term “legal malpractice” apply to a single cause of action? The answer is “Yes and No.” Why “Yes”?  
The answer is “Yes” when we consider how the phrase is often ordinarily used. The answer is “No” when we look at how the term works within the law. 
Yes
Often people, and even lawyers, speak and think about legal malpractice as a kind of negligence cause of action, where acceptable conduct is measured or determined by what a reasonable lawyer would do under the same or similar circumstances, where relevant circumstance might include a variety of things, for example, the location of the act or omission. Hence, when we think that way the phrase legal malpractice refers to a particular cause of action.  Ordinary usage, however, is quite misleading, as well as, out-and-out wrong.
No
The fact is that the phrase “legal malpractice” encompasses several different causes of action, which clients can use to try and get judgments against their lawyers then the performance of those lawyers is legally unacceptable.  Here is a list of at least some of them. Remember: they may apply to persons other than lawyers under some circumstances: 

Negligence act(s) or omission(s) by a lawyer, his/her corporate-type entity, and/or the relevant staff,  

Negligence by a non-lawyer posing as a lawyer, 
Breach of fiduciary duty by either or all of the above (henceforth on this list, I shall abbreviate all as “lawyer”), 
Breach of lawyer-client contract,
Fraud, whether actual or constructive,
Negligent misrepresentations to a client or in a way that reaches the client(s), 
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations
Conversion of client property,
Trespass on client property, 
Theft of client property under the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
Intentional infliction of emotional distress upon client(s),
Violations of securities statutes, state or federal,
Usury as to the client(s),
Violations of lending laws, and
Defamation as to client(s),
Conspiracy.

(Naturally, it should be kept in mind that any cause of action qualifying as part of the legal-malpractice network, but be within or very close to the scope of the lawyer’s representation of the complaining client. Of course, this line is not always clear, although it often is.)
 
Of course, most of these are hardly ever used to justify remedies, although often more than one of them is set forth in a single pleading, where it is intended that only one of them will be used. Then again, breach of fiduciary duty is often a good cause of action.
 
And so is breach of contract in theory, but, for several reasons, it is not used or even utilizable. 
In any case, Texas law governing actionable lawyer poor performance suffers from the so-called “Antifracturing Rule,” where only one type of legal malpractice can be used against a lawyer in any single case. At least, in theory, more than one could be used against a different lawyer when they are both defendants in the same case. Thus negligence might be used against L#1 while fiduciary duties might be used against L#2. Courts have never so much as tried to apply the Anti-Fracturing Rule against the joint use of lawyer negligence and trespassing or theft by a lawyer.
So much for the disorganization of legal categories as applied to lawyers. 
Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D.
Texas State Bar No. 16432900
1300 West Lynn
Austin, Texas 78703
512.656.0503
mquinn@msqlaw.com

Read More

2021 Election Law — Law Firms

 BIG TEXAS LAW FIRMS & STATE ELECTION LAW ALTERATIONSMichael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D. C.P.C.U., Etc.A fair number of large businesses (aka corporations) are objecting in various ways to election alterations in various states. The degree of opposition varies. The following is Quinn’s Model of some new laws or proposed election laws.  “No political party that has any candidate running in a current election shall serve water to voters standing in line to vote, if the position of the voter in the line waiting to vote is within X number of feet within the door to the voting place.”Texas has laws like this pending. The Business Section of the Tuesday, April 13, 2021, NYT is headlined “BIG LAW JOINS FIGHT TO PROTECT VOTING RIGHTS.”  Interestingly, no large Texas law firm is mentioned in the article.Perhaps this is because no large Texas companies, including newly imported ones, seem to be part of the protestorial set, at least not yet. One wonders what life would be like in a V&E-type firm if it followed the example of Skadden, and some others, like Cravath. I guess it’s hard to imagine American Airlines following Coca-Cola, but it’s not hard to see Oracle, Hewlett Packard, Tesla, and Boring doing this. What then?mquinn@msqlaw.com

Read More

ARE COVID PANDEMIC BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES INSURED?

DOES ‘MIKE’S MEET MARKET’ HAVE COVERAGE FOR THIS LOSS?

Present answer: Don’t know. Hard to tell. No rock-solid, damn-certain Texas precedent. Lots of business, economic, political opinions floating about, some posing as obvious and therefore pseudo-certitudes. Everybody knows this. 

Any case decisions anywhere that might give some clues? Yes, but–alas, as one might expect–they are going both ways, though most are saying, “No such coverage.”

THE WELL-KNOWN CULINARY DATING WHILST SIPPING ESTABLISHMENT, “MIKE’S MEET MARKET,” IN AUSTIN, TEXAS TOOK A TERRIBLE PROFIT-WHIPPING IN 2020 AS A RESULT OF THE COVID PANDEMIC.  MMM HAS SIZABLE STANDARD FIRST-PARTY PROPERTY AND BUSINESS INCOME COVERAGE. —MSQ

Here’s an unusual example: In re Society Insurance Company, COVID-19 Business Interruption Protection Insurance Litigation, MDL No. 2964 (N.D. Ill., February 22, 2021).

Read More

INSURANCE AGENT LIABILITY AND BAD FAITH

INSURANCE AGENTS & BAD FAITH LAW

VERY BRIEF SUMMARY

Under Texas law, retained insurance intermediaries are not normally held liable for insurance bad faith, if for no other reason because insurance agents and their customs do not usually have the “special relationship,” as it is known in Texas law. As is often the case, there may be exceptions. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has come up with a new idea with might be helpful to (or have a potential impact on) Texas jurisprudence.  It has been held that sometimes some insurance intermediaries do have a duty of good faith to their customers, although, usually, it is “merely” a typical merchant-customer relationship. 101 Ocean Blvd., LLC v. Foy Insurance Group, Inc., et al,  2021/2021011 (N.H. March 19, 2021).

MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION

Setting aside the rarity of bad faith playing a role in breach-of-contract cases, the Texas insurance law of bad faith does not apply to insurance agents of various sorts, aka insurance intermediaries.

Even the law of negligence–insurance intermediary malpractice–is applied narrowly. Often it is thought of this way: insurance intermediaries are not liable to customers on theories of negligence except when a customer has asked for a particular type of policy or a policy with certain, specific provisions, and the intermediary has failed to provide it, though it was available.  This provision of the law would not be triggered if the agent reasonably attempted to find it but could not, so long as the relevant information was provided to the customer within a reasonable period of time.

Given the way the idea of insurance bad faith is thought of in Texas law, the non-inclusion of intermediaries is sensible. The policy underlying insurer bad faith–the existence of “the special relationship”–hinges on the power and superior knowledge of insurance companies when compared to their usual insureds.

Some have doubts that the terminology developed to refer and quasi-describe insurers’ obligation of good faith to insureds, the phrase “special relationship,” is really informative or is a rhetorical device.

The locution “special relationship” does not fit with most intermediaries most of the time.  Moreover, insurance intermediaries, many of them small businesses, should not be continually subjected to questionable lawsuits, as they might well be if the applicable law of negligence were conceptually looser to them than it now is.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, however, has come up with a new idea the subtlety of which might be of interest to Texas jurisprudence. That court has held that sometimes some insurance intermediaries do have a duty of good faith to their customers, although, usually, that relationship is a typical merchant-customer relationship. 101 Ocean Blvd., LLC v. Foy Insurance Group, Inc., et al,  2021/2021011 (N.H. March 19, 2021)

There were a number of different issues in this case. My sole interest pertains to the court’s holding that there is such a thing as insurance intermediary bad faith. It was a split opinion, on one of the issues decided but not this one. (The “splitting point” pertained to proof of damages, an important, independent issue in and of itself.)

In any case here is the central point about the case for this piece.

Albert J. Bellemore, Jr., a local real estate developer, etc, bought the relevant building in 2006. It had been built in the 1920s. Since the early 2000s, he had purchased insurance from the Foy agency on several properties. Several years, Bellemore had worked with someone from Foy about how much insurance was needed for the 101 Ocean Blvd hotel.

In 2014 Bellemore increased its coverage, included replacement cost coverage, and, at the behest of his agent,  moved from Lloyds of London to AIX Speciality Insurance, a surplus lines carrier connected to Hanover Insurance.

The AIX policy provided $10,000 law and ordinance coverage, a sort of clause designed to cover the costs in building restoration while complying with the applicable law and ordinances.

In 2015 the hotel was badly damaged by a fire. At first, Bellemore wanted to rebuild. The up-to-date building code as regards a building like this one was elaborate and stringent. The amount of the needed coverage in the AIX policy is way, way, way too small. The cost of rebuilding would be $1.1M, in and of itself, and conformity with laws and ordinances would cost another $905,070 to comply with the current building code. Bellemore decided to demolish the structure, AIX paid $910,141.

Bellemore/101 Ocean sued the Foy company for the amount the policy should have included. The basis of its lawsuit was insurance-agency bad faith. To prevail on this the insured-plaintiff had proved that there was a “special relationship” between the agency and the customer, the insured. As the Court recognized, there was precedent for this view, Sintros v. Harmon, 148 N.H.478, 481-82 (N.H. 2002). In that case, the court held that an insurance agent has “an affirmative duty to provide advice regarding the availability of sufficiency of insurance coverage, [but] only when an insured justifiably relies upon a ‘special relationship’ with the agent.”

The trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to a “special relationship”:

“The general duty of care does not include an affirmative obligation to give advice regarding the availability or sufficiency of coverage. However, the existence of a ‘special relationship’ between the insurance agent and the client may impose upon an insurance agent an affirmative duty to provide advice regarding the availability or sufficiency of insurance coverage. An insured can demonstrate…a ‘special relationship’ by showing that there exists something more than the standard insurer-insured relationship between the parties.  This depends upon the particular relationship between the parties and is determined on a case-by-case basis. Examples include an express agreement between the insurance agent and the client, a long-established relationship or entrustment in which the agent clearly appreciates the duty of giving advice, the paying [of] additional compensation apart from premium payment, and the agent holding himself or herself out as a highly-skilled expert coupled with reliance by the insured. Also, a ‘special relationship’ between the parties may exist when the insured relies upon the agent’s offered expert [advice[ regarding the question of coverage, or when there is a course of dealing over time putting the agent on notice that his or her advice is being sought and relied upon. If a ‘special relationship’ exists between the parties, the Plaintiff must demonstrate not only the existence of the relationship, but also that he or she was justified in relying upon the relationship.”

The trial court also instructed the jury in detail about the nature and characteristics of applicable building codes as well as the nature of law and ordinance coverage.

In any case, the jury verdict and the judgment of the court favored the insured. The Plaintiff and the agency had a long, close relationship that involved the giving and the following of advice.  The insured was taken to have proved causation and damages, and so was awarded a substantial sum, and the supreme court affirmed.

(As already indicated, there was a dissenting opinion but it had nothing to do with the nature of insurance bad faith as applied to agents but had only to do with proof of causation, an interesting topic to be sure, especially given the case cited by the dissenting J. Emer’s Camper Corral, LLC v. Alderman, 943 N.W.2D 513 (Wis. 2020).

Read More

Quinn Quotes

Reasonable minds almost certainly adapt to, or change, in some strikingly different situations. When advocates argue different positions at different times, they have not necessarily changed their minds about anything.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

The books shown are NOT affiliate links.
MSQ (site) does not receive any compensation for books listed or sold.
Books are shown for the reader's convenience only.

Newsletter

Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc*., is available as an expert witness in insurance disputes and other litigation matters. Contact