Peg Legs, Eye Patches, Pirates, and Judges

In this case, a panel of the 9th Circuit disqualified a district judge on the grounds that his further handling of a case regarding whale hunting, hunters for whale hunters, and international law would undermine at least “the appearance of justice.”  Institute of Cetacean Research, a Japanese research foundation, et al v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir., Feb. 25, 2013). Cetacean sought an injunction putting a stop to the conduct of Sea Shephard.

A school of American whale-oriented environmentalists attacked a Japanese ship hunting for whales. This all happened south of Australia perhaps relatively near Antarctica. The brilliant Judge Kozinski–up there with Posner, maybe Easterwood, and a couple of others–appears to have written the opinion. (Since his signature appears on it, it is customary among lawyer to infer that he did in fact write it, although he may have provided the best language, edited it, talked about it, or merely read it.

The decision begins this way: “You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch.  When you ram ships; hurl glass containers of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage propellers and rudders; launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how minded you believe your purpose to be.”

Truly wonderful prose! Undoubtedly true, except perhaps in wartime, a trivial mistake–if it is a mistake–in connection with this case.

The opinion itself is also as about as elegant as this sort of opinion can be.  The whaling vessel was a research ship; it had a research permit under international law.  The discussion is learned, educational, and surely correct. There are even dramatic photos.  The Institute had sought an injunction, and the district had refused to grant it.  I will discuss the panel’s reasoning further.  Any lawyer having a few extra minutes will love it, even if they are an environmental lover of the most passionate nature.

The only part of the story I will tell here is what happened after the district court’s decision was reversed. That judge was subjected to stinging criticism.  Here is what the panel wrote: “The district judge’s numerous, serious and obvious errors identified in our opinion [and they were]  raise doubts as to whether he will be perceived as impartial in presiding over this high-profile case.  The appearance of justice would be served if the case were transferred to another district judge, drawn at random, and we so order in accordance with the standing orders of the Western District of Washington. The panel retains jurisdiction over any further appeals or writs involving this case.”

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How Lawyers Should Not Speak or Write: “Amazing,” “Awesome, & “OK”

Many of you probably have already adopted the view that the “near-word” (or maybe its “virtual word”) “OK” is vastly overused and misused repeatedly.  It’s used sort of like the terms “amazing” and “awesome.”   (As in, “You got a C- on this test? Amazing! Quite remarkable!” [Assuming that this is being said to a child who is not handicapped in some way.]) The linguistic corruption or semantic ruination is caused by a combination of over frequency of use and no real understanding of the special meanings of these terms.  Amazingly enough, the phrase “awe struck” does not seem to have suffered the same degradation. In addition, there is no “awesoming,” “He, having been awesomed, tried to see her again. The same is true for anything of the form “She awesomed me.”

There is no such thing as a lawyer “malpracticing” his client.  “Malpractice” is not a verb, period! 

“It would be amazing if Obama’s approval rating ever rose as high as 70% after the computer errors and his false assertions that no one happy with their current health insurance policy would lose it, assuming that the insured(s) had not changed after the “grand-fathered-in” date.” [I hope I’ve got that right.]

If a political strategist caused this to happen, she would be awesome, and should be hired forth by anyone needing that kind of assistance.”

Now for “OK”– a slightly but instructive burlesque:

“I understand that you are upset that, right in front of you, I brutally murdered the rest of your family–good people, all of them. Are you OK?”  How are you doing?” “Keep in mind, I understand your pain. OK?”

Or consider this one, some weaker variations of which might actually occur:

“It’s true, my dear husband, I have been unfaithful to you repeatedly for a long time, sometimes with as many as 3 lovers at once. But you must understand, my dear, I’m actually gay, bisexual, a lover of very special dogs, and a secretive transsexual ever since we married. OK?  Of course, I’ve concealed all this from you for years, and I’ve done an OK job at it, though I haven’t from our children or your mother. OK? 

“I didn’t have to disclose it to your Daddy, since we have been lovers from long before we married.  We met in all sorts of places: closets, back seats of various cars, his office, your office, and even in the middle of the night at OK nearly clean “johns” in various parks. In addition, you were never any good at sex anyway–but even OK, really.  All your girlfriends going way far back as anyone can remember unanimously agreed on this. OK? Are you doing OK?  In any case,  I’ll see you in court, only if it has to be. You’ll be OK. We’ll all be OK.  I and the kids all agree on this. . . . Oh god! Is that pistol for duels in your hand?  I don’t deserve this! OK?  Good thing you don’t really know how to use it, and you’ve said for years that that was OK with you.  Besides, it’s not loaded. OK! Thank God. Still, I know my love, that if I’m wrong and you use it and if the unlikely happens and you actually manage to fire well enough to hit me and if you go to prison, you’ll be OK. Maybe, you might kill me, that will be OK too.”

Is this an amazing portrait of semantic corruption?  Would anyone be willing to comment on this matter in public–even a special, narrow public–be counted as awesome?  What about a person who would assert a declarative variation of the immediately preceding interrogatory?  Should he be described as awesome? No. If he even thought that, he would be nothing but arrogant. 

So what is the lesson here for lawyers who write, e.g., briefs, motions, responses, replies, and so forth? Don’t use the words!  Some uses are so surprising, jolting, and attractive–virtually elegant, really–that they are tempting. David Books did this not long ago in his NYT column entitled “Rhapsody in Realism” on June 24, 2014, at A25. Wrote he, “There is an awesome incongruity between the purity you glimpse in the love and the fact he leaves used tissues around the house and drives you crazy.” (Emphasis added.) This column was about a blog entry by Lydia Netzer, whom Brooks admired, entitled “15 Ways to Stay Married for 15 Years.” I am not quite sure what Brooks meant, but it was not a cliche.  However, this kind of adventuresome prose (or poetic phrasing) should not be used in legal discourse.)

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Ironshore Cyber Insurance Policy

Tech E&O, Network Security, Internet Media and MPL Insurance Policy

Insuring Agreement I.K.:

MISCELLANEOUS PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY  COVERAGE

Part XII: Professional LIability Insurance Again

Remember: This Blog is organized around insuring agreements, definitions and exclusions. Conditions, etc., may be remarked upon briefly, but they often resemble not only so-called “Real World” policies and those found in other currently existing so-called  “Policies for the Virtual World.” It also ignores policy limits, retention matters, notice requirements, time intervals for coverage, etc., important as all these are. As usual, the discussion of everything in this blog is preliminary, tentative, sometimes speculative, and–no doubt–occasionally wrong.

After all, there is almost no correcting authority, and some of the most important vocabulary is both new and diversely defined, whether in clear ways or subtle.  There may even be topographical errors here and there.

Also remember, this blog is about substantive sections of the policy only the length of an actual policy is ignored here, though it is a matter of practical  importance in several ways.  Nor is this blog concerned with policy limits at the high end or the size of retentions of the insured at the other. And so on.

No doubt many of you, dear readers, have grown weary of “Essays on Ironshore.”  It’s over. OK?*No doubt you have found this to be an amazing experience, of one sort or another.* [*/* See the end of this blog.”

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The Insuring Agreement

This insuring agreement is easy to understand. Since it is liability insurance, it involves a promise of the Insurer to “pay on behalf of the Insured all Loss the Insured is legally obligated to pay as Damages as the direct result of any covered Claim alleging a Miscellaneous Professional Service Wrongful Act,” except that I.K. does not cover any portion of any claim covered insuring agreements B and C, assuming the insured purchased those coverages. (The Insurer’s duty to defend is found specified in some detail elsewhere in the policy, and the amount spent on defense is deducted from the policy limits.)

[Unlike other insuring agreements devoted to liability coverage, the “pay on behalf of” component of this agreement is not restricted to Damages that are both the direct result of a covered Claim which it itself is the direct result of a specified Wrongful Act. In addition, in at least one other insuring agreement the last phrase in the agreement indicates that this is a package policy. When one insuring agreement is purchased it need not be the case that all of them are.]

The explication of this insuring agreement begins with the definition of Miscellaneous Professional Service and then turns to the connected Wrongful Act.

Roughly speaking the definition of Miscellaneous Professional Service is any service listed in a part of the “Declarations Page” of the policy, but it does not include Technological Services or Electronic Publishing. [Presumably, an Insured need not have purchased I.K.]

The definition of the relevant Wrongful Act is nearly as simple, although the underlying concepts are deeper and therefore more complex. The phrase means “any actual or alleged act, unintentional error, omission, neglect, or breach of duty by an Insured, or by a Service Provider, in connection with a Service Provider, in connection with the rendering or failure to render Miscellaneous Professional Services for others for a fee.”

[Significantly, I.K explicitly makes clear the Doctrine of Fortuity, since it utilized the concept of intentionality in a prominent place where it spreads out over everything else.  At the same time, breaches of contract are not outside the definition. The concept of a Service Provider has already been discussed elsewhere in this string of blogs. What is important to remember is that one that is covered must be under written contract with the Insured to render relevant services to it.]This problem is one of appearance only.  There is a separate section in which the duty to defend liability cases is set forth.  This fact may be confusing even to the more experienced reader.  The reason is that the duty to defend is usually set forth in the insuring agreement section of a policy. Here the opposite is true.  That duty  gets its own section,  The insurer’s duty to defend in this policy may be weaker than in many so-called real “world policy.”  Most policies of the so-called “real world” require a liability insurer to defend its insured if the plaintiff’s pleading states–or, probably in many jurisdictions, sketches  a covered claim; it does not require that the claim actually be covered.  The plaintiff (and possible victim) can be wrong about what is asserted in the pleading or even lying, and there still be a duty to defend. The liability sections of this policy don’t appear to say that.  It at least appears that the claim must actually be covered.  I don’t see how that can be true, but if I have understood the language, that is what is says.

ExclusionsI have not noticed any Exclusions that are unique to I.K.  Moreover, I have not recognized an exclusion for breaches of contract.  Finally, I presume that the description of the professional service to be insured might itself exclude at least some exclusions.ConclusionI confess that I am not quite clear about what activities might count as “other” professional services.  If the general possibilities that appear to be available by filling a portion on the “dec” page and procuring an agreement from the insurer, they stretch as far as the imagination. This is not true. The Technological Services “exclusion” drives out virtually all of the professional services one would link to a high tech company, e.g., designing networks and lots of other cyber stuff.  In addition, I have understood the definition of Electronic Publishing to be, every kind of informational, therapeutic, or spiritual electronic publication, not to mention preachings of the gospel, etc. would all be excluded from I.K.  [One can almost hear the policy saying, “If you want coverage for broadcasting, etc., and it is not covered elsewhere in this policy, go buy another type of policy, perhaps a newspaper or other media coverage–you know, the type that already exists. OK?”*)Observation: the reader will have notice that the word “directly resulting from,” and its linguistic siblings and cousins appear frequently in this report on the Ironshore policy.  Sometimes in a chain of events which are linked together to create insurer liability the words appear more than one to describe the chain.  These words are becoming ever more used in various kinds of insurance policies but one sees them repeatedly in cyber policies, and certainly this one.

Disputes as to meaning are developing full boar in coverage litigation. See Retail Ventures Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh, PA., 691 F.3d (6th Cir. 2012)

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Cyber Insurance, Cyber Exclusions and Breach of Cyber Insurance Contract

(Cyber Insurance PolicyPolicy) Part I,A

The Ironshore under discussion here, and some other cyber insurance  policies providing liability coverage will contain coverage for at least some breaches of contract.  This is a rarity in most run of the mill insurance policies for the real world.  Here are some ways to look for covered breach of contract obligations on the part of the insurer.

Check the various insuring agreements.  So more than the narrowly relevant one.

Look at the general definition of “wrongful act.”

If the phrase “wrongful act” is set forth in term of being an “X activity [[or] service] wrongful act” look for it there.  Be sue to check the ones you care about, e.g., because you want to determine which coverage to purchase,  because you might try and negotiation and appropriate endorsement, because there might be a price differential.

Get a letter from whomever you use, whether a broker, a risk consultant, or a lawyer.  The letter should be general and particular, where the particular question(s) pertain to coverage for breaches of contract.

This potentially a subtle, hidden matter.  You may wish to use cyber-sophisticated coverage counsel.  You may not want to restrict you inquiries and analyses to a broker or to an external risk manager/consultant.  You need to be careful regarding the selection of counsel.  Experience with e-discovery is insufficient to make sure adequate knowledge is there, nor is the use of a BigFirm that promotes or advertises itself as “the go-to” group for cyber policy analysis.  Private, firm-sponsored “newsletters” don’t do the job either.  Of course, none of the activities and/or presentations imply that the lawyers in that firm (and, maybe, in are relative specialty group) are unacceptable.  

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BitTorrent

I am basically a tolerant, liberty-oriented, and liberal-minded person.  I was delighted to see female priests in the Episcopal church; gay clergy is fine with me; and I have no objection to a Lesbian archbishop.  I even now, under the improbably influence of Brent Cooper, a lawyer in Dallas (who-da thunk it), welcome the prospect of trying a case in front of a jury of  “Millennials”–all including purple haired maidens, women with multiple tattoos in vivid color, and men wearing baseball caps on backward.

In addition, in opposition to all the Yellow Dogs I know–and that’s a lot–I think that most insurance companies, most of the time, are reasonable entities trying to reach a reasonable result that is more or less consistent with the applicable contract of insurance. Similarly, I think that most lawyers–more than 65%–try to obtain a semblance of justice, even in contested matters, even if many of them are far, far, less than perfect or even marvelously good, relatively speaking, in their non-lawyering lives.

It is therefore a personal deficiency of mine–granted one I nonetheless love, honor, and obey–to not just delight but take considerable joy in observing a truly wicked lawyer–an evil one!–washed over by a tide of condemnation. Hearing about a come a uppence is not nearly so pleasurable as “watching”–if only in the imagination–not only a fall from a high place but also a long, trudging  trip on bare feet in the cold, cold rain on gravel roads on the way to the farthest away dumpy house of misery producing, sustaining, and worsening incarceration.

I have gone to confession on this point in which I take pride many times during and since my youth, yet (I do not really try to repent.)  Following vengeance upon the profoundly and deserving unworthy is one of life’s pleasures, like warm cornbread, especially when  you have no role in executing it. (In the current age of massive statin consumption, be careful not to eat too much of it.) Oddly enough, I would defend these wretches in court if s/he have the money* or were a close and beloved relative, like my brothers, my wife, and my children, even if broke.  I’m sure my father would have done it for one or all of us. Even the worse get a defense in the civilized secular world; besides, we have not burned witches in several centuries.

(*The liberality and tolerance I have proclaimed for myself gives out here.  I cannot see how the idea of  pro bono applies since that phrase means “for the good,” and I see no good in this defense.)

Now I finally get to the point.

There is a syndicate of lawyers who are way down there, not far from the lowest of the low.  Part of this is that they inflict suffering on large groups, and will go further if they can. What they do is to acquire copyrights “governing” poor pornography.  They then utilize it to blackmail weak citizens who have downloaded some of their junk.  They do this by finding out who these poor devils are by cyber investigations and then extort money from them, by use of our sacred courts, in exchange for silence.  Usually these victimized ninnies pay what sounds like relative sums, $4500 plus-or-minus, to get out from under. 

There have been at least dozens of these lawsuits around the country using boilerplate Complaints and then settling quickly.  At last various people have represented the populace and triggered genuine court action.

When the courts realized what was going on, they reacted vigorously to some extent with money sanctions and orders requiring what is in effect restitution.  In addition they have required recuperates to report to the courts all other courts where they have been trying to ruin the system and a sizable number of people.  (How does one explain to his wife where the $4500 went when its disappearances cancels the to NYC to see, hear, and sit in the stands for this and then that?)

Thank you Lord, the knights of justice are on the move.  In addition to the foregoing the judges are going to the relevant ethics committees of state bars, to U.S.Attorneys, to state attorney general, and to the FBI. Maybe they should also be going to the right groups that are influential so the “antiquated” provisions of the law of copyright can be discarded.

One of the leading cases is Ingenuity 13 LLC v. John Doe, 2013 WL 1898633 (C.D. Cal., May 6, 2013), Otis Wright, J., and its follower is AF Holdings, LLC v. John Does, 12-1445-9 (JNE/FLN)(D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2013), Franklin Noel, M.J. Judge’s Wright’s opinion contains marvelous charts, maps, and photographs of the “Punks of the Prenda,”–Prenda being the odious law firm of–the central filthy pigs–being led to the slaughters of disgrace, disbarment and imprisonment.  The Minnesota case is far more brief and lacks the visuals.  However, it dealt with five–REPEAT 5!–of these satanically sinful cases.  My first hope regarding the Pythons of Prenda is that they not even have enough money to hire capable defense counsel, not even Harvard’s best.

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Asserting a proposition one believes in a certain situation and asserting its opposition in a substantively different situation, is not necessarily inconsistent. Neither one, taken alone or together, entails advocacy.~Michael Sean Quinn, PhD, JD, CPCU, Etc.Tweet

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